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s a r a h s c h i n d l e r  
Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and
Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built
Environment
abstract. The built environment is characterized by man-made physical features that
make it difficult for certain individuals—often poor people and people of color—to access certain
places. Bridges were designed to be so low that buses could not pass under them in order to pre-
vent people of color from accessing a public beach. Walls, fences, and highways separate histori-
cally white neighborhoods from historically black ones. Wealthy communities have declined to
be served by public transit so as to make it difficult for individuals from poorer areas to access
their neighborhoods. 
Although the law has addressed the exclusionary impacts of racially restrictive covenants
and zoning ordinances, most legal scholars, courts, and legislatures have given little attention to
the use of these less obvious exclusionary urban design tactics. Street grid layouts, one-way
streets, the absence of sidewalks and crosswalks, and other design elements can shape the de-
mographics of a city and isolate a neighborhood from those surrounding it. In this way, the ex-
clusionary built environment—the architecture of a place—functions as a form of regulation; it
constrains the behavior of those who interact with it, often without their even realizing it. This 
Article suggests that there are two primary reasons that we fail to consider discriminatory exclu-
sion through architecture in the same way that we consider functionally similar exclusion
through law. First, potential challengers, courts, and lawmakers often fail to recognize architec-
ture as a form of regulation at all, viewing it instead as functional, innocuous, and prepolitical. 
Second, even if decision makers and those who are excluded recognize architecture’s regulatory
power, existing jurisprudence is insufficient to address its harms.
author. Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. This Article has
benefitted greatly from the feedback received at the Sabin Colloquium on Innovative Environ-
mental Law Scholarship at Columbia Law School, the annual meeting of the Association for
Law, Property, and Society, and the junior faculty works in progress workshop at American Uni-
versity’s Washington College of Law. I am grateful to Dmitry Bam, Justin Steil, Dave Owen, 
Florence Wagman Roisman, Robin Malloy, Zach Heiden, Anna Welch, Aaron Perzanowski, and 
Jim Kelly for their helpful comments. Special thanks to Patrick Lyons and Anthony Aloisio for
excellent research assistance.
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architectural exclusion
introduction
Robert Moses was known as the “Master Builder” of New York.1 During
the time that he was appointed to a number of important state and local offic-
es,2 he shaped much of New York’s infrastructure, including a number of “low-
hanging overpasses” on the Long Island parkways that led to Jones Beach.3 Ac-
cording to his biographer, Moses directed that these overpasses be built inten-
tionally low so that buses could not pass under them.4 This design decision
meant that many people of color and poor people, who most often relied on
public transportation, lacked access to the lauded public park at Jones Beach.5 
***
Although the Atlanta, Georgia, metropolitan area is known for its car-
centric, sprawling development patterns, it has a subway system: the Metro-
politan Atlanta Regional Transit Authority (MARTA).6 Wealthy, mostly white
residents of the northern Atlanta suburbs have vocally opposed efforts to ex-
pand MARTA into their neighborhoods for the reason that doing so would
1. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 571 
(1974); PIERRE CHRISTIN & OLIVIER BALEZ, ROBERT MOSES: THE MASTER BUILDER OF NEW
YORK CITY (2014); Paul Goldberger, Robert Moses, Master Builder, Is Dead at 92, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/30/obituaries/robert-moses-master-builder
-is-dead-at-92.html [http://perma.cc/5EAH-29NE].
2. These offices included “New York City Parks Commissioner, head of the State Parks Coun-
cil, head of the State Power Commission and chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tun-
nel Authority.” Goldberger, supra note 1.
3. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123 (1980); see also CARO, 
supra note 1, at 318.
4. CARO, supra note 1, at 318-19; see also Phillip Lutz, Where Has the Northern State Gone?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/11/nyregion/where-has-the
-northern-state-gone.html [http://perma.cc/H6ST-TQAL] (“[A] top Moses aide at the 
Long Island State Park Commission, Sidney M. Shapiro, . . . acknowledged that the bridges
had been designed to keep out buses.”).
5. Steven Paul McSloy, Breaking the Power of the Power Brokers (Closing Remarks), 9 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 669, 672-73 (1994) (“[T]he bridges spanning the parkway are very
low. . . . [T]he bridges were deliberately designed that way in order to prevent buses of city
dwellers, and particularly African-Americans, from reaching the Island’s fabled beaches.”).
6. See Jason Henderson, Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Au-
tomobility in Atlanta, Georgia, 30 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 293, 297-98 (2006) (noting
that the average Atlantan drives 30.5 miles each day despite the existence of a subway sys-
tem).
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give people of color easy access to suburban communities.7 The lack of public-
transit connections to areas north of the city makes it difficult for those who
rely on transit—primarily the poor and people of color—to access job opportu-
nities located in those suburbs.8 
***
At the request of white residents, in 1974 the city of Memphis closed off a
street that connected an all-white neighborhood to a primarily black one.9 
Supporters of this measure argued that it would ostensibly reduce traffic and 
noise, in addition to promoting safety.10 The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a
challenge to this action, stating that the road closure was just a “routine burden
of citizenship” and a “slight inconvenience.”11 Justice Marshall dissented, ac-
knowledging that this inconvenience carried a “powerful symbolic message.”12 
He wrote, “The picture that emerges from a more careful review of the record
is one of a white community, disgruntled over sharing its street with Negroes, 
taking legal measures to keep out the ‘undesirable traffic,’ and of a city, heed-
less of the harm to its Negro citizens, acquiescing in the plan.”13 He believed
that through this action, the city was sending a clear message to its black resi-
7. See id. at 298-99 (noting that the “racialized animosity towards transit affectively [sic] pro-
duced full automobile dependency for most Atlantans” and that county referenda to join
MARTA “failed under a cloud of racialized rhetoric and considerable movements of middle-
class whites away from proximity to blacks and to separate majority white suburbs”); see al-
so Lawsuit Seeks Dissolution of Dunwoody, Sandy Springs, Johns Creek, Milton, Chattahoochee
Hills, ATL. J.-CONST., Mar. 29, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/lawsuit-seeks
-dissolution-of-dunwoody-sandy-spring/nQr28 [http://perma.cc/WF87-PRJA] (noting
that, according to the 2010 Census, the majority of residents who live in the two counties
that make up Atlanta are black, but the majority of residents in the northern suburban areas
within those counties are white).
8. See infra notes 118-119 (discussing reliance on public transit by the poor and people of col-
or).
9. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 102-05 (1981); Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Greene, 
451 U.S. 100 (No. 79-1176), 1980 WL 339373, at *8-9 (noting that City Council approval
took place on January 29, 1974).
10. Greene, 451 U.S. at 104.
11. Id. at 119, 129.
12. Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He was joined in this dissent by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun.
13. Id. at 136 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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architectural exclusion
dents,14 and he could not understand why the Court could not see that mes-
sage.
***
Why have the Court, judges, and lawmakers—the entities usually tasked
with crafting and enforcing antidiscrimination law—failed to find fault with
these sorts of physical acts of exclusion? The most straightforward reason is
that it is difficult to show the necessary intent to discriminate, especially in sit-
uations involving land use and the built environment.15 This Article, however,
suggests an additional reason—specifically, that those entities often fail to rec-
ognize urban design as a form of regulation at all. Scholarship on urban plan-
ning, which describes the history of city-building, is rife with tales of physical
exclusion.16 And although the law has addressed the exclusionary impacts of
zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants, courts, legislatures, and most legal
scholars have paid little attention to the use of less obvious exclusionary urban
design tactics. Street grid design, one-way streets, the absence of sidewalks and
crosswalks, the location of highways and transit stops, and even residential
parking permit requirements can shape the demographics of a city and isolate a
neighborhood from those surrounding it, often intentionally. Decisions about
infrastructure shape more than just the physical city; those decisions also influ-
ence the way that residents and visitors experience the city.17 
This Article examines the sometimes subtle ways that the built environ-
ment has been used to keep certain segments of the population—typically poor
people and people of color—separate from others. Further, it considers the
ways in which the law views and treats the exclusionary effects of these seem-
14. Prominent legal scholar and critical race theorist Charles Lawrence agreed with Justice Mar-
shall. Writing of Memphis v. Greene, he states:
[T]he peace and quiet of a white neighborhood has been weighed against the 
stigmatization of blacks. The decision to build the barrier issues the statement
that white tranquility is more important than black pride. In the contextual re-
ality of Memphis, the message is as clear as if the declaration were painted on
the wall itself.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 364 (1987).
15. See infra Part III (discussing equal protection analysis in the context of exclusionary zoning).
16. See infra Part I.A (reviewing urban planning literature).
17. See Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
317, 317 (1955) (describing planning as “the process of consciously exercising rational control
over the development of the physical environment, and of certain aspects of the social envi-
ronment, in the light of a common scheme of values, goals, and assumptions”).
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ingly innocuous features of the built environment—which the Article terms
“architectural exclusion”—as compared to more traditional and more obvious
exclusionary practices. Although exclusion is perhaps the most important stick
in the bundle of property rights, and although certain forms of exclusion can
have beneficial results,18 this Article focuses on forms of exclusion that result in
discriminatory treatment of those who are excluded. This Article builds on
Lawrence Lessig’s regulatory theory, which asserts that behavior may be regu-
lated or constrained, in part, by “architecture.”19 Lessig broadly defined archi-
tecture as “the physical world as we find it, even if ‘as we find it’ is simply how
it has already been made.”20 The Article also employs the term “architecture”
quite broadly to encompass civil engineering, city planning, urban design, and 
transit routing. The decisions of those who work in these varied fields result in
infrastructure that shapes the built environment. The resulting infrastructure is
included in this broad definition of architecture and functions as a form of reg-
ulation through architecture.21 
Part I provides a theoretical framework for analysis by focusing on the way
that the built environment controls or regulates our behavior. It examines the
literature that discusses infrastructure placement and design as physical and
symbolic contributors to economic and social inequality, exclusion, and isola-
tion. While these concepts are foundational to planners and architects, only a 
small number of legal scholars—including Lessig—have begun to consider the
built environment’s regulatory role. Regulation through architecture is just as
powerful as law, but it is less explicit, less identifiable, and less familiar to
courts, legislators, and the general public. Architectural regulation is powerful
in part because it is unseen; it “allows government to shape our actions with-
out our perceiving that our experience has been deliberately shaped.”22 This
hidden power suggests that lawmakers and judges should be especially diligent
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998)
(arguing that exclusion is the “sine qua non” of property rights). Some would argue that cer-
tain forms of exclusion have beneficial goals and productive ends. For example, the fence
that allows children to play near a busy street excludes the children from that street, but
does so for reasons that further their health and safety.
19. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998).
20. Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
21. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041 (2002) (defin-
ing “architecture” broadly as “the full range of activities, from building design to city plan-
ning, with which architects are concerned”).
22. Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 2
(2004-2005).
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architectural exclusion
in analyzing the exclusionary impacts of architecture, but research demon-
strates that they often give these impacts little to no consideration.23 
Part II considers the practice of architectural exclusion. It details a number 
of ways that municipalities—through actions by their residents, their police
forces, or their local elected officials—have created infrastructure and designed 
their built environs to restrict passage through and access to certain areas of the
community. Such devices include physical barriers to access—low bridges, road
closings, and the construction of walls—as well as the placement of transit
stops, highway routes, one-way streets, and parking-by-permit-only require-
ments.
In Part III, the Article considers the way that courts have analyzed exclu-
sion through traditional land-use methods. Unlike architectural exclusion, the-
se traditional methods of exclusion are of central concern to modern law, in
part because lawmakers and legal analysis tend to focus on regulation through
law and norms. This Part provides context by briefly discussing the history of
overt physical exclusion by law in the United States. It examines the laws and
norms that led to racial and socioeconomic exclusion from certain parts of a
given community, and it surveys judicial and legislative treatment of those tra-
ditional forms of legal regulation, including racially restrictive covenants, racial
zoning, and exclusionary zoning.
Part IV continues a discussion of exclusion in the courts, but more specifi-
cally considers the application of existing legal constraints—including the
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1866—to architectural ex-
clusion. It provides examples of a small number of court cases that involve ar-
chitectural exclusion and finds that even if legal decision makers were to take 
account of architecture as a form of regulation, our current jurisprudence ap-
pears inadequate for addressing exclusion that results from design.
The Article concludes in Part V by recognizing that architectural decisions
are enduring and hard to change. While outdated laws are often overturned
when the norms informing them have sufficiently evolved, our exclusionary
built environment, which was created in the past, continues to regulate in the
present. Judicial and legislative solutions could alleviate, at least in part, the
continuing harmful effects of architectural exclusion. These might include a
version of the Americans with Disabilities Act that addresses architectural ex-
clusion on the basis of race or class, or the modification of existing environ-
mental review statutes to include an analysis of architectural exclusion. Public
education and engagement could also serve to bring more awareness to the fact
that the built environment often excludes. This Article seeks to serve that end
by offering examples of architectural exclusion with the hope that citizens,
23. See infra Part IV.
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courts, legislators, administrators, and legal scholars will look for ways to ac-
commodate more effectively the exclusionary effects of design decisions.
i . architectural exclusion: theory
Throughout history, people have used varied methods to exclude undesira-
ble individuals from places where they were not wanted. People used the law
by passing ordinances saying that certain individuals could not access certain 
locations.24 Social norms encouraged some to threaten undesirable persons
with violence if they were to enter or remain in certain spaces.25 And cities were
constructed in ways—including by erecting physical barriers—that made it very
difficult for people from one side of town to access the other side.26 The first
two methods of discrimination have received sustained attention from legal
scholars; the third form, which I refer to as architecture, has not. This Part de-
parts from tradition by focusing on architecture instead of ordinances and so-
cial norms.
A. Architecture as Regulation
We often experience our physical environment without giving its features
much thought. For example, one might think it a simple aesthetic design deci-
sion to create a park bench that is divided into three individual seats with arm-
rests separating those seats. Yet the bench may have been created this way to
prevent people—often homeless people—from lying down and taking naps.27 
Similarly, upon seeing a bridge, or a one-way street, or a street sign, many
people tend to think that these are just features of a place—innocuous and
24. The Article refers to this as “legal exclusion” or “exclusion by law.” See infra Part III (dis-
cussing methods of legal exclusion).
25. See infra Part III.B (discussing exclusion through threats of violence).
26. The Article refers to this as “architectural exclusion,” which is a form of physical exclusion.
See infra Part II (providing examples of architectural exclusion).
27. See, e.g., Kim Bell, Metro’s Bench Dividers at Bus Shelters Seen by Some as Slap at Homeless, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2013, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/metro-s
-bench-dividers-at-bus-shelters-seen-by-some/article_fa966d07-8aac-5678-a08a-ab3c4f12a
451.html [http://perma.cc/VEN4-UY6M]; Michael Van Sickler, City Hopes Bench Armrests
Will Deter Homeless, LAKELAND LEDGER (Fla.), Nov. 27, 1997, at B1, http://news.google
.com/newspapers?nid=1346&dat=19971127&id=5UlIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=p_wDAAAAIBAJ&pg 
=2316,1406932 [http://perma.cc/XJP6-TP2C] (“The city is ordering 28 steel armrests for
Munn Park benches in an attempt to keep homeless people from sleeping in the park.”).
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architectural exclusion
normal.28 However, a number of social scientists and planning scholars have 
argued that “monumental structures of concrete and steel embody a systematic
social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people that, after a
time, becomes just another part of the landscape.”29 By structuring our rela-
tionships, these features of the built environment control and constrain our
behavior. The architected urban landscape regulates, and the architecture itself
is a form of regulation. As this Part will detail, although many scholars of plan-
ning and urban design have addressed the idea that architecture can regulate 
behavior, and more specifically, exclude, these ideas have rarely been discussed
in the legal literature.30 
Legal scholars addressing constraints on behavior traditionally focus on
regulation through law,31 which is often termed simply “regulation.”32 Howev-
28. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123 (1980) (“In our ac-
customed way of looking at things like roads and bridges we see the details of form as in-
nocuous, and seldom give them a second thought.”); see also Bernward Joerges, Do Politics
Have Artefacts?, 29 SOC. STUD. SCI. 411, 412 (1999) (describing Winner’s observation that
“certain details of form in bridges, streets and roads are habitually taken to be meaning-
less”).
29. Winner, supra note 28, at 124 (discussing Robert Moses); see also LESLIE KANES WEISMAN,
DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT 35 
(1992) (“[O]ur collective failure to notice and acknowledge how buildings are designed and
used to support the social purposes they are meant to serve—including the maintenance of 
social inequality—guarantees that we will never do anything to change discriminatory de-
sign.”). A well-known example of this concept is Brasilia, the capital of Brazil, which was 
designed to be a highly stylized, modernist projection of the country’s future. See JAMES C.
SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION 
HAVE FAILED 117-32 (1999) (describing the monotonous and anonymous nature of life in
highly planned Brasilia, which lacks a vibrant street life and informal places for people to 
gather).
30. But see infra Part I.B (providing a review of the existing legal literature addressing physical 
architecture as regulation). Legal scholarship addressing disability discrimination has fo-
cused on environments designed in such a way that they are not accessible to disabled indi-
viduals. However, this literature and relevant court cases suggest that exclusion of disabled
individuals is generally due to inattention, rather than an animus toward or intent to ex-
clude those individuals. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985) (noting
that the ADA was needed because disabled individuals had been neglected); Rolf Jensen &
Assocs. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 282 P.3d 743, 747 (Nev. 2012) (noting that Congress
“specifically designed the provisions of the ADA to prevent discrimination stemming from
neglect and indifference”). As this Article will explain, architectural exclusion is often the re-
sult of an intentional decision to exclude.
31. Katyal, supra note 21, at 1042 (noting that “the instinctive reaction of many lawyers is to fo-
cus on legal rules, without thinking about the constraint of physical space”).
32. In the legal arena, “regulation” is generally defined as “[c]ontrol over something by rule or
restriction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (10th ed. 2014). These rules or restrictions are
most often laws. Regulations are often discussed in the context of administrative law, where
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er, as Lawrence Lessig has asserted, tools besides law may constrain or regulate 
behavior, and those tools function as additional forms of regulation.33 These
include norms,34 markets,35 and architecture.36 While many legal scholars have
begun to consider both norms and markets in their work, here I focus on the
regulatory role of architecture.37 The built environment does not fit within the
definition of “regulation” as legal scholars traditionally employ that term; it is
not a rule promulgated by an administrative body after a notice-and-comment
period.38 However, the built environment does serve to regulate human behav-
ior and is an important form of extra-legal regulation.
The idea that architecture regulates is found at the core of much urban
planning and geography scholarship, though that body of literature does not
always describe architecture as “regulation.” At the most general level, it is not
controversial among planning and geography scholars to assert that the built 
environment often is constructed in a way that furthers political goals.39 More-
the term is defined as “[a]n official rule or order, having legal force, usu[ally] issued by an
administrative agency.” Id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (5)
(2014) (defining a “rule” as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” that is created
through “rule making”); id. § 551(6) (defining “order” as any authoritative agency action
other than a rule created through an adjudication); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STE-
PHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 583-88 (2010) (discussing regulations promulgated 
under the Administrative Procedure Act).
33. Law “directs behavior in certain ways” and threatens individuals with sanctions if they do
not comply. Lessig, supra note 19, at 662. Further, the legal process is generally thought to
entail legitimacy, and one can easily discover which entity created a given law and the pro-
cess through which it did so. Tien, supra note 22, at 11-12 (noting that the law is perceived as 
legitimate and “that legitimacy and public deliberation are integral to our notion of law”).
34. As other scholars have argued, norms constrain behavior through community enforcement,
not through some official rule or source. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 19, at 662; see also Rich-
ard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 
(1997) (defining a norm as an unofficial rule).
35. Lessig, supra note 19, at 663 (“Markets regulate through the device of price.”).
36. In practice, it is hard to separate these categories from one another. Id. at 662-63. See also
Sarah B. Schindler, Banning Lawns, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 394, 425 & nn. 212-13 (2014).
37. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLU-
ENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001); 
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Jon Elster, Social Norms and
Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 99 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and So-
cial Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
38. See sources cited supra note 32 (addressing common definitions of “regulation”).
39. See Winner, supra note 28, at 124 (“Histories of architecture, city planning, and public works
contain many examples of physical arrangements that contain explicit or implicit political
purposes.”); see also LAWRENCE J. VALE, ARCHITECTURE, POWER & NATIONAL IDENTITY 3 
(1992) (“Throughout history and across the globe, architecture and urban design have been
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architectural exclusion
over, these scholars generally agree that architectural decisions will favor some
groups and disfavor others.40 Many would also agree that architecture can be,
and is, used to exclude.41 As one planning scholar acknowledged, “[r]ace is a
ubiquitous reality that must be acknowledged . . . if [planners] do not want
simply to be the facilitators of social exclusion and economic isolation.”42 
Despite this deep theoretical understanding of the powerful role that archi-
tecture plays in crafting experience, practicing planners sometimes fail to afford
sufficient weight to the concept of exclusion by design.43 They tend to make
decisions that focus on urban infrastructure needs without considering the im-
pact that such decisions might have on citizens. Nicholas Blomley terms this
“traffic logic”: the idea that planners and civil engineers prioritize the flow of
pedestrians and traffic through a physical space, with a focus on civil engineer-
ing, rather than prioritizing equal access to a physical space for all, with a focus
manipulated in the service of politics.”); Allyn West, Could Glenn Beck Bring Independence to
Texas?, SWAMPLOT (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://swamplot.com/could-glenn-beck-bring
-independence-to-texas/2013-01-29 [http://perma.cc/G2HG-BPH6] (“‘If you really wanna
[sic] pass on the secrets, if you really wanna pass on truth, embed it in architecture.’”).
40. DOLORES HAYDEN, REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN DREAM: GENDER, HOUSING & FAMILY LIFE
(1984) (discussing the role of home design in furthering stereotypes about a woman’s 
“place”); EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE 46 (2010) (stating his aim to “height-
en awareness of the powerful grip on our lives that comes from the political organization of
space as it is imposed from above as a form of social control and maintained by the local 
state, the legal system, and the land market”); VALE, supra note 39, at 9 (“[D]ecisions about 
urban design may also foster mutually reinforcive alienation and empowerment by magnify-
ing hierarchies in the outdoor public realm.”); Katyal, supra note 21, at 1045 (arguing that 
“[t]here is no form of neutral architecture.”). Of course, some may disagree. For example,
Langdon Winner wrote, “To discover either virtues or evils in aggregates of steel, plastic, 
transistors, integrated circuits, and chemicals seems just plain wrong, a way of mystifying
human artifice and of avoiding the true sources, the human sources of freedom and oppres-
sion, justice and injustice. Blaming the hardware appears even more foolish than blaming
the victims when it comes to judging the conditions of public life.” Winner, supra note 3, at 
122.
41. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA LANGE, WRITING ABOUT ARCHITECTURE: MASTERING THE LANGUAGE 
OF BUILDINGS AND CITIES 112-13 (2012); see also The Psychological Dimension of Architectural
Space, 46 PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE 159 (Apr. 1965) (“The history of architecture con-
tains innumerable examples of architectural spaces that have been consciously manipulated
to draw people together or to disperse them.”).
42. Rober Mier, Some Observations on Race in Planning, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 235, 236, 239
(1994) (emphasis omitted).
43. See, e.g., id. at 235-36 (“Race is a powerful aspect of most planning situations in urban areas,
yet it too often is the last way a problem, or especially an opportunity, is framed. . . . [R]ace
should be the first way to frame a local planning or development problem.”) (emphasis 
omitted).
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on civil rights.44 As a result, many planning decisions facilitate exclusion within
cities.45 
Legal scholarship is generally less explicit than planning scholarship about
the ability of the built environment to shape behavior.46 Exceptions include the
legal literature surrounding crime prevention through environmental design,
led by Neal Katyal,47 and some emerging law and geography scholarship.48 
However, there is a trend among some legal scholars toward using architecture
as a metaphor, demonstrating a fledgling appreciation of its power to structure 
44. Nicholas Blomley, Civil Rights Meet Civil Engineering: Urban Public Space and Traffic Logic, 
22 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 55 (2007); see also NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: SIDEWALKS
AND THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC FLOW (2011) (suggesting that the layout of sidewalks is a
form of regulation that shapes interactions in society). It is, of course, possible that some
planners recognize—or even intend—the likely exclusionary effects of their architectural de-
cisions, yet make choices that will result in those outcomes. In the past, decisions made with
the intent to exclude could be explained by prevailing norms. See infra Part III.B (discussing
social norms and racism in the United States). Currently, they may be explained, in part, by
Bill Fischel’s Homevoter Hypothesis, which suggests that most local government decisions
can be understood by considering how a homeowner would want a municipal official to act
or vote in order to maximize the homeowner’s most valuable asset—her home. See FISCHEL,
supra note 37; see also Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtak-
ing the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014) (finding that the Homevot-
er Hypothesis applies in urban as well as suburban locations). Wealthy property owners
have sufficient power, education, and organizational ability to convince their elected officials
to vote in ways that will protect their property values. Id. Thus, in examining why a city
planner or elected official would place infrastructure in an exclusionary way, one should 
consider how a homeowner would view the impact of the infrastructure decision on her
property value. To the extent that property values are increased by racially or socioeconomi-
cally homogenous neighborhoods, this may be the very result that wealthy, white home-
owners desire. See infra Part III.A (discussing examples of wealthy communities desiring to
keep out those they view as undesirable).
45. See Catherine L. Ross & Nancey Green Leigh, Planning, Urban Revitalization, and the Inner
City: An Exploration of Structural Racism, 14 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 367, 379 (2000) (“The
planning field is not alone in its culpability for failed revitalization efforts, but the misap-
propriation of its tools has, perhaps more than in other fields, made it a facilitator of social
exclusion and economic isolation.”).
46. But see Katyal, supra note 21 (describing the use of architecture to control crime); Norman
W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead
Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 311 (2012) (describing the relationship be-
tween “justice and the space in which it operates,” and highlighting a dearth of analysis of
physical space and courthouse architecture in the context of “[t]heories of justice”).
47. See Katyal, supra note 21, at 1044; see also James M. Anderson et al., Reducing Crime by Shap-
ing the Built Environment with Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
699, 703 (2013) (noting that cities can reduce crime by shaping the built environment, and
recognizing that “[t]his idea has received considerably more attention in the urban planning
literature than in legal scholarship.”).
48. See infra note 57.
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architectural exclusion
people’s lives. The metaphorical use of architecture implies an underlying 
recognition—foundational to planners and architects—that physical design
regulates and that the built environment controls human behavior. Legal
scholars use architecture as an analogue in their work with the understanding
that “small and apparently insignificant [architectural] details can have major
impacts on people’s behavior.”49 
For example, Lessig briefly provides specific examples of ways in which the
built environment regulates or controls:
That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the extent to which
the neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible
with a diversity of shops, increases the integration of residents in that
town. That Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionar-
ies to protest. That the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karls-
ruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the influence of one branch of
government over the other. These constraints function in a way that
shapes behavior. In this way, they too regulate.50 
Here, Lessig acknowledges the role of physical architecture as a constraint but
does not focus on it. He instead moves into an analogy that has been adopted 
by many intellectual property scholars: they use “code” as the digital analogue
of real-world architecture to describe structures of and behavior in cyber-
space.51 Lee Tien builds on this work by asserting his concerns with architec-
tural regulation in the context of high technology, describing it as “regulation
intended to influence acts by shaping, structuring, or reconfiguring the practi-
cal conditions or preconditions of acts.”52 And Susan Sturm uses architecture as
49. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (“As good architects know, seemingly arbitrary decisions
. . . will have subtle influences on how the people who use the building interact.”).
50. Lessig, supra note 20, at 507-08. Katyal discusses additional forms of regulation through ar-
chitecture, or design solutions to problems:
Fast-food restaurants use hard chairs that quickly grow uncomfortable so that 
customers rapidly turn over; elevator designers place the numerals and floor indi-
cator lights over people’s heads so that they avoid eye contact and feel less crowd-
ed; supermarkets have narrow aisles so that customers cannot easily talk to each
other and must focus on the products instead.
Katyal, supra note 21, at 1043.
51. See Katyal, supra note 21, at 1042 (“Outside of cyberlaw, contemporary legal scholars and
government have not given sufficient attention to architecture . . . .”).
52. Tien, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing that architectural regulation is “more dangerous” than le-
gal regulation because it has less public visibility and can be used to prohibit the possibility
of certain experiences, thus risking distorted norm formation).
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a metaphor in her work on structural inequality within institutions of higher
education.53 A similar emphasis on architecture as a metaphor emerges from
work on libertarian paternalism. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, for exam-
ple, discuss the concept of “choice architecture” and “choice architects,” recog-
nizing that those who control and create the context in which a decision is
made have influence over that decision because “there is no such thing as a
‘neutral’ design.”54 Indeed, some choice architects alter not only conceptual de-
cision-making structures but the built environment itself, suggesting that they
are in fact quite similar to traditional architects. For example, a cafeteria man-
ager who places healthier food items in a more visible and accessible location
than junk food in order to nudge people toward healthier choices is guiding ac-
tions through architectural decisions. These architectural decisions create ar-
chitectural constraints: features of the built environment that function to con-
trol human behavior or hinder access—the embodiment of architectural
exclusion. In the case of the cafeteria, the architectural constraint is that it is
physically difficult to reach or see the junk food, and thus it is harder to access.
These scholars use architectural concepts in an implicit acknowledgment
that the actual physical architecture of asphalt and steel binds our actions. Tha-
ler and Sunstein argue that choice architects influence our choices only be-
cause—and precisely because—they understand that traditional architects of 
the built environment influence our experience of the built environment.55 
Traditional architecture is not just a useful metaphor for exposing hidden
regulatory systems. It is regulation. Consequently, it makes even more sense to
apply the concept of regulation through architecture to the built environment
than it does to apply it to the Internet or structuring decisions.56 Although this
53. Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 
29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006); see also Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Coun-
termonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1992 (2003) (describing ways in which the design of monuments serve as a metaphor 
for the new federalism).
54. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 3 (defining a “choice architect” as one who “has the
responsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions”); Eric J. Johnson
et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 487, 488 (2012) 
(“While it is tempting to think that choices can be presented in a ‘neutral’ way . . . , the re-
ality is that there is no neutral architecture.”).
55. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 3; see also Matthew A. Smith & Michael S. McPher-
son, Nudging for Equality: Values in Libertarian Paternalism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 323
(2009).
56. See Tien, supra note 22, at 15 (“Although architectural regulation is not inherently associated
with technological change, these issues are raised most clearly in that context.”); Katyal, su-
pra note 21, at 1041 (“[T]he real world may be more amenable to architectural constraints 
than the Internet.”).
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architectural exclusion
may appear to be a banal observation, few in the legal community have dis-
cussed architecture itself as a regulatory tool.
B. Architecture as Architecture in Legal Scholarship: Racialized Space and Place,
Briefly
Although legal scholars do not often write directly about architecture as
regulation, some—especially law and geography scholars and critical race theo-
rists—have confronted concepts like architecture, the built environment, mu-
nicipal infrastructure, space, and place in the context of class and race.57 As one
commentator has noted:
It is hard to understate the central significance of geographical
themes—space, place, and mobility—to the social and political history
of race relations and antiblack racism in the United States. . . .
[S]egregation, integration, and separation are spatial processes; . . . 
ghettos and exclusionary suburbs are spatial entities; . . . access, exclu-
sion, confinement . . . are spatial experiences.58 
For example, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz examines “exclusionary amenities,” which 
are features of residential developments that are generally expensive and that
only appeal to certain demographic groups.59 By including these features in a
common interest community, a developer can deter unwanted potential resi-
dents—generally poor people and people of color—from buying homes in that
development. Strahilevitz therefore recognizes that architecture and design can 
be employed to steer human behavior and to promote desired ends.60 This Ar-
57. For more on law and geography, see generally Gordon L. Clark, Foreword, in THE LEGAL GE-
OGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, at x (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (not-
ing that this is a new field of research). Even earlier, Foucault has been “credited with con-
ceptualizing the relationship between space, architecture, and social power.” Elise C.
Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 442 (2010); see Richard Thompson Ford,
The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1857
(1994); Paul Rabinow, Ordonnance, Discipline, Regulation: Reflections on Urbanism, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE 353-61 (2003); see also Chris Philo, Michel Foucault, in
KEY THINKERS ON SPACE AND PLACE 121, 126 (Phil Hubbard et al. eds., 2004) (noting that
Foucault addresses “the physical divide of segregation and exclusion that inscribes into 
bricks and mortar a distancing of the Other from the Same” (internal citations omitted)).
58. DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW: 1836-1948, at 9 (1998).
59. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437,
441, 487 (2006) (providing examples such as golf courses, tennis courts, polo grounds, in-
home elevators, and concierges).
60. Importantly, he also argues—in a similar vein to this Article—that extra-legal exclusion can
circumvent traditional antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 437.
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ticle builds on this work by bringing light to additional ways in which cities
and communities have used design to exclude undesirable individuals writ 
large, not just within residential communities. We often expect certain biases
in our residential neighborhoods, both due to Fischel’s Homevoter Hypothe-
sis—suggesting that homeowners are more likely than renters to vote and more
likely to vote in ways that will protect their property investment—and our
country’s long history of intentional discrimination and exclusion.61 However,
people tend to believe that the plan and structures of cities are created for pur-
poses of efficiency or with the goal of furthering the general public interest,
and they overlook the ways that design can exclude.62 
Legal academics have also proposed the idea that spaces themselves have
racial meanings.63 For example, Elise C. Boddie argues that places have racial
identities based on their history of or reputation for exclusion, and that courts
should consider this racial meaning for purposes of racial discrimination
claims.64 She further suggests that the racial meaning of a place can allow those
in charge, such as police officers, to determine who belongs in that place and
who does not.65 Similarly, Stephen Clowney has addressed the way in which 
landscapes, parks, and statues create a narrative that often marginalizes African
Americans.66 Despite this recognition from scholars, Boddie points out that
“law overlooks the racial identifiability of spaces,” and Clowney notes that
“landscape is one of the most overlooked instruments of modern race-
making.”67 
61. See FISCHEL, supra note 37 (describing the Homevoter Hypothesis); see also infra Part III.A.1
(describing intentional exclusion in residential communities).
62. See Blomley, supra note 44, at 56.
63. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism,
Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1993) (ex-
plaining how architectural preferences influence and contribute to patterns of racial distri-
bution); John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of
Hope from a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995) (discussing racialized space
as urban apartheid); Ford, supra note 57 (discussing the role of segregation in disempower-
ment); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Ra-
cial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997) (addressing differing legal treatment of racially
segregated electoral districts and racially segregated local governments); Michael Keith &
Malcolm Cross, Racism and the Postmodern City, in RACISM, THE CITY AND THE STATE 11 (Mi-
chael Keith & Malcolm Cross eds., 1993) (discussing “the architecture of power in the city”).
64. Boddie, supra note 57, at 405-06.
65. Id. at 409.
66. See Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built Environ-
ment, 2013 UTAH L. REV 1.
67. Boddie, supra note 57, at 414 n.63; id. at 401 (arguing that places “have a racial identity and 
meaning based on socially engrained racial biases regarding the people who inhabit, fre-
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architectural exclusion
While these authors offer compelling explorations of spatial organization’s 
ability to exclude and culturally marginalize, their critiques have not yet pene-
trated the mainstream of land-use or civil rights law. Law and lawmakers ha-
bitually overlook68 the way that the built environment functions as an express
tool of exclusion.69 For example, a leading land-use casebook has a chapter
called “discriminatory land use controls.”70 This chapter addresses discrimina-
tion against people of color, the poor, “unconventional households,”71 and
people with disabilities.72 And while it addresses tools of exclusion such as ra-
cially restrictive covenants and exclusionary zoning, never does it mention ex-
clusion based on features of the built environment.73 Perhaps even more tell-
quent, or are associated with particular places and racialized cultural norms of spatial be-
longing and exclusion”); Clowney, supra note 66, at 1; see also JAMES S. DUNCAN & NANCY G.
DUNCAN, LANDSCAPES OF PRIVILEGE: THE POLITICS OF THE AESTHETIC IN AN AMERICAN SUB-
URB 4 (2003) (“A seemingly innocent appreciation of landscapes and desire to protect local 
history and nature can act as subtle but highly effective mechanisms of exclusion and reaf-
firmation of class identity.”).
68. It is difficult to prove that an issue has been overlooked, as this requires proving a thing’s 
nonexistence or underreporting. Here, I attempt it by examining places where I would ex-
pect to find mention of architectural exclusion, and not finding it there, suggest that it has
been overlooked. See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES FOR PRESUMP-
TIVE REASONING 119 (1996) (“In some circumstances it can safely be assumed that if a cer-
tain event had occurred, evidence of it could be discovered by qualified investigators. In
such circumstances it is perfectly reasonable to take the absence of proof of its occurrence as 
positive proof of its nonoccurrence.” (quoting IRVING COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 102 
(1982)).
69. See Boddie, supra note 57, at 414 n.63; see also Richard H. Chused, Gendered Space, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 125, 125-35 (1990) (arguing that law has allowed the creation of gendered spaces);
Johnson, supra note 54, at 488 (noting that “[c]hoice architects have significant, if perhaps 
underappreciated, influence, much like the architect of a building who affects the behaviors
of the building’s inhabitants through the placement of doors, hallways, staircases, and bath-
rooms”).
70. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 725-810 (4th ed. 2013).
71. The text uses this term as a catchall that includes, for example, extended families, homosex-
ual couples, and unrelated college roommates living together. Id. at 787-94.
72. Id. at 725-810 (the chapter is organized into five categories, including the four mentioned in 
the body of the text).
73. Id. at 746. The text does quote Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 760-61
(1993), which acknowledges “the disproportionate displacement of African-American fami-
lies through urban renewal, highway, and local redevelopment projects,” but this is as close
as the text gets to a discussion of architectural exclusion. See also DAVID CALLIES ET AL., LAND
USE 573-74 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing exclusionary zoning and stating, “Local governments
are most imaginative in regulating land use in facially innocuous ways that have the effect of
excluding, and all too often been intended to exclude, racial, religious and economic minori-
ties . . . . Among the more common techniques: minimum lot area requirements, minimum
floor area requirements, limitations on multifamily dwellings and manufactured housing, 
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ing, despite the large number of examples of architectural exclusion set forth in
Part II, there are only a small number of cases addressing this phenomenon.74 
Finally, some legal fields have addressed racialized forms of geographic organi-
zation—for example, the environmental justice movement75 and the literature 
addressing discrimination in the provision of municipal services.76 However,
architectural exclusion is different in that it is concerned with the placement
and location of infrastructure that physically separates and inhibits access, not
just disparities in treatment based on geographic location.
Although regulation through architecture is just as powerful as law, it is
less identifiable and less visible to courts, legislators, and potential plaintiffs.77 
While this observation suggests that decision makers should be even more dili-
gent in analyzing the impact of architecture, research demonstrates that they
often fail to take it seriously.78 To be clear, officials may understand that an ar-
chitectural decision could have an exclusionary effect—they might even intend
that result—but they generally do not see their decisions as a form of regula-
minimum yard, setback and other extraordinary bulk requirements, and growth caps” but
not mentioning architectural exclusion); DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION
697-737 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing discrimination but focusing only on exclusionary zon-
ing); STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 295-331 (2011) 
(land-use text whose section on discrimination discusses discrimination against racial and 
ethnic minorities, discrimination based on disability, and discrimination based on family
composition, but does not address architectural exclusion).
74. See infra Part IV.B; see also Boddie, supra note 57, at 408 (“[T]he ongoing spatial isolation
and marginalization of people of color as a group remains a significant problem. . . . [B]ut
constitutional law has mostly ignored this context, except in cases involving overt discrimi-
nation, or where the state explicitly uses racial classifications to draw, reinforce, or create
physical or jurisdictional boundaries.”).
75. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Sit-
ing or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environ-
mental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 
(1993).
76. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010);
Gershon M. Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Munici-
pal Services, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1968); see also Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., 783 F.2d
982 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the city intentionally discriminated against African Amer-
icans by providing them with unequal municipal services, including street paving and storm
water drainage facilities); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983)
(affirming district court’s finding of discriminatory intent where the city maintained a geo-
graphically and racially segregated municipal services system).
77. Tien, supra note 22, at 22 (“Government action that architects social settings and equipment
can regulate our behavior as effectively as can sanction-backed rules.”); see also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 11 (using architecture in the broad sense, stating, “[S]ometimes
the architecture is taken for granted and could benefit from some careful attention.”).
78. See infra Part IV.
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architectural exclusion
tion that should be analyzed and patrolled in the same way that a law with the
same effect would be. Exclusion through architecture should be subject to scru-
tiny that is equal to that afforded to other methods of exclusion by law.79 
i i . architectural exclusion: practice
The architecture of the built environment directs both physical movement
through and access to places. This Part details a number of ways that states and
municipalities—through actions by their residents, police force, planning staff, 
engineers, or local elected officials—have created infrastructure and designed 
their built environs to restrict passage through and access to other areas of the
community. A number of specific exclusionary techniques have been used to
keep people out, including physical barriers to access, the siting of transit and
transportation infrastructure, and the organization of residential neighbor-
hoods. While some of these designs expressly serve to exclude those who are
unwanted, others have that effect indirectly. This Part will examine a number
of these methods of exclusion.
A. Physical Barriers to Access
A number of localities have used physical barriers to exclude. A paradig-
matic example of architectural exclusion through physical barriers is Robert
Moses’s Long Island bridges that were mentioned in the Introduction to this
Article.80 Moses set forth specifications for bridge overpasses on Long Island,
which were designed to hang low so that the twelve-foot tall buses in use at the
time could not fit under them.81 “One consequence was to limit access of racial
minorities and low-income groups”—who often used public transit—”to Jones
Beach, Moses’s widely acclaimed public park. Moses made doubly sure of this
result by vetoing a proposed extension of the Long Island Railroad to Jones
Beach.”82 Moses’s biographer suggests that his decision to favor upper- and
middle-class white people who owned cars at the expense of the poor and Afri-
can-Americans was due to his “social-class bias and racial prejudice.”83 
79. Because of architectural exclusion’s hidden nature, one could argue that courts should be
even more diligent about policing the exclusionary effects of an architectural decision than a 
legal one.
80. See supra notes 3-5.
81. Winner, supra note 28, at 123-24.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 123.
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Instead of garnering support to pass a law banning poor people or people 
of color from the places in which he did not want them—which, if the intent
were clear, would not be permissible today84—Moses used his power as an ar-
chitect to make it physically difficult for certain individuals to reach the places
from which he desired to exclude them. Although in this situation, there was at 
least anecdotal evidence of the architect’s intent, that sort of evidence is often
not available. Instead, our environment contains low bridges that might make
travel difficult for some, but we tend to view such bridges as innocuous fea-
tures rather than as exclusionary objects.
A municipality that lacks sufficient connections between different parts of
the community is often exclusionary because residents are deterred from travel-
ing. For example, sidewalks make walking easier and safer, in large part by re-
ducing the risk of pedestrian and vehicle collisions.85 However, many commu-
nities lack sidewalks and crosswalks, making it difficult to cross the street or
walk through a neighborhood. Sometimes this is intentional.86 For example, in 
his book detailing continuing racism and intentionally white communities in 
the United States, James Loewen describes architectural exclusion in some
towns where “[s]idewalks and bike paths are rare and do not connect to those
in other communities inhabited by residents of lower social and racial status.”87 
If someone wanted to walk or bike to another area, then, it might have to be
along the shoulder of a busy road or on the road itself.
Similarly, the existence of divided highway-style median barriers on local
arterials makes it difficult for pedestrians to cross streets or for cars to turn
84. See generally infra Part III (discussing the evolution of court decisions striking down racially
discriminatory laws).
85. PATRICK J. MCMAHON ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO “WALKING 
ALONG ROADWAY” CRASHES: RESEARCH STUDY AND GUIDELINES FOR SIDEWALKS
AND WALKWAYS 8 (2002), http://www.pedbikeinfo.org/collateral/PSAPTraining/gettraining
_references_WalkingAlongRoadway.pdf [http://perma.cc/HB7Z-B5GH] (determining that
“the likelihood of a site with a paved sidewalk being a crash site is 88.2 percent lower than a
site without a sidewalk. . . . [T]he presence of a sidewalk clearly has a strong beneficial effect
of reducing the risk of a ‘walking along roadway’ pedestrian/motor vehicle crash”).
86. Often, decisions are intentionally race-based, as will be discussed in this section. However,
sometimes decisions are made with the knowledge that there might be a race-based effect,
but with the actual purpose of the decision not being race-based. For example, the decision 
to forego sidewalks in a community could have motivations other than exclusion, such as a
desire to reduce impervious cover or maintain a rural feel, even if the effect is also exclusion-
ary.
87. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 254-55 
(2006) (describing a number of U.S. towns that excluded African Americans, either formal-
ly or informally).
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architectural exclusion
left.88 In Palo Alto, traversing Highway 101 to reach affluent West Palo Alto
from low-income East Palo Alto is dangerous and involves passing through
numerous busy intersections; the area has one of the highest rates of car-
pedestrian collisions.89 The lack of secure pedestrian infrastructure makes areas
more difficult to access in a safe and easy manner.
Municipalities also often use the most straightforward physical structures
to exclude—walls and barriers. Walled ghettos are a well-known example of
physical segregation.90 Jewish people in Europe were made to live in separate,
walled areas, as were Arab and European traders in China.91 This form of phys-
ical exclusion by walls and barriers is nothing new.92 However, it is not only a
remnant of the distant past, but also exists in more modern examples.
In Detroit in 1940, a private developer constructed a six-foot-high wall— 
known as Eight Mile Wall—to separate an existing black neighborhood from a
new white one that was to be constructed.93 Historically, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) provided financing for a new development project only
88. Episode 51: The Arsenal of Exclusion, 99% Invisible Podcast (Apr. 4, 2012) (downloaded at 
http://99percentinvisible.org/episode/episode-51-the-arsenal-of-exclusion [http://perma.cc
/2ZGF-4KVF]) (describing one-way streets that prohibit turns into a fancy neighborhood);
see also Ann S. Kim, Maine Architects Look To Make Over Misfit Street, PORTLAND PRESS HER-
ALD, Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.pressherald.com/2011/09/20/architects-look-to-make-over
-misfit-street_2011-09-20 [http://perma.cc/7NJ2-WCAU] (describing an arterial road with
concrete median barriers that was constructed as part of urban renewal with the goal of cre-
ating a ring of multi-lane roads around the city so that cars could easily and quickly get from
one side of the city to the other).
89. Bryan Goebel, Divided by a Highway, East Palo Alto Looks To Reconnect Its West Side, 
STREETSBLOG SF (Oct. 25, 2012), http://sf.streetsblog.org/2012/10/25/divided-by-a-highway
-east-palo-alto-looks-to-reconnect-its-west-side [http://perma.cc/B8C2-LGHP].
90. See generally Peter Marcuse, The Enclave, the Citadel, and the Ghetto: What Has Changed in the
Post-Fordist U.S. City, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 228, 231 (1997) (defining ghetto as a “spatially con-
centrated area used to separate and to limit a particular involuntarily defined population
group (usually by race) held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society”).
91. GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT 71 (2000).
92. But see Marcuse, supra note 90, at 229 (“Space and race have been combined in the United 
States today to produce a new ghetto that is different from the ghettos of the past and from
the immigrant enclaves of the past and present. The U.S. ghetto today is an outcast ghetto, 
differing in its definition and role from the historic black ghettos in that its inhabitants are
the excluded and the castaway rather than the subordinated and restricted.”).
93. Sarah Hulett, Racial, Regional Divide Still Haunt Detroit’s Progress, NPR (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/09/11/160768981/racial-regional-divide-still-haunt-detroits-prog
ress [http://perma.cc/Z2EN-AZWZ]; Steve Neavling, Wall Built To Separate White, Black
People Near 8 Mile Stays Strong, Colorful & Relevant, MOTOR CITY MUCKRAKER (Apr.
22, 2013), http://motorcitymuckraker.com/2013/04/22/wall-built-to-separate-white-black
-people-near-8-mile-stays-strong-colorful-relevant [http://perma.cc/U66G-UYK9].
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if the neighborhood was sufficiently residential and racially segregated.94 In the
case of the Eight Mile Wall, the FHA would not finance the new housing pro-
ject unless the wall was constructed because the FHA believed that the pro-
posed new development was too close to an existing black one.95 The wall still
exists today—a legacy of discriminatory government policy—and though De-
troit has experienced declines in segregation in recent years, this city is still the
most racially segregated metropolitan area in the United States.96 
Another divider was an approximately ten-foot-high, 1,500-foot-long fence
that separated the racially diverse (though predominantly white) suburb of 
Hamden, Connecticut, from the primarily black public housing projects in
New Haven.97 Although the fence was finally removed in May 2014, while it
was in place, residents in the public housing were extremely isolated from the
94. See Justin P. Steil, Innovative Responses to Foreclosures: Paths to Neighborhood Stability and
Housing Opportunity, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 63, 69 n.14 (2011) (“The four-tiered underwrit-
ing system developed by the Federal Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) in the early
1930’s systematically undervalued racially mixed neighborhoods and strongly discouraged
lending in integrated or primarily non-white communities. The Federal Housing Authori-
ty . . . express[ed] concern about the impact of ‘incompatible racial or nationality groups’ on
property values and stating that, ‘if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.’” (quoting
GREGORY SQUIRES, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES IN BLACK AND WHITE 53 (1994))). See gener-
ally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 203-18 (1985) (describing FHA and loan
programs).
95. Hulett, supra note 93.
96. See John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New
Findings from the 2010 Census, US2010 PROJECT 6 (2011), http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010
/Data/Report/report2.pdf [http://perma.cc/CVG4-K47D] (ranking the Detroit metropolitan
area number one in black-white segregation while noting that Detroit “had substantial de-
clines in segregation for the first time since 1980,” which “coincided with very substantial
declines in the central city black population[] . . . as part of the fallout from the recession
and foreclosure crisis”); see also Kyle Vanhemert, The Best Map Ever Made of America’s Racial
Segregation, WIRED (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/08/how
-segregated-is-your-city-this-eye-opening-map-shows-you [http://perma.cc/YBR7-QGUV]
(describing comprehensive maps made by a University of Virginia researcher using 2010
U.S. Census data to illustrate the racial makeup of major metropolitan areas, including one
for Detroit that depicts Eight Mile Road as a “sharp racial dividing line”).
97. Sari Bashi, Bad Fences, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 13 (noting that ninety percent of the
residents in the housing project are African-American, while seventy-seven percent of resi-
dents in Hamden are white); Benjamin Mueller, In Connecticut, Breaking a Barrier Between a
Suburb and Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07
/12/nyregion/in-connecticut-breaking-barrier-between-a-suburb-and-public-housing.html
[http://perma.cc/HNJ9-EAZX] (noting that the wall was 1500 feet long and twelve feet
high).
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architectural exclusion
surrounding community.98 In order “to buy groceries at a Hamden shopping
center three miles away,” the public housing residents would “have to travel
into New Haven to get around the fence, a 7.7-mile trip that takes two buses
and up to two hours to complete.”99 The fence was originally erected by the
city of Hamden in the 1950s to keep crime in the New Haven projects out of
Hamden.100 As recently as 2012, calls to remove the fence were met with re-
sistance from Hamden residents who “described the robberies and traffic over-
flow they said would result from opening the fence.”101 Hamden agreed to re-
move the fence only after the New Haven Housing Authority threatened to
“sue Hamden on civil rights grounds.”102 A similar eight-foot-tall spiked fence
was installed in 1998 around a public housing project in Hollander Ridge in
Baltimore.103 This fence, which was constructed by the local housing authority
with funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), blocked access to and through Rosedale, a contiguous, mostly white
neighborhood.104 The Rosedale residents wanted the fence to keep out crime
and keep their property values up, and “there was a not insubstantial vocal
segment of the Rosedale whose racist views were made readily apparent.”105 
98. Bashi, supra note 97 (“Because of the fence, West Rock is one of the country’s most isolated
public housing projects. There is only one road out, and it winds past a university, a ceme-
tery, and an Army Reserve office before reaching city streets.”).
99. Paul Bass, New Haven-Hamden “Berlin Wall” Coming Down, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (May
4, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/new
_haven-hamden_berlin_wall_coming_down [http://perma.cc/M638-G65R]; Ben Mueller,
What Doesn’t Love a Wall, 45 NEW J., (2012), http://www.thenewjournalatyale.com/2012/12
/what-doesnt-love-a-wall [http://perma.cc/C8UK-GKYU].
100. Bass, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Associated Press, Hamden-New Haven Fence To Come Down Today, NBC CONN. (May 12,
2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Hamden-New-Haven-Fence
-to-Come-Down-Monday-258827651.html [http://perma.cc/2BST-CTD6]; see also Bass, su-
pra note 99 (“The federal government began a civil-rights investigation that could lead to a
lawsuit against the town of Hamden over the fence, and prevent the town from receiving
any federal money.”).
103. Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 428 (D. Md. 2005). 
104. Id. at 404, 427, 428 (stating that plaintiffs, African-American residents of public housing in
Baltimore County, asserted that the local housing authority’s practices resulted in segrega-
tion and discrimination in violation of their Equal Protection rights).
105. Id. at 429, n.56; see also Daniel D’Oca, Perimeter Fence, ARSENAL EXCLUSION & INCLUSION
(Aug. 8, 2010, 10:51 AM), http://arsenalofexclusion.blogspot.com/2010/08/perimeter-fence
.html [http://perma.cc/EZ6S-AWJ4]; Erin Texeira, Plans To Fence in Hollander Ridge
Killed[;] HUD Officials Refuse To Help City, County Pay for the Project, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 
1996, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-08-28/news/1996241031_1_hollander-build-a
-fence-rosedale [http://perma.cc/MLT4-YNUV] (“After residents in Rosedale . . . com-
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Another common version of this phenomenon is one of the most obvious
forms of architectural exclusion: the walls, gates, and guardhouses of gated
communities.106 These architectural features serve to keep out those who are
not expressly allowed in.107 Although these walls are generally put in place by
private developers to keep out those whom they do not want to access their
communities, local governments have the power to prohibit these barriers. And
while some cities have taken action to actively outlaw gated communities,108 
most have not.109 
Local governments also take affirmative steps to install exclusionary archi-
tecture themselves. Often, cities use barriers and blockades to mold traffic pat-
terns. For example, the concrete barriers and bollards that exist throughout the
streets of Berkeley, California, were installed to calm traffic;110 however, the
plained about rising crime and decreased property values in their middle-class neighbor-
hood, city and county officials agreed to help pay for an 8-foot-high wrought-iron fence.”).
106. See generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COM-
MUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (discussing municipal debates surrounding gated
communities); Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse
of Urban Fear, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45, 45 (2001) (noting that gated communities cre-
ate “a landscape that encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/gender) seg-
regation more permanently in the built environment”).
107. See Jerry L. Anderson et al., A Study of American Zoning Board Composition and Public Atti-
tudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689, 710 (2008) (“Historically, gated communities
have been seen as mostly white professional enclaves, contributing to social segregation by
race and class.”); Steven Siegel, The Public Interest and Private Gated Communities: A Com-
prehensive Approach to Public Policy That Would Discourage the Establishment of New Gated 
Communities and Encourage the Removal of Gates from Existing Private Communities, 55 LOY. L.
REV. 805, 811 (2009) (“Although gated communities are subject to general federal and state
nondiscrimination laws, these communities nevertheless have been found to be ‘succe[ssful] 
in keeping out minorities and large families.’” (footnote omitted)).
108. See, e.g., LA HABRA HEIGHTS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 7.3.20(E)(2) (2013), http://
www.codepublishing.com/ca/lahabraheights [http://perma.cc/AG4V-QTV7] (prohibiting
“[g]ates or guardhouses that restrict access to residential neighborhoods, subdivisions, and
multi-lot developments” in the Residential-Agricultural Zone); CARRBORO, N.C., LAND USE 
ORDINANCE art. X, § 15-149(c)(6) (1980) (prohibiting “[c]onstruction of gates that 
prevent access to private roads serving five or more lots or dwelling units”); 2012 
Comprehensive Plan, GROWTH PLAN. COMM. 101 (June 12, 2012), https://www1.maine.gov
/dacf/municipalplanning/comp_plans/Kennebunkport_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD55
-HHCA] (“Gated communities are not in keeping with the character of Kennebunkport.”).
109. See Howard Blume, La Habra Heights Shuts the Gates : Privacy: Council Majority Calls Action
To Bar Gated Communities a Stand Against Elitism. Real Estate Industry Leaders Express Dis-
may., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-09-20/news/hl-1019_1_
la-habra-heights [http://perma.cc/Q94N-KH6M] (noting the rarity of municipal bans on
gated communities).
110. See Transp. Div., Traffic Calming in Berkeley, CITY BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us
/contentdisplay.aspx?id=8238 [http://perma.cc/2ZJG-XQMT] (noting that traffic diverters
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architectural exclusion
barriers do this by preventing people from driving down the streets on which
they are placed. In Shaker Heights, Ohio, the city installed a “traffic diverter,”
which was called “the Berlin Wall for black people” by nearby neighbors in
Cleveland.111 In some communities, the purpose of rerouting traffic is to inhibit
harmful behaviors tied to drugs and crime. Concrete barriers were put in place
near the highways of Bridgeport, Connecticut, to block quick access into the
city by those who wanted to buy drugs.112 The strategy, according to police,
was that “buyers would fear ‘driving all over looped streets, stopping and turn-
ing around, trying to find drugs with the possibility of having their nice cars,
their jewelry, their money ripped off as they look.’”113 A similar technique was
implemented in Los Angeles, which put traffic barriers in place on certain
streets that allegedly provided quick escape routes for gang members who had
committed crimes.114 
In all these instances, the barriers and road closures were instituted, in-
stalled, and approved based on their purported relationship to public health
and safety. While these barriers are often related to traffic, they have marked
secondary effects: they often intentionally restrict access by a certain class of
individuals (here, drug dealers and “johns”). They also make access more diffi-
cult for those unfamiliar with the area—not just those bad actors who the local-
ity wants to keep out, but any outsider. It is quite possible that these architec-
tural decisions contribute to racial or socioeconomic change in the
were first installed in the mid-1960s “to keep through-traffic from running alongside San
Pablo Park” and that Berkeley’s City Council adopted a Traffic Management Plan in 1975,
which resulted in the installation of many additional diverters and street barriers).
111. Douglas Martin, Fence Is Not Neighborly in a Suburb of Cleveland, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/27/us/fence-is-not-neighborly-in-a-suburb-of-cleveland
.html [http://perma.cc/V9E3-PUJA] (“The barricade and three others like it were erected by
Shaker Heights in 1976 in the name of traffic control but were immediately perceived as
something quite different by some Clevelanders.”).
112. See Joel Epstein & Santiago Sifre, Bridgeport: Cutting off Access by the Suburban User: Final
Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, ABT ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED 4 (Sept.
15, 1993), http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research-Digital-Library/clinton-
admin-history-project/41-50/Box-50/1504630-ondcp-crime-violence-law-enforcement-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FNA2-HGNG].
113. Katyal, supra note 21, at 1049 n.31. In fact, one year after these barriers were erected, a quali-
tative ethnographic study of East Bridgeport revealed that open-air drug deals were still
prevalent throughout the area. See Epstein & Sifre, supra note 112, at 8-10. The study
showed that drivers responded by parking their cars and walking to buy drugs, and any
curbed drug sales often just pushed drug dealers “to go to where the heat is not.” Id. at 10.
114. Katyal, supra note 21, at 1070 (noting that after placing those barriers, assaults and homi-
cides decreased). In North London, the city closed off a number of roads in order to de-
crease prostitution-related traffic, which resulted in a decrease in crime and a more peaceful
neighborhood. Id.
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neighborhoods.115 Katyal notes that traffic measures implemented in North
London resulted in a neighborhood transformed “from a noisy and hazardous
‘red light’ district into a relatively tranquil residential area.”116 The possibility
of transformation as a result of architecture raises a related question: where did
the people who were using these streets prior to the architectural intervention
go? Presumably, they were pushed to a different—possibly less affluent—part
of town.117 This suggests that the area from which they were expunged may
have had residents with sufficient political capital to organize and make this
change happen.
B. Transit
Communities also engage in architectural exclusion in the way they design
and place public transit and transportation infrastructure. The siting of bus
stops and subway stations changes the built environment. These routing deci-
sions and patterns have a dramatic impact on the mobility of individuals
through, and the accessibility of, different areas of the community.118 Further,
transit siting and infrastructure decisions are often implemented with the in-
tention of making it more difficult for certain groups of people to access certain
parts of the community.119 This section will provide examples of these exclu-
sionary transportation design decisions.
115. Of course, these structures might also be put in place to preserve the status quo in a neigh-
borhood that wants to maintain its current state. And although exclusionary infrastructure
also affects local residents, who must often take a longer way around and thus may be seen
as over-inclusive, many residents are fine with that result, so long as it keeps out “unde-
sired” visitors. See LOEWEN, supra note 87, at 254 (noting that residents of one “New York
city suburb ‘would rather bear the inconvenience of narrow and congested streets on a day-
by-day basis than make it easier for the inhabitants of New York City to reach the town.’”).
116. Katyal, supra note 21, at 1070.
117. A study revealed that efforts by the City of Bridgeport to curb drug dealing and violence
through building demolition and road closures resulted in forcing the drug trade from one
side of a neighborhood project to the other. See Epstein & Sifre, supra note 112, at 8-10.
118. Regina Austin, “Not Just for the Fun of It!”: Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, Social
Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 669 (1998) (“[T]he re-
straints may operate not on a leisure activity itself, but on the mobility required to engage in
the activity. For example, the routing patterns of some urban public transportation systems
deliberately make it difficult for central-city residents to get to outlying leisure venues like 
shopping malls and beaches.”).
119. Id.; see also Thomas Sanchez et al., Moving to Equity: Addressing Inequitable Effects of
Transportation Policies on Minorities, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARV. UNIV 14 (2003), http://
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/metro-and-regional-inequalities/transportation/moving
-to-equity-addressing-inequitable-effects-of-transportation-policies-on-minorities/sanchez
-moving-to-equity-transportation-policies.pdf [http://perma.cc/DRZ4-L9AH]; Jerett Yan,
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architectural exclusion
1. Placement of Transit Stops
A present-day example of architectural exclusion comes in the form of deci-
sions about where to place transit stops. Throughout the United States, many
moderate- and high-income individuals travel—to their jobs, to events, to see
friends, and to shop—in a private vehicle.120 In contrast, although people of all
socioeconomic groups use public transit—buses, subways, and light rail—in
larger metropolitan areas, low-income people and people of color often rely
more heavily on public transportation than people from other groups.121 Those
individuals therefore have a hard time reaching areas that are underserved by
transit.
Because there are a number of benefits to living near a transit stop,122 the
Homevoter Hypothesis suggests that homeowners will readily lobby for
Comment, Rousing the Sleeping Giant: Administrative Enforcement of Title VI and New Routes
to Equity in Transit Planning, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2013) (“The overt de jure discrim-
ination Plessy and Parks faced is largely a relic of this nation’s past; however, transit-related
disparities endure. Today, transit policy tends to favor higher-income transit riders over
lower-income transit riders, and suburbs over cities.”).
120. White people are also more likely to own cars than people of color. See, e.g., Sanchez et al., 
supra note 119, at vii (“Just 7 percent of white households do not own a car, compared with
24 percent of African-American households, 17 percent of Latino households, and 13 percent
of Asian-American households.”).
121. Id. (“Nationally, public transportation users are disproportionately minorities with low to
moderate incomes. Overall, public transit users are 45 percent white, 31 percent African
American, and 18 percent Latino/Hispanic.”); see also Adie Tomer et al., Missed Opportunity: 
Transit and Jobs in Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS INST. 9 (May 2011), http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/12%20jobs%20and%20transit/05 
12_jobs_transit.pdf [http://perma.cc/VZJ2-37JM?type=pdf] (“[L]ow-income people are less
likely to own cars and depend more on transit than other groups.”); Mark Garrett & Brian
Taylor, Reconsidering Social Equity in Public Transit, 13 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 6, 13 (1999)
(“[C]ity residents tend to be poorer, mostly minority, and more transit dependent than
suburbanites.”).
122. In addition to providing mobility options to those who are unable to drive due to age, con-
dition, or financial reasons, transit hubs aid those in private vehicles by “freeing up scarce
freeway space or making it easier for babysitters, house cleaners, or other car-less service
providers to reach their homes.” Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 487. Further, perhaps coun-
ter-intuitively, some studies have shown that areas directly surrounding mass transit have
reduced crime rates. See, e.g., Richard Block & Carolyn Rebecca Block, The Bronx and Chica-
go: Street Robbery in the Environs of Rapid Transit Stations, in ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS:
FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE 137, 147-48 (Victor Goldsmith et al. eds., 2000) (research based on
the Bronx and Chicago). However, there is also some evidence that bus stop locations have
been tied to crime, though this research suggests that crime is more tied to the area around
the stop rather than to the existence of the stop itself. See Katyal, supra note 21, at 1095 n.210
(“The location of the bus stop was found to be a critical factor in predicting the crime rate; 
for example, those bus stops near porous alleys had crime rates that were approximately
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them.123 However, many communities actively push their elected decision mak-
ers not to bring transit stops to their neighborhoods. Research shows that the 
opposition to transit is often motivated by the desire to block access by certain
“undesirable” people who ride transit (for example, people of color and the 
poor).124 As one scholar acknowledged, “race has been a factor limiting the ge-
ography of transit.”125 For example, wealthy white residents of suburban Atlan-
ta, Georgia,126 suburban San Francisco, California,127 and Washington, D.C.,128 
have organized to oppose the locating of transit stops in their communities, at
least in part because transit would enable people who live in poorer areas of the
cities to easily access these wealthier areas.129 Although the decision to locate a
transit hub is typically made by elected local officials, those officials often act at 
the behest of their constituents.130 When a locality is successful in its opposi-
tion, people who rely on transit to get around will not have access to those
communities.131 
double those of stops not near alleys. . . . Bus stops near vacant lots also had crime rates at 
least double those of stops not near such lots.” (citations omitted)).
123. See FISCHEL, supra note 37 (describing the Homevoter Hypothesis).
124. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 6, at 299-300 (“In suburban Cobb County[, Atlanta], the
chairman of a local anti-tax organization declared that ‘M[etropolitan] A[tlanta] R[egional]
T[ransit] A[uthority]-style mass transit would lead to an increase in crime and the construc-
tion of low-income housing in Cobb County[.]’” (citation omitted)). Henderson’s research
on transit in Atlanta involved interviews with elected officials and planners; he noted that
“[m]ost interviewees for this research acknowledged that white racism complicated deci-
sion-making about transit. Suburban elected officials acknowledged that a substantial por-
tion of their constituents held racist views. One county official mentioned that at public
meetings in her Atlanta suburb, residents loudly protested against the MARTA bus service
because blacks would steal TVs[.]” Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Ross & Leigh, supra note 45, at 377. 
127. Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 488 n.163 (“Some white suburbs of San Francisco opted out of
the Bay Area Rapid Transit system, fearing it might encourage African Americans to move 
in.”).
128. Id. at 487-88.
129. Id. (“[I]n the process of planning the Washington, D.C., subway, citizens in various rela-
tively affluent areas opposed the establishment of subway stations because of concerns that
inner city denizens would ride the subways into their neighborhoods. Affluent neighbor-
hoods in other parts of the country have done likewise, foregoing otherwise desirable in-
vestments in valuable amenities like well-maintained public roads, parks, and even street
signs because of fears that such amenities would attract undesirables.”).
130. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 37.
131. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 6, at 300 (“A couple in the exurban sprawl north of Atlanta
stated that they moved to the county because they felt mass transit would never come there,
and that ‘transit makes areas accessible for lower-income families that could otherwise not 
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architectural exclusion
As one scholar notes, “public transportation continues to be routed in a
way that makes it difficult for some blacks to get to and from leisure venues
that more affluent or more mobile persons freely enjoy.”132 While particular in-
dividuals’ lack of access to any area is troubling, transit-siting decisions are also
intimately connected to employment opportunities for minorities and low-
income individuals.133 Decisions to exclude transit stops (and those who use
them) from parts of the suburbs mean that many workers who would accept 
minimum-wage jobs in the suburbs cannot physically access those jobs.134 For
example, although many jobs in the Detroit suburbs lack sufficient workers,
the city and the suburbs have not coordinated their public transportation sys-
tems. Thus, those who live in the inner city—and who are mostly black— 
cannot easily access suburban jobs, which are located in areas that are mostly
white.135 Similarly, employers in some suburban Atlanta areas were forced to
pay higher than their typical near-minimum wage to attract retired and teenage
workers from the surrounding community because lower-income people living
in the central city could not easily access the jobs.136 Residents and policymak-
ers in those areas have rejected proposals to bring Atlanta’s rapid transit net-
work (MARTA) into their communities, which would have allowed inner-city
workers easy access to these suburban jobs via public transit.137 The inability to
come out here because they don’t have transportation and that’s good[.]’” (citation omit-
ted)).
132. Austin, supra note 118, at 682.
133. Dr. Martin Luther King recognized this fact when he stated, “Urban transit systems in most
American cities . . . have become a genuine civil rights issue—and a valid one—because the
layout of rapid-transit systems determines the accessibility of jobs to the black community. 
If transportation systems in American cities could be laid out so as to provide an opportuni-
ty for poor people to get meaningful employment, then they could begin to move into the 
mainstream of American life.” Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, PLAYBOY, Jan. 
1969, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MAR-
TIN LUTHER KING, JR. 313, 325 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1991).
134. See, e.g., Ross & Leigh, supra note 45, at 376-77; see also MICHAEL J. AUSTIN ET AL., SERVING
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES IN POVERTY NEIGHBORHOODS USING PROMISING PROGRAMS AND 
PRACTICES: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR REDESIGNING PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT SOCIAL
SERVICES 106-07 (2004), http://cssr.berkeley.edu/pdfs/lowIncomeFam.pdf [http://perma
.cc/WDK2-3SB8?type=live] (“Many low-income parents must rely on public transportation
to get to their jobs. As more and more employment opportunities move to suburban areas,
while low-income workers remain in urban areas, the use of public transportation becomes
more problematic.”).
135. Ross & Leigh, supra note 45, at 376-77 (noting that seventy-six percent of inner-city resi-
dents were black while ninety-one percent of suburban residents were white).
136. Id. at 377.
137. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 299 (discussing Atlanta, and noting that whites rejecting
MARTA and relying on automobiles “enabled physical secession to outer suburban areas
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use public transit to access the suburbs is one of the primary barriers prevent-
ing black people from obtaining suburban jobs.138 Moreover, as more low-
income individuals move to the suburbs, they face continued difficulty access-
ing jobs in their communities due to the lack of transit options within subur-
ban communities.139 
Sometimes transit will allow a person to get close to a given area, but not
all the way there, leaving the rider in a dangerous situation.140 This was the
scenario faced by Cynthia Wiggins, a seventeen-year-old woman who was hit
and killed by a dump truck while she was attempting to cross a seven-lane
highway to get to the mall where she worked.141 Wiggins took the bus from the
inner city, where she lived, to her job at the suburban mall.142 However, the
mall’s owners had actively resisted requests to allow the bus to stop on its
property; rather, the bus stopped outside the mall on the other side of the large 
highway.143 Documents produced during trial revealed that this transit-siting
decision was motivated at least in part by race or class bias; a local transport of-
ficial wrote in an internal document that “‘[mall decision-makers] feel it will
while simultaneously providing a means of travel through spaces inhabited by blacks, all
without having to interact with blacks”). Policymakers in particular should be cognizant of
the constitutional implications of their discriminatory behavior. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give them effect. ‘Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may
not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial preju-
dice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.’” (quoting Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J., dissenting))).
138. Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: A Review of Recent
Studies and Their Implications for Welfare Reform, 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 849, 881 (1998).
139. See Tomer et al., supra note 121, at 19 (“Residents of low-income suburban neighborhoods
can reach just over one-in-five middle- or low-skill industry jobs in their metropolitan are-
as[,] . . . the types of jobs for which they may be most likely to qualify.”).
140. It is not only the placement and location of individual transit stops that results in an exclu-
sionary environment, but also the larger structure of the transit system. See, e.g., Shoaib M.
Chowdhury & Steven I-Jy Chien, Intermodal Transit System Coordination, 25 TRANSPORT.
PLAN. & TECH. 257 (2002) (describing intermodal transportation networks).
141. David W. Chen, Suit Accusing Shopping Mall of Racism over Bus Policy Settled, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/18/nyregion/suit-accusing-shopping-mall
-of-racism-over-bus-policy-settled.html [http://perma.cc/7LWX-5CV8].
142. Id.
143. Id.; Kevin Collison, Wiggins Suit Settled - Son To Get $2.55 Million, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 17, 1999, http://www.buffalonews.com/article/19991117/CITYANDREGION
/311179898 [http://perma.cc/7S8T-HYKW] (“The first [witness] was to be Kenneth D.
Cannon, the official for Galleria owner Pyramid Cos. who was the alleged architect of the
mall’s policy banning the Route 6 bus.”).
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architectural exclusion
not bring in the type of people they want to come to the mall.”144 One mall re-
tail store owner recalled a conversation with a mall official who said something
like, “The people who rode the Walden Avenue bus were not the kind of peo-
ple they were trying to attract to the Walden Galleria.”145 The mall did, howev-
er, allow some charter buses to stop on its property.146 Members of Buffalo’s
black community asserted that the mall was “trying to use the highway as a
moat to exclude some city residents”147—a classic example of architectural ex-
clusion. The case settled, but it presents a stark example of the dangers inher-
ent in exclusionary transit design.
2. Placement of Highway Routes, Bridge Exits, and Road Infrastructure
Bridge exits and highway off-ramps are often located so as to filter traffic
away from wealthy communities. The Robert F. Kennedy Bridge (formerly 
known as the Triborough Bridge), as it traverses the East River from Queens
to Manhattan, “makes an almost perpendicular hard right turn north, so that 
the traffic lets out in Harlem, not on the wealthy Upper East Side.”148 Accord-
ing to one commentator, this terminus location was chosen due to “a combina-
tion of regard for the wealthy Upper East Side, disregard for the residents of 
Harlem, and plain old-fashioned graft.”149 It was not selected for convenience,
as most traffic would be coming from and heading to areas below 100th
Street.150 Similarly, the Northern State Parkway avoids the affluent North 
Shore area of Long Island because wealthy homeowners in the area were able 
144. Lynne Duke, Buffalo Family Seeking Millions For Fatal Lack of a Bus Stop, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 15, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-11/15/002r-111599
-idx.html [http://perma.cc/8J3F-YR7H].
145. Id.; see also Chen, supra note 141 (“[O]fficials from the Transportation Authority revealed
that they had, over several years, repeatedly asked the mall to allow the bus onto the premis-
es, but that the mall had always refused, fearful of rambunctious youths.”); Collison, supra
note 143.
146. Chen, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. Steven Paul McSloy, Closing Remarks: Breaking the Power of the Power Brokers, 9 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 669, 671 (1994).
149. Id. at 671 n.17; see also Graft, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/graft [http://perma.cc/R2XV-L362] (defining graft as “the acquisition of gain
(as money) in dishonest or questionable ways”).
150. CARO, supra note 1, at 390 (“Placing the Manhattan terminus at 125th Street condemned 
most motorists . . . to thus add two and a half totally unnecessary miles to their every jour-
ney over the bridge.”).
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to convince Moses to reroute the location of the parkway, which resulted in a
five-mile detour.151 
The placement of highways so as to intentionally displace poor black
neighborhoods is even more familiar.152 Policymakers “purposeful[ly]” decided 
to route highways through the center of cities, often with the intent “to destroy
low-income and especially black neighborhoods in an effort to reshape the
physical and racial landscapes of the postwar American city.”153 Although this
work was undertaken in order to make places more accessible to cars, it was al-
so done with an eye towards eliminating alleged slums and blight in city cen-
ters.154 These tactics were so common that they earned a name among critics:
“white roads through black bedrooms.”155 
For example, in 1954, the City of Detroit was engaged in urban renewal.156 
It razed the black community of Black Bottom to build the I-375 highway and
new developments such as the Mies van der Rohe-designed Lafayette Park157 
151. Id. at 301-02; McSloy, supra note 148, at 672 n.18.
152. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. ITTELSON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
348 (1974) (noting that “the construction of major highways through central cities . . . frac-
ture[s] and fragment[s] delicate social networks”); Wesley Skogan, Fear of Crime and
Neighborhood Change, 8 CRIME & JUSTICE 203, 206 (1986) (“[F]reeway networks driven
through the hearts of many American cities . . . destroyed . . . low-income, minority neigh-
borhoods . . . .”).
153. Raymond A. Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities: Highways, Housing, and the Freeway Revolt,
POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL 1 (2002), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/mohl.pdf
[perma.cc/ZWU6-KH6A] (“In retrospect, [this motivation] now seems apparent . . . .”).
154. Id. at 1-2.
155. See, e.g., GERHARD FALK, TWELVE INVENTIONS WHICH CHANGED AMERICA: THE INFLUENCE
OF TECHNOLOGY ON AMERICAN CULTURE 26 (2013) (“Racism was also invoked, as more and
more interstate and other roads were built, some of which cut through black neighbor-
hoods. These roads did indeed displace many established communities, as critics com-
plained of ‘White roads through black bedrooms.’”); B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., ‘White Roads
Through Black Bedrooms’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1967, at E7 (discussing a group called
N[******] Incorporated that was resisting the construction of highways through black
neighborhoods in Washington D.C.).
156. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY
IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996) (describing the extensive urban renewal efforts in Detroit and
the resulting segregation of the region).
157. Lafayette Park, MIES VAN DER ROHE SOC’Y, http://www.miessociety.org/legacy/projects
/lafayette-park [http://perma.cc/UST6-HQEG]; see also Ben Cosgrove, Mies van der
Rohe: Architect of the Modern World, LIFE.COM, http://life.time.com/culture/architect-mies
-van-der-rohe-and-the-poetry-of-purpose/#ixzz3OTz8m4do [http://perma.cc/V38W-72LS]
(describing van der Rohe, a well-known modernist architect, as the “German master”
“whose work so defined his time that it’s impossible to imagine certain decades and city-
scapes without his influence”).
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architectural exclusion
and public housing projects.158 In the early 1950s, there were an estimated
140,000 black people living in Black Bottom, and while some middle-income
families in the area were able to relocate to more prosperous neighborhoods,
the urban renewal project forced many low-income residents into public hous-
ing.159 Now Detroit is considering removing the architectural barrier of the ag-
ing I-375 highway and creating a pedestrian-friendly parkway to connect Lafa-
yette Park with the central business district.160 
This story is not unique. Local government officials and state highway 
planners in Miami intentionally located I-95 so that it would cut through Over-
town, an inner-city black community.161 Although it had previously been
known as “the Harlem of the South,” Overtown became “an urban wasteland
dominated by the physical presence of the expressway.”162 I-10 through New
Orleans was constructed along a portion of North Claiborne Avenue, which
was “the center of an old and stable black Creole community.”163 Highway 101
separates the Latino and black residents of East Palo Alto, California, from the
west side of town.164 Other examples include streets in Omaha, Nebraska;165 I-
158. John Gallagher, Op-Ed, When Detroit Paved over Paradise: The Story of I-375, DET.
FREE PRESS, Dec. 15, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20131215/OPINION05/312150060
/Black-Bottom-Detroit-I-375-I-75-paradise-valley-removal [http://perma.cc/LJ8Z-4RWL]
(“Named for the rich dark soil that French explorers first found there, the Black Bottom dis-
trict in the 1940s and ‘50s housed the city’s African-American entrepreneurial class, with
dozens of thriving black-owned businesses and the Paradise Valley entertainment zone,
where Duke Ellington, Ella Fitzgerald and Count Basie performed.”); see also Mohl, supra
note 153, at 4 (“The consequence of state and local route selection was that urban express-
ways could be used specifically to carry out local race, housing, and residential segregation
agendas.”).
159. Carrie Da Via, A Brief History of Detroit’s Black Bottom Neighborhood, ROGUE HAA, May 18,
2012, http://roguehaa.com/a-brief-history-of-detroits-black-bottom-neighborhood [http://
perma.cc/VFC2-9VU8] (“Like other urban renewal projects, significant areas of the former
Black Bottom neighborhood remained vacant for over half of a decade.”).
160. John Gallagher, No More I-375? Detroit To Study Removing Freeway in Favor of Walkable
Surface Street, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20131124
/BUSINESS06/311240072/I-375-downtown-MDOT [http://perma.cc/H3DA-3B5K] (“Re-
moving the 1960s-era freeway could sprout residential communities anew in the once-
thriving historic black areas known as Black Bottom and Paradise Valley that were torn apart 
five decades ago by local freeway construction, the same as in cities across the nation.”).
161. Mohl, supra note 153, at 30.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 32.
164. Goebel, supra note 89 (noting that traversing Highway 101 to get to the east side is danger-
ous and involves passing through a busy intersection); see also George Packer, Change the
World, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27
/change-the-world [http://perma.cc/9W42-2R5N] (“[P]ublic schools in poor communi-
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880 in Oakland, California;166 a turnpike in Delaware;167 I-64 and I-77 through
Charleston, West Virginia;168 the list goes on.
To some extent, the placement of highways through city centers is a legacy 
issue, meaning that it is an issue that remains in the present because of deci-
sions made in the past.169 It was not illegal to tear apart poor neighborhoods at
the time that urban renewal was in full swing, and the resultant features of the 
built environment are now hard to change.170 However, the elimination of low-
income and minority neighborhoods under the guise of clearing blighted areas
is far from a legacy issue in and of itself; as the Supreme Court’s decision in
Berman v. Parker established, clearing “blight” is an acceptable use of the emi-
nent domain power.171 Notably, in the aftermath of Kelo, which reaffirmed the
validity of takings for economic development purposes, many states passed
ties—such as East Palo Alto, which is mostly cut off from the city by Highway 101—have
fallen into disrepair and lack basic supplies.”).
165. Conversation with David Levy, Attorney, Baird Holm LLP, in Omaha, Neb. (Aug. 2013)
(explaining that in the 1960s and 1970s, fairly transparent measures were taken to “wall off”
the black community in North Omaha from the rest of the city; Sixteenth Street was a main 
thoroughfare connecting North Omaha to downtown, until the City allowed construction of 
a large hotel running from 15th Street to 17th Street that closed 16th Street at the (then)
north edge of downtown; another such thoroughfare was 24th Street, until it was turned in-
to a one-way street just north of downtown; further, a freeway was constructed that effec-
tively bisected, and many say killed, the black community at the time). For a contemporary
description of Omaha’s black neighborhoods, see ELIA PEATTIE, Omaha’s Black Population: 
The Negroes of This City – Who They Are and Where They Live, in IMPERTINENCES: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF ELIA PEATTIE, A JOURNALIST IN THE GILDED AGE 58 (2005).
166. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1998); see generally Fed.
Highway Admin. Envtl. Justice Case Studies, Cyprus Freeway Replacement Project, U.S. DEP’T 
TRANSP. (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/environmental_justice
/case_studies/case5.cfm [http://perma.cc/9C4J-5QZV] (noting that the decision to recon-
struct a portion of I-880 in a new location after the Loma Prieta earthquake was due, in part,
to considerations of the way that the highway had previously divided and isolated black
communities).
167. GEORGE RENGERT & JOHN WASILCHICK, SUBURBAN BURGLARY: A TIME AND A PLACE FOR
EVERYTHING 62 (1985) (noting that a Delaware turnpike cuts a community in half).
168. See Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497, 497 (1971) (writ of certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted). Interstate highways cut through Charleston, West
Virginia’s primarily poor, black Triangle neighborhood despite lawsuits attempting to stop
them. Plaintiffs raised claims under the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20, 22-26 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).
169. See infra Part IV.A.
170. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (holding that it is within legislative power “to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled”).
171. Id. at 33-34 (allowing exercise of eminent domain to eliminate blight in an area even though
the property at issue was not blighted).
1968
  
  
 
 
             
     
        
  
           
          
          
         
 
                 
            
          
          
            
          
        
             
           
            
         
            
            
          
          
             
          
            
         
                
         
    
           
     
              
   
       
       
             
         
              
         
     
       
           
   
architectural exclusion
laws restricting the use of eminent domain; however, many of those new laws
retained exceptions allowing its use to clear blight.172 
3.	 Wayfinding: One-Way Streets, Dead-End Streets, Curvy Streets, and
Confusing Signage
Another method of exclusion involves the creation and use of one-way
streets. These streets function to funnel traffic away from certain areas and into
others.173 There are sometimes health- and safety-based reasons for the crea-
tion of one-way streets, including traffic-calming and pedestrian safety.174 But
172. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (holding that the taking of private
property for “economic development” was a valid use of eminent domain power even
though New London was “not confronted with the need to remove blight [as in Berman, be-
cause] . . . the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvena-
tion”); see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5202 (2011) (defining blight); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 816(2) (2006) (generally prohibiting the condemnation of land that has
residential houses or commercial structures thereon, unless there has been a finding of
blight and the area is covered by a redevelopment or urban renewal plan); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 970-b (McKinney 2012) (declaring it to be the policy of the state to promote redevel-
opment of blighted areas, including through the use of eminent domain); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 163.021 (West 2007) (allowing, under certain conditions, for an agency to appropri-
ate property it has found in a blighted area or slum); see also Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo
Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain Statutes and Past Blight Statutes Are a Ma-
ginot Line-Defense Mechanism for all Non-Affluent and Minority Property Owners, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 609, 612 (2007) (“Because governments have retained their blight-designation powers,
they may still specifically do what the recently enacted state statutes tried to prevent—take
the homes of low-income households and replace them with private developments. This re-
sult has unjustly and disparately affected blacks over whites, the poor over the rich, and
those with little political representation over those that are politically-connected.”).
173. See G. Wade Walker et al., Downtown Streets: Are We Strangling Ourselves on One-Way
Networks?, TRANSP. RES. BD. CIRCULAR F-2, at 4 (Dec. 2000), http://onlinepubs.trb.org
/onlinepubs/circulars/ec019/Ec019_f2.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6T7-Y9WW] (discussing the
experience of the “occasional visitor” motorist in a one-way street network); Episode 51: The
Arsenal of Exclusion, supra note 88.
174. See, e.g., Nathaniel Hoffman, One Way, Two Way, Yes Way, No Way, BOISE WKLY., July
31, 2009, http://www.boiseweekly.com/CityDesk/archives/2009/07/31/one-way-two-way
-yes-way-no-way [http://perma.cc/DVK8-7QMQ] (explaining benefits of one-way streets,
including that “[p]edestrian safety is improved as the pedestrian has fewer directions to be 
concerned about at intersections. Drivers have fewer potential conflicts to handle as well so
can give more attention to pedestrian safety.”). However, there is countervailing data sug-
gesting that two-way streets result in slower traffic, which can result in a safer environment
for pedestrians. See, e.g., Eric Jaffe, The Case Against One-Way Streets, ATLANTIC:
CITYLAB (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2013/01/case-against-one-way
-streets/4549 [http://perma.cc/2ZGG-TW7W] (“[S]peeds tend to be higher on one-way
streets, and some studies suggest drivers pay less attention on them because there’s no con-
flicting traffic flow.”).
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they also may serve to exclude by making it difficult to gain access by car into
or out of certain parts of a community.175 For example, Greenmount Avenue in 
East Baltimore separates the poor, predominantly African-American neighbor-
hood of Waverly on its east side from the wealthy, predominantly white neigh-
borhood of Guilford on its west.176 While it is easy to access Waverly from
Greenmount due to the existence of a grid pattern of two-way cross streets,
that grid does not extend to the west side of Greenmount.177 Rather, access to
Guilford on the west is blocked by houses or bollards, and in the rare instance
that there is a street crossing from the west over Greenmount, it is typically a
one-way street headed east, toward Waverly.178 In addition to making vehicular 
access difficult, one-way streets such as these are exclusionary in that they can
confuse visitors, which might discourage their continued presence in a neigh-
borhood, or make it hard for them to find their way to or from a specific
home.179 Many one-way streets were created during urban renewal with the
stated goals of accommodating automobile traffic and allowing people to pass 
quickly through cities.180 More recently, however, some communities have be-
175. See Episode 51: The Arsenal of Exclusion, supra note 88 (visiting an affluent, predominantly
white neighborhood in East Baltimore that uses one-way streets, dead ends, and bollards to
inhibit the influx of traffic from the adjacent lower-income, predominantly black neighbor-
hood).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Mark Mikin, The United States of 2012, ESQUIRE (2015), http://www.esquire.com
/the-side/feature/2012-maps-of-the-us-6647201#slide-4 [http://perma.cc/DR6K-UHH9]
(“[O]f the eight streets that intersect Greenmount Avenue between 33rd Street and Cold
Spring Lane, only one (39th Street) allows travel from east to west. Six of the streets are
one-way pointing east (i.e., out of the wealthy, white side), and one of the streets (34th
Street) thwarts westward movement with bollards.”).
179. Vikash V. Gayah, Two-Way Street Networks: More Efficient than Previously Thought?, 41 AC-
CESS MAG. 10, 11 (2012), http://www.uctc.net/access/41/access41-2way.pdf [http://perma.cc
/D6S9-TDFP] (“Downtown visitors, whether they arrive by car or public transportation,
prefer two-way street networks to one-way street networks because they are less confusing.
Visitors driving in a two-way grid network can easily approach their destination from any
direction. A one-way network may prevent drivers from approaching their destination from
the most logical direction. This uncertainty can intimidate drivers and, in some cases, make
them hesitant to return.”).
180. See, e.g., ALLAN R. TALBOT, THE MAYOR’S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND THE POL-
ITICS OF CHANGE 112 (1967); Bill Landauer, Easton Could Open Traffic on Fourth Street to Two
Ways, MORNING CALL (Pa.), Dec. 14, 2014, http://www.mcall.com/news/local/easton/mc
-easton-fourth-street-20141214-story.html [http://perma.cc/Z7MP-DLXS] (noting that a
city street became one-way during urban renewal to “move traffic through the city more
quickly”).
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architectural exclusion
gun to convert formerly one-way streets into two-way streets, in part to reduce
confusion and increase access.181 
Communities also rely on other confusion techniques to keep people out,
or to make it hard for them to find their way around an area. For example, in
describing Darien, Connecticut,182 one of many intentionally white communi-
ties in the United States, James Loewen notes, “[e]ven street signs are in short 
supply in Darien, . . . making it hard to find one’s way around that elite sun-
down suburb. Darien doesn’t really want a lot of visitors, a resident pointed 
out, and keeping Darien confusing for strangers might deter criminals— 
perhaps a veiled reference to African Americans.”183 A similar, though perhaps
less nefarious, technique has been used to keep tourists and “city folks in search
of weekend homes” out of Bolinas, California.184 Citizens there have, for years,
been removing directional signs that the State Department of Transportation
places on Highway 1 to direct drivers toward Bolinas.185 In fact, in 1989, the
residents of the town held a nonbinding advisory vote, and approximately
181. Notably, these recent conversions often require city council approval, which means there is
an opportunity for public participation in the process. See, e.g., E-mail from Judy Crites, Of-
fice Manager, City of Charleston, to Patrick Lyons, Research Assistant, Univ. of Me. Sch. of 
Law (Apr. 11, 2014, 10:31:00 EST) (on file with author) (describing the process of convert-
ing one-way to two-way streets and stating, “First an internal review would be done and if
feasible an outside engineering consultant would be hired to perform a comprehensive traf-
fic study. Results would be reviewed by staff and presented to the City Council Traffic and
Transportation Committee at which time a public hearing on the matter would be sched-
uled. After the public hearing the Traffic and Transportation Committee would vote on the
matter. If approved by the Traffic and Transportation Committee, it would then move for-
ward to City Council for consideration.”).
182. According to the 2000 Census, Darien was 95.97% white, 0.04% black, and 2.19% Hispanic.
Darien was also listed ninth in CNN’s list of “top-earning towns.” John Nickerson,
Occupy Darien Set To Begin Wednesday, DARIEN NEWS (Conn.), Dec. 21, 2011, 
http://www.dariennewsonline.com/news/article/Occupy-Darien-set-to-begin-Wednesday
-2413997.php [http://perma.cc/TTZ5-ZK4L] (noting the economic status of Darien and its
neighboring town); Demographics, TOWN DARIEN, http://darienct.gov/content/108/415/419
/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/8XNS-VCN9].
183. LOEWEN, supra note 87, at 254-55.
184. Mark A. Stein, Road Signs? Bolinas Voters Say ‘Read Our Lips’ Instead, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-11-09/news/mn-1431_1_road-signs [http://perma.cc
/7VX7-BV84]. This appears to have been unsuccessful, as many wealthy individuals, includ-
ing some celebrities, now own homes in Bolinas. See Aaron Britt, Going Coastal: Is the Elusive
Bohemian Enclave of Bolinas Getting a Bit Glossier?, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2007, http://
www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Going-coastal-Is-the-elusive-bohemian-enclave-2653492
.php [http://perma.cc/XHK7-4V37](explaining that Bolinas has seen an influx of wealthy
new homeowners, including actress Frances McDormand and her filmmaker husband, Joel
Coen).
185. Stein, supra note 184.
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three-quarters of the residents voted to prohibit road signs that would direct
travelers to Bolinas.186 Further, the design of many suburban communities,
with their cul-de-sacs and curvy streets, makes them confusing to outsiders 
who cannot see what lies on the other side of the neighborhood. This street
layout also gives non-residents fewer reasons to enter the neighborhood in the 
first place; the multiple dead end streets and cul-de-sacs of a suburban neigh-
borhood often all branch off a single arterial road. Thus, unlike the traditional
urban grid pattern, these neighborhoods lack connectivity to other parts of the
community, making them useless to those who want to cut through.187 Fur-
ther, while perhaps successful from an exclusionary standpoint, these architec-
tural elements often result in less efficient travel for residents.
4. Residential Parking Permits
In some neighborhoods, people can park on the street only if they live in
the neighborhood and have a residential parking permit or are given a guest 
permit by a resident.188 As a result, those who do not live in or have friends in
the neighborhood cannot drive in and park there. Moreover, these neighbor-
hoods are often not easily accessible via public transportation. These exclusion-
ary parking schemes are often imposed administratively; they do not provide a 
formal opportunity for non-residents—or, often, residents—to offer their in-
put.189 Although a residential permitting scheme like this allows neighbor-
hoods to physically exclude, it also imposes bureaucratic requirements on resi-
dents such as purchasing parking permit stickers and remembering to give
guest passes to visiting friends.
The Supreme Court expressly upheld the ability of cities to enact this sort
of parking permit requirement. In County Board of Arlington County v. Rich-
186. Id. 
187. See, e.g., Clay Risen, The Cul-de-Sac Ban, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 13, 2009, http://www
.nytimes.com/projects/magazine/ideas/2009/#c-2 [http://perma.cc/B62T-A8MT].
188. See, e.g., FULLERTON, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.44.230(A) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person
to stand or park any vehicle on any street or portion thereof so restricted by resolution of the
City Council to permit parking only during all or certain portions of the day provided signs
giving notice of said restriction have been posted, unless a parking permit issued by the City
is displayed on the vehicle . . . .”); Resident Parking Program, CITY BOS., http://www
.cityofboston.gov/parking/residentparking [http://perma.cc/9WPH-STQ7] (“Boston’s Res-
ident Permit Parking Program is an initiative designed to give residents a better chance of 
finding an on-street parking space in their neighborhood. Many of the parking spaces on
Boston’s residential streets are regulated as ‘Resident Parking Only.’”).
189. For example, in Portland, Maine, the city traffic engineer has the authority to establish park-
ing regulations without requiring city council approval and thus, ostensibly, without formal 
public input. PORTLAND, ME., CODE § 28-24(g)(1) (2013); infra note 302.
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architectural exclusion
ards,190 the county had adopted a rule that restricted daytime street parking to 
residents with residential parking permits,191 excluding commuters who had
previously parked on local streets.192 The Court held that such a scheme was
permissible and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since it was pur-
portedly enacted to reduce hazardous traffic conditions, air pollution, and
noise, as well as to preserve property values and the safety of neighborhood 
children.193 Courts have similarly upheld residency restrictions that prevent
some individuals from using public facilities such as beaches, sports courts,
and playgrounds on the grounds that residents’ taxes and fees resulted in con-
struction of those facilities, and so residents should be given use priority.194 
The effect of these types of residency requirements is often to exclude people
who do not live in a given neighborhood from that neighborhood.
The examples of architectural exclusion identified in this Part are concern-
ing in that they reveal a number of underlying problems. For example, physical
exclusion prevents members of minority groups from partaking in the civic life
of the community; makes it extremely difficult or physically dangerous for
some people to access wealthier communities and jobs; may result in stigma or 
harm to dignity; can often destroy existing communities of color; and may al-
low groups to conceal racially discriminatory motives behind a veneer of health
and safety rationales. These problems and others will be analyzed more fully in
the remainder of this Article.
i i i . a  brief history of exclusion by law (and norms)
This Article has demonstrated that the built environment serves to segre-
gate and has highlighted ways in which segregation by architecture, like segre-
gation by law, operates in a pernicious manner. The remainder of the Article
190. 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (per curiam).
191. Id. at 5-6.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id. at 7 (“A community may also decide that restrictions on the flow of outside traffic into
particular residential areas would enhance the quality of life there by reducing noise, traffic
hazards, and litter.”).
194. Austin, supra note 118, at 673. But see Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn.
2001) (allowing non-resident access to a municipal beach, finding it to be a traditional pub-
lic forum); Austin, supra note 118, at 674 (“City of Dearborn[, Michigan,] had gone too far
when it restricted access to two parks to residents and their guests . . . . Because of its dis-
parate impact on blacks, the residency restriction was held to violate the provision of the
Michigan Constitution prohibiting racial discrimination against individuals exercising their
civil rights . . . [and the] proof of residency [requirement] violated the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
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seeks to establish how legal decision makers tend to overlook the regulatory
nature of architectural forms of exclusion. It does this by examining judicial
consideration of physical exclusion by law and by architecture.
Before exploring the ways that courts have approached cases addressing ar-
chitectural exclusion, it is important to consider the long history of legally
permissible physical exclusion in the United States and the eventual interven-
tion in these practices by legislators and courts. Legal scholars and historians
have repeatedly recounted the formal laws and informal norms that furthered
racial and socioeconomic exclusion in this country.195 The use of “[i]nformal
measures ranging from disapproval to threats and violence” to exclude African
Americans have been traced back to at least the 1790s.196 And the wealthy have
long used formal legal methods to keep the poor and people of color out of
their communities.197 
This Part describes the way that law has historically been used to exclude
“undesirable” members of a community from certain parts of the community.
It analyzes the most common, explicit tools of exclusion—including racial zon-
ing, racially restrictive covenants, and exclusionary zoning—that courts and
legislators tend to view as proper topics for consideration, though they often
fail to consider architecture and design as validly within their purview.
A. Legal Regulation that Furthered Exclusion
When land-use and property-law scholars consider the interplay between
land-use law and the exclusion of people of color and the poor, they tend to 
195. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMP-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) (discussing the role
of local governments in promoting racially identifiable space); Jerry Frug, Symposium, The
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1081-89 (1996) (describing the use of zon-
ing and redevelopment power by municipalities to isolate communities along lines of race or
socioeconomic status); Lawrence, supra note 14 (reconsidering the doctrine of discriminato-
ry intent established by the 1976 decision of Washington v. Davis); Daniel R. Mandelker, Ra-
cial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L.
REV. 1217 (1977) (examining the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on racial exclusion-
ary zoning and calling for legislative action).
196. RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RE-
STRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2013).
197. J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2286 (1997) (reviewing
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) 
and DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER & LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING,
AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)) (discussing the role of the courts in addressing “the
persistent use of the law by the affluent to exclude the poor and minorities from their com-
munities”).
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architectural exclusion
think about methods of exclusion from neighborhoods through the use of 
law—racial zoning, racially restrictive covenants, and exclusionary zoning.198 
This section will briefly consider each in turn, demonstrating that while courts
have disapproved of racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants, they have
been more ambivalent about exclusionary zoning, finding that it is generally
not actionable.
1. Judicial Disapproval
a. Racial Zoning
Initially, some cities tried to use their zoning powers directly to keep out
minorities.199 Baltimore passed one of the first racial zoning ordinances in
1910, and the ordinance was quickly imitated by a number of Southern cit-
ies.200 In 1913, Atlanta enacted a racial zoning ordinance, which like most oth-
ers at the time, designated each block in the city based on the race of the major-
ity of people living there at the time.201 After those designations were made,
black people could not move onto primarily white blocks.202 The commonly
198. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 725-810. Another comparison that could be made is that 
of physical segregation of the races in contexts other than housing under the Jim Crow laws
in the early 1900s. See generally BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 26 (describing separation
in public and commercial common spaces, including public transportation); Robert R.
Weyeneth, The Architecture of Racial Segregation: The Challenges of Preserving the Problematical
Past, 27 PUB. HISTORIAN, 11, 13 (2005) (examining the spatial system of racial segregation in
the U.S. and stating that “[t]he architecture of racial segregation represented an effort to de-
sign places that shaped the behavior of individuals and, thereby, managed contact between 
whites and blacks”). The Supreme Court upheld the validity of “equal but separate” public
transportation facilities in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, after which time Southern states ex-
panded segregation in a variety of public spaces. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 27. This resulted in the use of architecture to separate the
races in two ways: “isolation and partitioning.” Weyeneth, supra, at 12.
199. Ross & Leigh, supra note 45, at 372 (describing the use of racial zoning to “exclude undesira-
ble groups from entering” upscale communities). See generally Garrett Power, Apartheid Bal-
timore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289 (1983).
200. David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical 
Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 835 (1998); Power, supra note 199 at 298-300. An even ear-
lier example came from San Francisco. See In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359, 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1890) (describing San Francisco’s earlier ordinance that confined Chinese people to a certain
part of the city).
201. CHRISTOPHER SILVER & JOHN V. MOESER, THE SEPARATE CITY: BLACK COMMUNITIES IN THE
URBAN SOUTH, 1940-1968, at 21 (1995).
202. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court originally deemed the ordinance—which applied retroac-
tively—violative of due process for infringing on the right of an individual to “acquire, en-
joy, and dispose of his property.” Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456, 460 (Ga. 1915); see 
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asserted reason for the passage of these ordinances was blatantly racist—“to
prevent too close association of the races, which association results, or tends to 
result, in breaches of peace, immorality, and danger to the health.”203 In sup-
port of Baltimore’s ordinance, its mayor stated that “[b]lacks should be quar-
antined in isolated slums in order to reduce the incidents of civil disturbance,
to prevent the spread of communicable disease into the nearby White neigh-
borhoods, and to protect property values among the White majority.”204 These
were commonly held views among many at the time.205 
In the 1917 case Buchanan v. Warley,206 however, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a similar racial zoning ordinance in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, prohibiting the sale of property to black people, exceeded the city’s po-
lice powers and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.207 While the Court’s
opinion mentioned racial equality, its holding centered on the issue of property
also State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338, 340 (N.C. 1914) (striking down Winston-Salem’s racial
zoning ordinance because it interfered with “the fundamental right of every one to acquire
and dispose of property by sale”). But see Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139, 148
(Va. 1915) (upholding Richmond’s racial zoning ordinance and holding that “the town
council . . . had full authority . . . to pass an ordinance providing for separate residences for
white and colored people within its limits, that the ordinance passed was a reasonable exer-
cise of this power, and that it does not conflict with the fourteenth amendment”). Yet once
Atlanta’s ordinance was amended to “exclude[] from its operation vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption,” that court upheld its constitutionality. Harden v. City of Atlanta,
93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917), overruled by Lee v. Warnock, 96 S.E. 385 (Ga. 1918) (“Segre-
gation is not imposed as a stigma upon either race, but in order to uphold the integrity of
each race and to prevent conflicts between them resulting from close association. An ordi-
nance designed to accomplish this purpose will be upheld, notwithstanding that to some ex-
tent the use of property may be somewhat restricted . . . .”).
203. Hopkins, 86 S.E. at 144; see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1917) (“It is said
such legislation tends to promote the public peace by preventing racial conflicts; that it
tends to maintain racial purity; that it prevents the deterioration of property owned and oc-
cupied by white people . . . .”).
204. Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23, 27 (June Manning Thomas &
Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997) (quoting Baltimore Mayor J. Barry Mahool).
205. David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow?, FERRIS STATE U. JIM CROW MUSEUM RACIST MEMO-
RABILIA (Sept. 2000), http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm [http://perma.cc/T4JR
-Y57J].
206. 245 U.S. at 82 (holding that the “attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in ques-
tion to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State” and
thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
207. See id. (“We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a per-
son of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is in direct vio-
lation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law.”).
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architectural exclusion
rights and due process.208 Undeterred, a number of Southern cities, including
Atlanta, New Orleans, and Charleston, hired well-known planning profession-
als to design new racial zoning ordinances that could withstand judicial scruti-
ny after Buchanan.209 These attempts were unsuccessful; courts struck them
down.210 Having been blocked from using public law in a directly discriminato-
ry way, those intent on exclusion turned to other methods.211 
b. Racially Restrictive Covenants
Many community members relied on private law and adopted racially re-
strictive covenants, and these covenants became a common way to keep minor-
208. See Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 76 (1993) (“The Court’s finding disregarded the more pernicious effect
of the ordinance—the exclusion of an unempowered group, not merely from buying or sell-
ing property, but from the opportunity to ascend to social and economic levels already
claimed by the empowered group.”).
209. SILVER & MOESER, supra note 201, at 21-22; see also Boddie, supra note 57, at 428 n.161 (rec-
ognizing that racial zoning “continued with some force for decades thereafter”). For exam-
ple, Robert Whitten, who drafted many early zoning ordinances and comprehensive plans,
proposed a post-Buchanan plan, cast in the language and context of comprehensive plan-
ning, that zoned Atlanta so as to expressly separate residential districts by race. See LEEANN 
LANDS, THE CULTURE OF PROPERTY: RACE, CLASS, AND HOUSING LANDSCAPES IN ATLANTA, 
1880-1950, at 143 (2011) (describing Whitten’s work with zoning codes in New York and 
Cleveland).
210. See, e.g., Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 668 (1927) (invalidating a New Orleans, Louisiana
ordinance), rev’g Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200 (La. 1927); City of Richmond v. Deans, 37
F.2d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930) (invalidating a Richmond, Virginia ordinance), aff’d, 281 U.S. 
704 (1930); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 P.2d 1054 (Okla. 1935) (invalidating an Oklahoma 
City ordinance); Smith v. City of Atlanta, 132 S.E. 66 (Ga. 1926); see also ELLICKSON ET AL., 
supra note 70, at 93 (discussing a racial zoning ordinance in Ohio that was struck down);
SILVER & MOESER, supra note 201, at 22 (“It was a widely held tenet of planning in the 1920s 
that controlled growth of black neighborhoods was necessary to produce a socially better
city. Even though the explicit racial designations in the city’s zoning plan had to be re-
moved, the ‘controlled segregation’ objective of race-based planning guided public policy
and private real estate decisions in Atlanta over the ensuing decades.”); Bruno Lasker, The
Atlanta Zoning Plan, 48 SURVEY 114, 114-115 (Apr. 22, 1922).
211. SILVER & MOESER, supra note 201, at 22 (“Even without the powerful legal tool of zoning,
white and black Atlantans proved adept at guiding the process of black residential growth in
conformity with the prescription in the 1922 plan through the use of deed restrictions and an
assortment of racially sensitive real estate practices.”); see also E. Bernard West, Black Atlan-
ta—Struggle for Development: 1915-1925, at 25-48 (May 1976) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Atlanta University), http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2085&context=dissertations [http://perma.cc/W2EH-GRF6] (examining the numerous
obstacles blocking black Atlanta’s development).
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ities out of certain neighborhoods for many years.212 Restrictive covenants typi-
cally limit what homeowners in a given neighborhood can do with, on, or to
their property; they not only restrict the original parties to the contract but also
encumber future owners because they “run with the land.”213 
While a typical restrictive covenant might forbid a homeowner from paint-
ing her house with polka dots or planting anything other than grass in the
front yard, racially restrictive covenants typically stated that a homeowner
could not sell or rent her home to anyone other than a white person.214 Courts
initially viewed racially restrictive covenants as legal; in Corrigan v. Buckley,215 
the Court noted that the covenants were merely private contracts concerning 
private property and involved no state action.216 
Not only did the Supreme Court give these covenants the imprimatur of
acceptability, but the covenants were also recorded and thus became an official
part of a property’s chain of title.217 Their legality allowed these covenants to
become “institutionalized and internalized,” and therefore very hard to chal-
lenge.218 That said, many legal scholars at the time vigorously opposed the
212. Kevin Fox Gotham, Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial Segregation in
a US City, 1900-50, 24 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 616 (2000) (using a case study of Kan-
sas City, Missouri, to examine efforts undertaken by community builders and homeowner 
associations who used racially restrictive covenants to create racially homogeneous neigh-
borhoods).
213. See, e.g., BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 55; see also Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kra-
emer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 61 (1998) (arguing for alternatives to fighting private racial discrimination beyond 
state action theory).
214. Gotham, supra note 212, at 617.
215. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
216. Id. at 330-31. In discussing strategy before the appeal to the Supreme Court, some urged the 
NAACP to argue that court enforcement of the covenants was effectively state action and
thus unconstitutional (the argument that would, twenty years later, win over the court). See
STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND
RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 46 (2001) (describing the strategy sug-
gested by NAACP lawyer Louis Marshall). However, the NAACP instead focused on an ar-
gument that the covenants constituted a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and result-
ed in disease, crime, and overcrowding. Id. at 46; cf. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 55
(asserting that the NAACP continuously used the state action line of argument in all cases 
up to and including Shelley v. Kramer). See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY:
THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959).
217. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 211 (discussing the “respectable legal form” of racially
restrictive covenants).
218. Id. at 212.
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architectural exclusion
Court’s treatment of racially restrictive covenants in Corrigan.219 Practicing real
estate lawyers also expressed concern about the legal validity of racially restric-
tive covenants, even after the Court’s decision.220 Some worried that courts
would hold the covenants to be unreasonable restraints on alienation and con-
sequently strike them down.221 
In 1948, the Court decided Shelley v. Kraemer,222 famously holding that ra-
cially restrictive covenants could not be enforced because such enforcement
would constitute state action.223 There are also now federal statutory prohibi-
tions against racially restrictive covenants,224 and some states require home-
owners’ associations to affirmatively renounce any lingering recorded racially
restrictive covenants.225 
2. Judicial Ambivalence: Exclusionary Zoning
After being blocked from using public- and private-law exclusionary tech-
niques, some municipalities found ways to use zoning more indirectly to keep 
out residents they viewed as undesirable. Exclusionary zoning is a method
whereby municipalities’ zoning regulations require large lot sizes, square-
footage minimums for buildings, or occupancy restrictions that make property
unaffordable to or impractical for use by poor people or those who live with 
large or extended families.226 While these exclusionary tactics are often directed
219. One author cites a string of twelve law review articles, three student notes, and one book
that were written in the aftermath of the Corrigan case questioning its holding. See VOSE, su-
pra note 216, at 275 n.45. 
220. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 55-56 (discussing concerns of real estate developers and
their attorneys).
221. Id. at 56; see also Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 685 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (“Such a covenant
has been held not to be an unlawful restraint upon alienation.”). But see L.A. Inv. Co. v.
Gary, 186 P. 596, 597 (Cal. 1919).
222. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
223. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
224. For example, the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race (as well as religion, gender, national origin, and, now, disability) with respect to sale
and rental of most property, and prohibits the creation of racial covenants. 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2012).
225. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 228 (describing California and Missouri laws); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 12955(l), 6606 (West 2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 213.041 (2014).
226. The idea behind large-lot zoning is that poor people will not be able to afford to build or
buy a house on such a large lot. Occupancy restrictions might limit the number of bedrooms
permitted in a structure, which effectively keeps out larger families. See Lawrence Gene
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 767 (1969) (describing exclusionary zoning as “zoning that raises the price of res-
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at low-income people, they are arguably also racially motivated given the high
correlation between race and class.227 Sometimes forms of exclusionary zoning
are less well-known yet have the same effect—for example, prohibiting people
from operating “lower-income” home businesses such as barber shops and
child-care facilities in residential homes but allowing uses such as in-home in-
surance practices.228 
Those supporting exclusionary zoning practices are often purportedly mo-
tivated by the desire to preserve property values,229 but sometimes their moti-
vations do not seem all that different from the more nefarious ones that were
set forth in support of racial zoning.230 There is much evidence to suggest the
use of facially race-neutral exclusionary zoning as a strategy to further racial
homogeneity and to exclude racial minorities.231 For example, citizens who
supported the repeal of a zoning ordinance in Ohio allowing construction of a
idential access to a particular area, and thereby denies that access to members of low-income
groups”); Byrne, supra note 197, at 2265 n.2 (“‘Exclusionary zoning’ generally refers to zon-
ing laws that aim for a social effect.”).
227. Using the ideas concerning “intersectionality” as a basis, this Article considers the impact
that exclusion has on both socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals and people of color. 
See generally Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1782 (2005)
(“Although broad racial, national, class, and gender structures of inequality have an impact
and must be discussed, they do not determine the complex texture of day-to-day life for in-
dividual members of the social group under study, no matter how detailed the level of dis-
aggregation.”). Of course, courts apply different levels of scrutiny to race and class, but they
cannot be separated in this discussion, as “economic segregation is not only the easiest but
also the most effective form of racial and ethnic segregation.” Williams, supra note 17, at 
330; see also Wayne Batchis, Suburbanization and Constitutional Interpretation: Exclusionary
Zoning and the Supreme Court Legacy of Enabling Sprawl, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 37 (2012) 
(“Wealth and race share an unfortunate correlation in America; and while the relationship is
not as strong as it once was, minorities in America are still saddled with a disproportionate
share of poverty and economic despair.”); Byrne, supra note 197, at 2277 (“Although it is
sometimes asserted that exclusionary practices result merely from the pursuit of economic 
self-interest by suburban residents, the history of suburban expansion makes the conclusion
that it is also driven by a desire for racial isolation inescapable.”).
228. Ross & Leigh, supra note 45, at 373 (describing these types of zoning ordinances that have
exclusionary effects).
229. Byrne, supra note 197, at 2277.
230. Suburbanites “fear that when poor people move next door crime, drugs, blight, bad public
schools and higher taxes inevitably follow. They worry that the value of their homes will fall
and the image of their town will suffer. It does not help that the poor are disproportionately
black and Latino.” David L. Kirp, Op-Ed Here Comes the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/20/opinion/sunday/here-comes-the-neighborhood
.html [http://perma.cc/A82U-3AAS]. Regardless of the motivation, the results are still ex-
clusionary.
231. Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 465-66 (describing exclusionary zoning as “well documented
and widely practiced”).
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architectural exclusion
low-income housing project expressed concerns at public meetings “that the
development would cause crime and drug activity to escalate, that families with 
children would move in, and that the complex would attract a population simi-
lar to the one of Prange Drive, the City’s only African-American neighbor-
hood.”232 
Although many legal scholars have critiqued the practice of exclusionary
zoning,233 it is still quite widespread. This form of exclusion passes legal muster
in a way that outright discrimination does not;234 no modern court has found 
exclusionary zoning to be a violation of federal constitutional requirements.235 
It is hard to see how standard federal constitutional arguments would work in
the context of exclusionary zoning,236 especially because housing is not a fun-
232. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 192 (2003).
233. See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 227 (discussing the relationship between exclusionary zoning
and urban sprawl); Byrne, supra note 197 (examining exclusionary zoning in the context of
the Mount Laurel decisions); Sager, supra note 226 (examining the application of the Equal 
Protection Clause to exclusionary zoning); see also Ross & Leigh, supra note 45 at 372-73
(discussing exclusionary zoning’s role in racial segregation).
234. See GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SO-
CIAL ENVIRONMENT 72 (2000) (“Such hidden discrimination is hard to detect.”).
235. But see ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 741 (“In the early 1970s, several federal courts ap-
plied the Equal Protection Clause to exclusionary zoning practices that stopped short of
drawing explicitly racial classifications. . . . Soon thereafter, however, the Equal Protection 
Clause ceased to be a viable weapon against exclusionary, but not explicitly racial, land use
controls.” (internal citations omitted)). Exclusionary zoning has been found to violate some
state constitutions, and some states have attempted to curb it through legislation. See, e.g., 
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65300, 65302 (West 2014) (requiring a housing element as part of
comprehensive planning); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.312 (2013) (preventing local governments
from disallowing in residential zones “attached or detached single-family housing, multi-
family housing for both owner and renter occupancy or manufactured homes”); S. Burling-
ton Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed &
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Ex-
clusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1987). However, it is still quite
common in much of the country. Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of
Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 125 (2000) (determining that low-density, exclusionary
zoning resulted in fewer rental housing units, and thus fewer residents of color); Jonathan
Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Ur-
ban Areas, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 779 (2009) (finding a significant relationship between low-
density zoning and racial segregation).
236. See McDougall, supra note 235, at 623-24 (“The entry barriers to federal litigation on exclu-
sionary zoning matters, as established by the United States Supreme Court, are quite
high . . . .”). While racial animus might be behind many exclusionary zoning decisions,
most elected officials know not to mention it in the context of a public meeting or to use it as
a justification for the decision. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 197, at 2277; see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (suggesting that it is not difficult for governments to shield 
bad motivations behind legitimate reasons). Thus, although race is a suspect classification,
it is typically difficult to establish that an exclusionary decision was race-based.
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damental right,237 wealth is not a suspect classification,238 and the Court has
suggested that zoning restrictions do not interfere with the fundamental right
to travel.239 As Lawrence Gene Sager explained:
Zoning ordinances that operate to exclude the poor may have been en-
acted with exactly that purpose in mind; it is also entirely possible in
any given instance that no exclusionary intent was involved. While the 
extent to which other legitimate ends of government are served by an
ordinance is of course relevant to its constitutional validity, . . . [i]t will
be assumed that no [discriminatory] purpose is identifiable. The ease
with which this sort of motive may be disguised and the understanda-
ble judicial reluctance to pry into motive makes this a realistic basis for
inquiry.240 
To the extent the Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of exclusionary 
zoning, it has made constitutional challenges to exclusionary ordinances quite 
difficult.241 The Court held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp.242 that discriminatory intent is necessary to invalidate
governmental action in the context of exclusionary zoning; a plaintiff must
prove intentional discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny.243 Since Washington
237. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
238. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973).
239. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see also Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (discussing an exclusionary zoning ordinance
and stating that “[b]oth the United States Supreme Court and this court have refused to 
apply the strict constitutional test to legislation, such as the present ordinance, which does 
not penalize travel and resettlement but merely makes it more difficult for the outsider to es-
tablish his residence in the place of his choosing”). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (applying rational basis review and striking down a 
zoning ordinance that prohibited group homes for mentally disabled individuals as violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause because the ordinance was based on “irrational prejudice”
against the mentally retarded); Richard Fielding, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulation?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972) (suggesting that ex-
clusionary zoning violated the freedom of travel of prospective residents). 
240. Sager, supra note 226, at 782.
241. Id. at 767 (writing in 1969, and noting that, at that time, exclusionary zoning was “a prob-
lem that has thus far been ignored by the Supreme Court”). The Court finally spoke to the
issue, at least generally, in 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
242. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
243. Id. at 265; see also ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 763.
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architectural exclusion
v. Davis,244 legal scholars have explained how difficult it is to prove intentional 
discrimination. That is true even in cases challenging more traditional legal
regulations like zoning ordinances;245 proving that infrastructure decisions
were made with the intent to discriminate is even more unlikely.246 Indeed, in
Memphis v. Greene,247 which was decided shortly after Arlington Heights, the
Court was unwilling to find evidence of discriminatory intent in the face of
clear disparate impact.248 
244. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that even if a “law or other official act” has a racially dis-
criminatory effect, the plaintiff must also show that there was a discriminatory intent in or-
der to prevail in an equal protection case).
245. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How 
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1991) (finding that intent cases are
rarely litigated, and stating, “[t]he Court in Davis disparaged the importance of demonstrat-
ed, racially disproportionate effects, prompting a flurry of criticism that continues. This crit-
icism assumes that an intent standard will rarely be satisfied and that, while it governs,
many racial wrongs will remain unproven and therefore unrighted”); Lawrence, supra note
14, at 319 (“Improper motives are easy to hide. And because behavior results from the inter-
action of a multitude of motives, governmental officials will always be able to argue that ra-
cially neutral considerations prompted their actions.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing
Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 137 (2000) (noting
that with respect to “the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—the ‘intent’ requirement []
has made it increasingly difficult to hold states responsible for equal protection violations
committed by state actors”); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 309 (1997) (describing “[t]he Court’s demanding
standard for identifying acts of intentional discrimination”); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amend-
ment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 
2454 (2003) (“[I]n cases stretching from Milliken v. Bradley through Washington v. Davis . . . 
the Court has—in most though not all contexts—made it increasingly difficult to prove dis-
criminatory intent[.]”).
246. In Arlington Heights, the Court recognized that intent could be shown through circumstan-
tial evidence, including “historical background of the decision,” a “specific sequence of
events” leading up to the decision being challenged, “[d]epartures from the normal proce-
dural [and substantive] sequence,” and legislative and administrative history. 429 U.S. at
267-68.
247. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
248. Justice Marshall recognized this in his dissent, stating that “[t]his case is easier than the ma-
jority makes it appear. Petitioner city of Memphis, acting at the behest of white property
owners, has closed the main thoroughfare between an all-white enclave and a predominant-
ly Negro area of the city. The stated explanation for the closing is of a sort all too familiar:
‘protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential neighborhood’ by preventing ‘undesir-
able traffic’ from entering it. Too often in our Nation’s history, statements such as these
have been little more than code phrases for racial discrimination. These words may still sig-
nify racial discrimination, but apparently not, after today’s decision, forbidden discrimina-
tion.” Greene, 451 U.S. at 135-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Given these facts, it is likely that most exclusionary zoning claims would be
examined under a rational basis standard.249 And in the Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,250 the Supreme Court upheld an exclusionary zoning ordinance after
applying rational basis review.251 It will always be difficult for a plaintiff to
overcome rational basis review.252 This is especially true in the context of land
use because local governments make land-use decisions pursuant to their police
powers, which have been interpreted quite broadly;253 it is not difficult to find
legitimate, rational justifications—typically relating to health, safety, or wel-
fare—for most zoning ordinances.254 
249. To the extent that a claim concerns discrimination in the context of housing, a plaintiff
might have an easier time succeeding with a claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012). There, one need only prove the discriminatory effects of a hous-
ing program or decision on a minority group. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988) (agreeing with the Seventh and
Third Circuits that a defendant must show that their actions furthered a legitimate govern-
ment interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory ef-
fect); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977) [hereinafter Arlington Heights II] (holding that “a showing of discriminatory effect
without a showing of discriminatory intent” is under some circumstances sufficient to estab-
lish a violation of section 3604(a)). The Supreme Court will take up the issue this term. In-
clusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275,
282 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371).
250. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
251. Id. at 7. 
252. Under the rational basis test, the government must offer only a legitimate governmental in-
terest. Such review rarely leads to the invalidation of the law because it is relatively easy for
the government to show some legitimate purpose, and courts are highly deferential to the
government’s justifications. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (4th ed.
2013) (“There is a strong presumption in favor of laws that are challenged under the rational
basis test.”(citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961))). See generally id. at 
717-40 (offering a detailed discussion of rational basis review).
253. “[T]he [Memphis v. Greene] Court saw the city’s decision as justified by the importance of
discretion to local governments, specifically noting that local governments need ‘wide dis-
cretion’ in making the policy decisions that govern traffic patterns.” Selmi, supra note 245, at 
308 (quoting Greene, 451 U.S. at 126).
254. Taken together: (a) proving intent is extremely difficult; (b) not all architectural exclusion
is exclusion based on race (much of it is based on class, though intersectionality suggests
that the two are often related); and (c) not every instance of architectural exclusion is inten-
tional. But to the extent an architectural decision has discriminatory or exclusionary effects,
that should be enough for the courts to take notice, as it is still pernicious. See, e.g., Law-
rence, supra note 14, at 319 (“[T]he injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the deci-
sionmakers’ motives. . . . Are blacks less prisoners of the ghetto because the decision that ex-
cludes them from an all-white neighborhood was made with property values and not race in 
mind?”).
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architectural exclusion
While no state has forbidden exclusionary zoning via statute,255 some state
courts have placed limitations on it.256 An especially well-known and far-
reaching example of this comes from the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision
in South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
I).257 In that case and its successor,258 the court invalidated exclusionary zoning
practices based on the general welfare provision in the state constitution.259 
The court interpreted this provision so that “general welfare” applied to the
state as a whole, and appropriate zoning was required to advance the state’s 
general welfare.260 Therefore, the court held that every municipality that want-
ed to develop more housing in the state had to provide its fair share of the re-
gion’s needed affordable housing.261 Of note, although the plaintiffs pled both
255. Some states, however, have adopted statutes that address exclusionary zoning by encourag-
ing or promoting affordable housing. See, e.g., New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27d-301 to -329.19 (West 2013) (creating an administrative agency respon-
sible for determining regional need for low-income housing); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 
(West 2013) (requiring comprehensive plans with a housing element); The Massachusetts 
Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2013)
(providing incentives to developers who reserve a portion of their constructed units for low-
and moderate-income households). See generally Rachel G. Bratt, Overcoming Restrictive Zon-
ing for Affordable Housing in Five States: Observations for Massachusetts, CITIZENS’ HOUSING 
& PLAN. ASS’N (2012), http://www.chapa.org/sites/default/files/BrattOvercomingRestrictive
Zoning112012.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ALZ-FP33].
256. Byrne, supra note 197, at 2266 (“No state has statutorily barred exclusionary zoning, nor
have many state courts expressed any apprehension about it. A few states have hedged the
practice with restrictions, or offered limited remedies to the excluded. And then there is
New Jersey.” (footnote omitted)).
257. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975). Byrne mentions a few other courts that have considered exclusionary zoning: 
“Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991) (relying in part on Mount Laurel cas-
es to require in New Hampshire a builder’s remedy less stringent than that in New Jersey);
Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975) (relying in part 
on Mount Laurel I to find a Pennsylvania township zoning ordinance that provided for
apartment construction on only 80% of the 11,589 acres in the township unconstitutionally 
exclusionary).” Byrne, supra note 197, at 2266 n.4; see also Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215
A.2d 597, 613 (Pa. 1965) (holding large minimum lot size to be unconstitutional); cf. Appeal
of Kravitz, Inc., 460 A.2d 1075, 1082 (Pa. 1983) (upholding an ostensibly exclusionary zon-
ing ordinance because locality was not a place where future development was logical).
258. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983).
259. See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725-28.
260. Byrne, supra note 197, at 2271.
261. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724.
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race and economic discrimination, the court based its opinion on the economic
grounds alone.262 
While Mount Laurel I suggests the possibility that exclusionary zoning
could be struck down more broadly throughout the country, this seems unlike-
ly; despite the successful outcome and aftermath of Mount Laurel I,263 other
states have not readily followed suit.264 It is unclear precisely why more state
courts and legislators have not mandated affordable housing. One possibility is 
political: affordable housing is unpopular in many affluent communities.265 
Further, unlike racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants, which clearly
exclude on the basis of race, exclusionary zoning is fuzzier. While its intent and
effect certainly result in the exclusion of certain groups, exclusionary zoning
does not inherently prohibit or forbid people of color, or even low-income in-
dividuals, from entering or living in the community. Rather, it just makes it
exceedingly unlikely that those groups of individuals will be able to live in
those areas. In this way, exclusionary zoning has more in common with archi-
tectural exclusion than it does with racial zoning and restrictive covenants.
While exclusionary zoning and architectural exclusion make access much more
difficult for certain groups, these practices do not mandate exclusion.
The bottom line seems to be that the Supreme Court has been fairly active 
and responsive in striking down laws that create “formal racial barriers”—racial
zoning, racially restrictive covenants, Jim Crow laws requiring physical separa-
262. Id. Of course, “economic segregation is not only the easiest but also the most effective form
of racial and ethnic segregation . . . .” Williams, supra note 17, at 330.
263. Although its implementation has taken an extremely long time, analysis suggests that it has
been widely successful. See, e.g., Kirp, supra note 230 (noting that the housing development 
was not approved until 1997, and was not built until 2000, but that “this affordable housing
has had zero impact on the affluent residents of that community—crime rates, property val-
ues and taxes have moved in step with nearby suburbs—while the lives of the poor and
working-class families who moved there have been transformed” (citing DOUGLAS S. MAS-
SEY ET. AL, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SO-
CIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2013) (positively evaluating the Ethel Lawrence 
Homes, the affordable housing project in Mt. Laurel))).
264. See, e.g., ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 778 (“Most state courts continue to attach a pre-
sumption of validity even to municipal land use controls that admittedly exclude lower-cost
housing (absent evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose) . . . .”).
265. See, e.g., Erin Durkin, City Plans To Attack Economic Segregation by Moving Poor into Middle-
Class Neighborhoods, Richer into Poverty Spots, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 21, 2014, http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/city-plans-attack-economic-segregation-article-1.1801477
[http://perma.cc/3E5M-B3XG] (noting that the New York City Council housing chairman
“anticipated some resistance [to the plan to build affordable housing in wealthy areas] from
affluent New Yorkers unhappy about low-income developments in their neighborhoods . . . 
.”).
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architectural exclusion
tion in public places266—but not so when considering other “less obvious forms 
of discrimination”—including (to some extent) exclusionary zoning and archi-
tectural exclusion.267 Although it is possible that in the future, the court may
become more active in these latter areas, it is doubtful due to current Equal
Protection jurisprudence and intent requirements.268 
B.	 Social Norms That Furthered Exclusion: Sundown Towns, “White
 
Terrorism,” and Threats To Keep the “Other” Out

One reason that restrictive covenants and zoning for exclusion were so
common is that they were preceded by a long history of norms in support of
segregation in the United States269: “The dominating normative ideas in
neighborhood segregation were first that minority neighbors would undermine
white property values, and second that white residents owed it to their neigh-
bors to keep that from happening.”270 These norms existed before their exclu-
sionary legal counterparts,271 and even after the law no longer expressly en-
forced those norms, the norms themselves served as a form of regulation. As
racial zoning fell out of favor, its “eventual demise . . . did not undermine the
underlying social norms. The norms were based in a belief that Providence cre-
ated racial barriers, and violence was natural to prevent integration.”272 
The book Sundown Towns identifies large numbers of ordinances and cus-
toms that purportedly made it illegal for African Americans to live in certain
communities.273 Even after they were technically illegal, these ordinances were
266. For more on Jim Crow laws, see supra note 198.
267. See Boddie, supra note 57, at 413; see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 286 (1997) (analyzing “the Court’s 
reluctance to see discrimination in any but the most obvious situations”).
268. See Batchis, supra note 227, at 40 (“The Court’s trajectory on zoning matters would thus 
seem unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.”).
269. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Book Review Essay, Crimes Without Punishment:
White Neighbors’ Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 375 (2002) 
(“The social norms of residential racial segregation were at the core of the structure of twen-
tieth century racial subordination.”). But see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 166, at 30-31, 51 
(noting that racial segregation was much less common before the 1910s and suggesting that
federal programs exacerbated the norm of segregation).
270. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 212.
271. Id. at 19 (“[I]t took some time before white claims to own the neighborhoods moved be-
yond informal measures . . . and jelled into the legal form of racially restrictive covenants.”).
272. Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 269, at 375.
273. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 228-79
(2005). For example:
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enforced with threats and violence on the part of white residents to drive exist-
ing minorities out of their communities, and to keep new ones from moving
in.274 Scholars describe the “white terrorism” endured by African Americans,
which “was the everyday reality, and it induced a widespread state of fear in the
African American community.”275 These norms are resilient; such harassment
continues today in some areas. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently indicat-
ed that city officials, including police officers, may have taken part in an intim-
idation and harassment campaign to induce African Americans to move else-
where.276 An important point here is that law could be used to restrain and
condemn these norm-based discriminatory practices and regulations; legisla-
tures could craft laws to outlaw such discriminatory behavior, and strong en-
forcement of those laws could ensure that harassers are punished accordingly.
Law could be used to overcome or disrupt exclusionary architectural practices
as well.
C. A Clarification: Legal Exclusion Versus Architectural Exclusion
Before moving on to an analysis of architectural exclusion in the courts, it is
important to briefly solidify the distinction between that form of exclusion and
the foregoing material in this Part, which has primarily focused on legal, or
law-based, forms of exclusion. Legal exclusion concerns the use of traditional
In Syracuse, Ohio . . . no Negro is permitted to live, not even to stay overnight
under any consideration. This is an absolute rule in this year 1905, and has existed 
for several generations. The enforcement of this unwritten law is in the hands of
the boys from 8 to 20 years of age . . . [.] 
Id. at 228 (quoting For White Men Only, FAIRMONT FREE PRESS (W. Va.), Dec. 7, 1905).
Some working-class or multiclass sundown suburbs have passed ordinances re-
quiring teachers, firefighters, police officers, and other city workers to live within 
their corporate limits. Thus they can be assured that all their employees will be
white. . . . In turn, African Americans are ineligible to be hired for future open-
ings, since they would first have to move in to be considered. 
Id. at 253.
274. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 23 (noting that “informal and illegal violence and threats
remained as powerful constraints”); LOEWEN, supra note 273, at 257-77; MEYER, supra note
216, at 14 (“Anxious whites used violence and intimidation to keep African Americans off
their blocks. Blacks saw their homes bombed or stoned.”).
275. RUTH THOMPSON-MILLER ET AL., JIM CROW’S LEGACY: THE LASTING IMPACT OF SEGREGA-
TION 4 (2015).
276. Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] jury could
conclude that the officials targeted the organization’s black members in particular . . . .
[A]lthough the program had white clients, none of them reported police harassment to [the 
director]; all complaints of police harassment came from black clients.”).
1988
  
  
 
 
          
        
          
        
            
          
          
         
           
        
          
            
          
             
        
        
          
          
           
         
           
         
          
        
          
      
 
          
            
         
           
               
      
    
         
         
 
       
               
             
                
  
architectural exclusion
legal tools like ordinances and covenants to exclude people from certain loca-
tions, whereas architectural exclusion uses physical features of the built envi-
ronment to do so. Tools of legal exclusion are enforced by law enforcement of-
ficials, agencies, self-policing, and vigilante action, while architectural
exclusion is enforced by its very presence, which physically inhibits or hinders
passage. However, because so much of the built environment was created pur-
suant to laws, it is hard to decouple the two completely.277 
For example, legal exclusionary tools such as zoning and covenants were
primarily aimed at preventing certain races or classes of people from living or
owning property in a given area,278 and the legacy of those laws remains; many 
neighborhoods continue to be segregated nearly a century later.279 In contrast,
architectural exclusion is broader in that it prevents ease of access to or passage 
through a given location. A wall doesn’t mean that a person cannot enter a 
community or other space; it just makes it more difficult for him to do so.
Notwithstanding this important distinction, many examples of architectural
exclusion described in Part II—especially the urban-suburban transit divide
and the suburban use of confusing street designs—result in exclusion precisely
because the individuals being excluded do not live in the same neighborhood as
those doing the excluding. In these instances, architectural exclusion is possible
because of the legacy of legal exclusionary practices.280 The interaction between
the two forms of exclusion is perhaps less pronounced in the context of certain
physical architectural barriers, such as low bridges or difficult pedestrian cross-
ings, which will have an impact regardless of residential segregation.281 
Finally, architectural exclusion is perhaps less connected to the highly im-
portant values that we associate with private property ownership; zoning and
covenants implicate the right to exclude from private property in a way that
277. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 36, at 425 (noting that, in the context of land use, “legal inter-
vention into architecture . . . all but guarantees that there are no pure design solutions”).
278. Strahilevitz recognized this, stating that “[e]xclusionary zoning would be adequate to keep 
the poor from living in these communities.” Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 488.
279. See, e.g., Editorial, The Death of Michael Brown: Racial History Behind the Ferguson Protests,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racial-history
-behind-the-ferguson-protests.html [http://perma.cc/94JQ-RBBM] (discussing the pro-
tests and racial divide in Ferguson, Missouri, and noting that, “[u]ntil the late 1940s, blacks 
weren’t allowed to live in most suburban St. Louis County towns, kept out by restrictive
covenants”).
280. See supra Part IV.A (discussing legacy issues).
281. That said, although the placement and location of these physical barriers would have the
same effect on anyone who must pass under or through them, it may be more or less likely
that a person would need to pass under or through them based on the place that the person
lives, and where he or she is heading.
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rights of access to or passage through a public place do not.282 In the private
property context, society places value on the right to exclude.283 In contrast, we
tend to believe that public spaces should be open to all, and thus we do not 
value exclusion in that context.284 De jure residential segregation historically
required and allowed individuals to exclude in a way that is no longer permis-
sible.285 So while we value the right to exclude others from private property, we
place limits on the extent of and reasons for that exclusion.286 De jure residen-
tial segregation also resulted in architectural constraints to support and further
that segregation.287 Many examples of architectural exclusion addressed above
were constructed while de jure segregation was still in force—often with the
intent of furthering that segregation—and remain in place today. Although
most segregation by law is no longer permissible, its remnants—the legacy of 
that segregation—continue to exclude individuals from public spaces. Thus, we
are faced with a gap between the value that we purportedly place on exclusion
(it is valued in private but not public spaces) and the exclusion that we see on
the ground: our public streets and bridges, which should be equally accessible
to all, are often not. Architectural exclusion is pernicious in that it is invisible to
most, and yet it continues to solidify otherwise defunct forms of legal exclu-
sion.
282. The right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public . . . .”); Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and
Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 25 (2013) (“[T]he open and public space
that we share with others—in streets, public squares, and parks—is not a private environ-
ment. We cannot exclude fellow citizens from this space . . . .”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use As A
Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 125, 168 (2011) (“[T]angible public space is the open
arena where people share common resources that are not held in exclusive possession by any 
single person.”).
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. Sometimes necessity or need results in courts bending the right to exclude. See State v.
Shack, 277 A. 2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971) (holding that the right to exclude does not include
the right to bar access of governmental employees providing services to migrant workers).
287. See supra Part II.
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architectural exclusion
iv . architectural exclusion in the courts: a lack of
attention and success
A review of the limited case law and scholarly literature in this and related
areas suggests that there are two barriers to finding exclusionary architecture to
be an illegal form of regulation. The first is the failure of courts, legislatures,
and citizens to recognize that architecture regulates. The result is that many ex-
amples of architectural exclusion likely go unchallenged or are dismissed. The 
second is that, even if challengers and decision makers come around to under-
standing the idea of architecture as regulation, our existing jurisprudence is in-
sufficient to invalidate288 this form of exclusion.289 Existing legal protections
located in the federal Constitution and federal statutes have led courts to inval-
idate some traditional methods of exclusion, including racial zoning and racial-
ly restrictive covenants, but they have generally not been sufficient to curb ex-
clusionary zoning.290 This Part offers support for the argument that existing
legal protections are likely insufficient to deal with the problem of architectural 
exclusion. This is true despite the fact that “questions of racial equity . . . are so
vastly more salient in today’s moral universe”—and better answers to those 
questions are now more commonly accepted—than they were at the time that 
racial covenants and racial zoning were frequently used.291 These two barriers
contribute to the relative dearth of cases and scholarly articles addressing archi-
tectural exclusion.292 
A. A Failure To Recognize Architecture as Regulation
There are a number of reasons that potential challengers, courts, and legis-
lators might not take architectural exclusion into account, but key among these
is that architecture and law are, in many ways, fundamentally different as regu-
latory tools. Specifically, architecture is less explicitly regulatory than is law.
288. Invalidation of architectural exclusion could take the form of preventing its initial construc-
tion or of reconfiguring existing examples.
289. This is because of the difficulty of proving intent, especially in the context of architecture
and land use, and because not all exclusionary decisions are based on race. See, e.g., supra
notes 266-268 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part III.A. Much dialogue surrounding the development of civil rights law in the
United States focuses on actions that have a non-discriminatory justification, which could 
be pretextual. Architectural exclusion fits within that dialogue.
291. BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 196, at 57.
292. I say “relative” in comparison to the number of cases that the courts have heard concerning
other civil rights issues, and specifically, for example, school desegregation.
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Lessig refers to this as architecture “hid[ing] its pedigree.”293 As another com-
mentator notes, “architectural regulation operates surreptitiously and may not
even be perceived as governmental action. Architectural regulation thus allows
government to shape our actions without our perceiving that our experience 
has been deliberately shaped, engendering a loss of moral agency.”294 If indi-
viduals are unaware that architecture is deliberately shaping their behavior,
they may be less likely to bring a legal challenge against exclusion that results
from architecture because they might not perceive the architecture as the rea-
son for the exclusion, or as something that can or should be challenged in a
court of law.295 
For example, when someone crosses the road at one particular point instead
of another, or must walk a long distance to reach a bridge to cross over a high-
way, she is not likely consciously aware that an actual person or persons made
intentional decisions so that she would have to follow a certain path of ac-
cess.296 And even if one realizes that these architectural decisions were deliber-
ate, it is hard to know who actually made those design choices.297 The “career”
of a law is clearer than that of architectural regulation.298 Indeed, public partic-
ipation in the creation of laws is often more explicit and better understood than
participation in the architectural decisions that result in infrastructure and the
built environment.299 Unlike laws, architecture
293. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 98 (1999).
294. Tien, supra note 22, at 2, 5 (“Architecture . . . can affect us directly without our being aware 
of what it does. . . . Its effects are normatively significant because we often are not aware
that architecture is deliberately being used to constrain our action.”). Ironically, this is why
some scholars, including Sunstein, are drawn to the idea of architectural regulation: it pre-
serves a sense of freedom. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 54.
295. If the intent to discriminate is clear or obvious, even architecture could be actionable in
court. But it rarely will be obvious, and we often don’t even think to look for the intent be-
cause we don’t think that architecture regulates.
296. “Architecture operates ‘much more [on the] subconscious than [the] conscious. . . . [Y]ou
live in architecture, and it affects you whether you’re even conscious of it.’” Katyal, supra
note 21, at 1072 (quoting Avrel Seale, Architect Lawrence W. Speck and “The Vision Thing,”
TEX. ALCALDE, July-Aug. 1999).
297. “Often, we simply have no clue as to who made the key design decisions regarding our set-
tings or equipment.” Tien, supra note 22, at 10.
298. Id.
299. In describing a criticism of both architecture and “nudge,” or “choice architecture,” as a
form of regulation, one commentator notes that the “problem is that regulators perform this
substitution [for the coercive function of law] without reintroducing the procedural safe-
guards that usually attend the passage, interpretation, and enforcement of laws.” Ryan Calo,
Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 777 (2014). With respect to public participa-
tion in the creation of laws, see generally CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., TRANSPARENCY AND PUB-
LIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS V (2008), http://www.hks.harvard.edu
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architectural exclusion
does not necessarily have to pass through a political process. . . . [T]he
executive—the local police department or attorney general—does not
serve as a check on the legislature. And if the change makes [a certain] 
behavior impossible or unlikely, if there is no law to interpret or apply,
then the judiciary has neither need nor opportunity to get involved.300 
Here, it is useful to make a comparison to exclusionary zoning,301 which
unlike architectural exclusion, is clearly a form of regulation by law.302 Zoning
occurs through standard political processes and is well recognized by courts as
a form of regulation subject to their oversight. That said, exclusionary zoning
presents an interesting point of comparison: it occupies a middle ground be-
/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2EU-KDC4] (noting that federal
administrative agencies adopt procedures that provide notice to the public and encourage 
participation with the aim to improve the quality and legitimacy of the rulemaking process);
KARL T. KURTZ, LEGISLATURES AND CITIZENS: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND CONFIDENCE
IN THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1997), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/public/trust/LegCitizens
_PublicParticipation_Kurtz2.pdf [http://perma.cc/27QQ-AFTC] (“In a democracy, the
more people involved the better the result.”). That said, many cities do hold public meetings 
when considering road reconfiguration or the placement of transit stops. However, some of
those decisions are eventually determined through administrative processes. See, e.g., 
Sanchez et al., supra note 119, at ix (“State departments of transportation and Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations are responsible for planning transportation . . . . Although these
agencies are required to seek out and consider the needs of low-income and minority house-
holds, there are no effective mechanisms to ensure their compliance with this require-
ment.”).
300. Calo, supra note 299, at 781 (noting that architecture “can, but need not, be subject to the 
same procedural safeguards as law” and that “[o]ne branch of government (say a city coun-
cil) can decide to change the architecture of a road . . . and simply hire a contractor to carry 
out the decision”). On the other hand, some might argue that architectural decisions are
more visible than legal decision making because certain choices about infrastructure and ar-
chitecture are made at the local level, by institutions or councils to which citizens might have 
more access than the federal or state legislature.
301. See supra Part III.A.2.
302. See supra Part III.C. Zoning ordinances are adopted by elected bodies, whereas architectural
or infrastructural decisions are often administrative, and thus lack the imprimatur of law.
The extent to which this is true, however, is highly location dependent. For example, the
city of Portland, Maine, gives the city traffic engineer the authority to establish parking reg-
ulations—including residential parking designations—without requiring city council ap-
proval. PORTLAND, ME., CODE § 28-24(g)(1) (2013) (demonstrating that because authority
regarding “no parking any time” and metered parking changes are the only exceptions listed
regarding the city traffic engineer’s authority to establish parking regulations, all other types 
of parking determinations—such as residential parking—do not appear to require amend-
ment to the traffic schedule by the city council. § 28-24(g)(1)(i-ii) (2013)). In contrast, the
city of Charleston, South Carolina, requires any change in permit parking to be approved by
the city council before it can be implemented. CHARLESTON, SC., CODE § 19-268; see also E-
mail from Judy Crites, Office Manager, City of Charleston, to Patrick Lyons, Research As-
sistant, Univ. of Me. Sch. of Law (Apr. 11, 2014, 10:31:00 EST) (on file with author).
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tween racial zoning and restrictive covenants on the one hand, where the court
has forcefully acted to strike down exclusionary practices, and architectural ex-
clusion on the other, where it has not. And although exclusionary zoning is 
mostly not actionable,303 there have been many law review articles discussing 
it, and it is covered in depth in land-use casebooks.304 This is not true of archi-
tectural exclusion, although it is also mostly not actionable under current juris-
prudence. This raises the question: why is exclusionary zoning covered by
scholars and courts, while architectural exclusion is mostly not? Perhaps this 
difference is due in part to the fact that exclusionary zoning is a form of legal
exclusion, which is more readily challenged by aggrieved citizens and which is
more recognizable to courts and scholars.305 
In addition to the fact that architecture is a less express means of regulation
than is law, architectural constraints are experienced differently than are legal
constraints. As Lessig notes in the context of cyberlaw, “constraints of architec-
ture in real space—railroad tracks that divide neighborhoods, bridges that
block the access of buses, constitutional courts located miles from the seat of
the government—they are experienced as conditions on one’s access to areas of 
cyberspace.”306 A person therefore experiences architecture physically; the
physical design of the built environment affects a person’s ability to travel or
move around in that environment.307 Law constrains behavior, while architec-
ture constrains physical movement and hence behavior.308 
The physical nature of architectural regulation also relates to the ways in
which the temporal constraints imposed by law differ from those imposed by
303. See supra Part III.A.2; see also ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 778 (“Most state courts
continue to attach a presumption of validity even to municipal land use controls that admit-
tedly exclude lower-cost housing (absent evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose), and
merely require that the controls be rationally related to some permissible governmental ob-
jective.”). But see supra note 194 (discussing successful disparate impact claims under the
FHA).
304. See, e.g., ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 758-94 (noting, in the section titled, “Discrimi-
nation Against Low- and Moderate-Income Housing,” that in the 1970s “reformers har-
bored considerable hope that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution
would lead to the demise of zoning that had the effect of excluding lower-cost housing for
poor or working-class families . . . the Supreme Court refused to cooperate”).
305. See supra Part III.C (discussing legal versus architectural exclusion).
306. Lessig, supra note 20, at 509.
307. Nick Scharf, Life Through a Lens: A “Lessigan” Model for Understanding Digital Copyright In-
fringement?, 16 J. INTERNET L. 18, 26 (2012) (“The modality of ‘architecture’ represents the
physical burdens in existence . . . .”).
308. Tien, supra note 22, at 4 (describing architectural regulation as “government action directed
at the real-world conditions of human activity, tangible or intangible, which in turn affects
what people can or are likely to do”).
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architectural exclusion
architecture: law regulates both before and after the fact, while architecture 
regulates only before the fact, as a “present constraint” on action.309 For exam-
ple, say that there is a large wall along a line that divides public property from
private property. Law controls after the fact here in that if you scale the wall, or
somehow enter the private property, you are trespassing; you are breaking the
law and can be sanctioned for doing so—through arrest, jail time, or a fine.310 
After you have crossed the line, and broken the law, the law’s sanctions may be
enforced against you. But law also regulates before the fact. For example, you
may decide not to scale the wall, and not to enter the private property, because
of the existence of the law. Assuming you know about the law and its sanc-
tions, it influences—or constrains—your behavior. You may decide that the ac-
tion—scaling the wall or entering the private property—is insufficiently valua-
ble to run the risk of the sanction. Because violation of the law comes with
after-the-fact sanctions, the consequences of law-breaking explicitly play into
your before-the-fact decision-making process. Notably, norms also constrain in
this way: perhaps you would face social sanctions from your neighbors if you
scaled the wall, as it might be “unneighborly” to enter another’s private prop-
erty.311 
In contrast, let us assume that the wall is very high and smooth; it is so
high and smooth that it cannot be scaled without very expensive equipment
and a high level of skill. And it is solid and goes on for miles; there is no way 
through this wall, and getting around it would require a long journey. The wall
separates the public from the private property in this location; you will not be
able to enter the private property unless you have the equipment, skill, and
time to circumvent the wall. This is an architectural constraint: the existence of
the wall stops you—before the fact—from entering the private property. While
you had to undergo a relatively complex thought process to conclude that you
should not climb the wall because of the legal consequences of doing so, your
decision not to climb the wall because it is physically difficult to do so is a more
intuitive—perhaps even subconscious—process of reasoning. Although the ex-
istence of the wall constrains and shapes behavior just as much as, if not more
than, law, we often do not consider the existence of the wall—the architecture
itself—to be a form of regulation. One reason for this is likely that it is not 
something people—including judges and legislators—naturally consider to be
within the purview of a court of law or a legal analysis.
309. Id. at 3, 7 (citing LESSIG, supra note 293, at 237).
310. See LESSIG, supra note 293, at 237 (discussing law and norms as after-the-fact regulation, and
architecture as a present constraint on action). Of course, law may also serve a deterrent
function.
311. Id. (noting that norms and law prevent a person from breaking into a neighbor’s home to
access her air conditioning, while a lock on the door is a form of architectural constraint).
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Another differentiating factor between architecture and law relates to the
way in which each is disobeyed and the consequences for doing so. As I have
already mentioned, when a person disobeys a law, she acts in the face of a rule
that says she cannot do something, and then she suffers after-the-fact sanc-
tions.312 In contrast, “[d]isobedience of architectural regulation . . . involves ei-
ther [1] exit from the architected system or [2] circumvention of the architected
constraint.”313 In the context of the built environment, it is often quite difficult
to physically circumvent an architectural constraint.314 This is because the
physical environment is enduring and often hard to change. For example, if an
area without access to public transportation has only a single bridge connecting
one community with another, and that bridge is three miles away, a person
without access to personal transportation who is physically able-bodied could
ostensibly walk the distance to the bridge. However, that person would also
need to have the time to do so. On the other hand, she could seek to bypass the
architectural constraint by finding transportation—asking a friend for a ride or
borrowing a bicycle.315 With respect to the first option, “exit from the architect-
ed system,” a person would have to leave the excluded community entirely in
order to disobey the architectural constraint.316 
312. Id.
313. Tien, supra note 22, at 10.
314. For example, we do not need laws to prevent large buildings from being stolen; their archi-
tecture protects them and effectively prohibits their theft. Lessig, supra note 20, at 523 (“We
have special laws to protect against the theft of autos, or boats. We do not have special laws 
to protect against the theft of skyscrapers. Skyscrapers take care of themselves. The architec-
ture of real space . . . protects skyscrapers much more effectively than law. Architecture is an
ally of skyscrapers (making them impossible to move); it is an enemy of cars, and planes
(making them quite easy to move).”).
315. Of course, breaking the law and circumventing the architectural constraint are sometimes
one and the same; examples are going the wrong way down a one-way street or parking in a
residential parking permit zone without such a permit.
316. Because excluded communities are often also poor or underserved, exit is not always a real
choice. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing exit and voice). Indeed, part of
architectural exclusion is that a person actually cannot get out (or in)–either due to physical
barriers that make it difficult or the lack of transit options. Further, the lack of a true ability
to exit is one of the strongest arguments against Tiebout’s theory, which suggested that
communities provide different goods and services that appeal to different types of people 
and that people will seek out a community that provides them with the most appealing
goods and services. Compare Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956), with Nick Gill & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Do Citizens Really Shop Be-
tween Decentralized Jurisdictions?: Tiebout and Internal Migration Revisited, 16 SPACE & POLITY
175 (2012) (noting that analysis of other nations suggests that there is only a weak link be-
tween migration among jurisdictions and decentralization), and Kenneth Bickers & Richard
N. Engstrom, Tiebout Sorting in Metropolitan Areas, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1181 (2006) (finding
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architectural exclusion
Although regulation through architecture is different from legal regulation
in all of these ways, the two share some key features. Most importantly, just as
law has been used to shape behavior, design has been used across time and
civilizations to perpetuate desired systems of belief.317 Although we easily rec-
ognize that the law has this function, the idea that architecture also shapes
tastes is much less common in the legal literature.318 However, the idea of ar-
chitecture as social control is foundational to social science fields such as geog-
raphy, environmental psychology, and planning.319 Further, research supports
the notion that the built environment communicates;320 it functions as a sym-
bol, expressing the views of those who create it and imposing those views on 
those who interact with it each day.321 The philosopher Martin Heidegger, in
discussing buildings and the built environment, noted our tendency to consid-
er architecture as merely architecture, as opposed to—or at least prior to— 
symbolic expression. He wrote:
random sorting among municipalities in the Houston and Atlanta metropolitan areas).
However, in order to uproot and move to a more appealing community, a person needs re-
sources, including money and job flexibility.
317. Katyal, supra note 21, at 1043 (“Research in architectural theory and environmental psychol-
ogy reveals that architects influence, in subtle ways, the paths by which we live and think.”).
318. See supra Part I; see also SCOTT, supra note 29, at 117-32; Boddie, supra note 57, at 442 (“The
theory that space might be used for social control may be foreign to constitutional law
. . . .”); Katyal, supra note 21, at 1087 (“The theory of how architecture shapes tastes has
been developed within the field of environmental psychology and has been largely ignored 
by law schools due to their focus on the use of legal codes to regulate conduct.”).
319. See supra Part I.A; see also EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 4 (1966) (“[B]oth
man and his environment participate in molding each other. Man is now in the position of actu-
ally creating the total world in which he lives . . . . In creating this world he is actually de-
termining what kind of an organism he will be. This is a frightening thought in view of how
very little is known about man. It also means that, in a very deep sense, our cities are creat-
ing different types of people in their slums, mental hospitals, prisons, and suburbs.”); Bod-
die, supra note 57, at 442; Katyal, supra note 21, at 1131-32.
320. JOHN ZEISEL, SOCIOLOGY AND ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 26 (1975) (describing how the built
environment “express[es] individual group affiliation . . . [and] send[s] informal public 
messages”).
321. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 166
(2011) (“The capacity of local governments to change the physical architecture of communi-
ties is an important way that local governments influence individual lifestyles and behaviors
. . . .”); see also 9 + 1 Ways of Being Political: 50 Years of Political Stances in Architecture and Ur-
ban Design, MUSEUM MODERN ART, http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/1313
[http://perma.cc/E72E-2XG5] (“The political potential of architecture was one of the found-
ing credos of the avant-garde in the early 20th century. Yet today it is commonly believed
that this potential has been overwhelmed by economic realities and by the sense that archi-
tecture, by its very nature, is symbiotic with existing power structures.”).
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People think of the bridge as primarily and really merely a bridge; after
that, and occasionally, it might possibly express much else besides; and
as such an expression it would then become a symbol . . . . But the 
bridge, if it is a true bridge, is never first of all a mere bridge and then 
afterward a symbol.322 
This sentiment certainly brings to mind Moses’s Long Island bridges,323 which
existed not just to carry people over the expressway but also to exclude people 
from Jones Beach at the end of the expressway. Another architectural scholar
writing on the subject noted that buildings are not just buildings, but “mediat-
ing objects through which we create a world for ourselves and enter into a dia-
logue with the world around us.”324 Though research suggests that design
functions in this way, “we usually do not stop to inquire whether a given device
might have been designed and built in such a way that it produces a set of con-
sequences logically and temporally prior to any of its professed uses.”325 
Despite the fact that both law and design control behavior, many fail to
view the important symbolism or purpose behind many architectural deci-
sions.326 For this reason, people aggrieved by architecture may be less likely to
think of bringing a lawsuit to challenge its injustices. Further, some courts
simply do not see a role for judges in the context of decisions about the built
322. Martin Heidegger, Building Dwelling Thinking, in POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 143, 153
(Albert Hofstadter trans., Harper & Row 1971). Foucault, in his discussions of the Panopti-
con, noted that “architecture can shape tastes. When architecture ‘is no longer built simply
to be seen . . . but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control[;] . . . architecture 
. . . operate[s] to transform individuals.’” Katyal, supra note 21, at 1131-32 (quoting MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 171 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) 
(1975)).
323. Caro, supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
324. Gunter A. Dittmar, Architecture as Dwelling and Building Design as Ontological Act, CLOUD
CUCKOO LAND 5 (1998), http://www.cloud-cuckoo.net/openarchive/wolke/eng/Subjects
/982/Dittmar/dittmar_t.html [http://perma.cc/V72S-RMPA]; see also Joerges, supra note 28, 
at 412 (“Architects, for instance, may want people to communicate, and can then design
their office buildings accordingly.”). This idea of designing a space to foster certain types of
discussions or interactions was examined in the work of architect and artist Lebbeus Woods.
See Lebbeus Woods - Biography, EUR. GRADUATE SCH., http://www.egs.edu/faculty/lebbeus
-woods/biography [http://perma.cc/J8ZL-6LJB] (“Woods works independently and creates
various conceptual and experimental projects based on his theoretical positions regarding
the role of architecture as a political force in society.”).
325. Winner, supra note 28, at 125.
326. Architectural features often appear as mere design choices to uninformed observers. AMOS
RAPOPORT, THE MEANING OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT: A NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 
APPROACH 139 (1982) (noting that in parts of the Middle East, sloped roofs are viewed as a
status symbol and flat roofs as a symbol of poverty; those who have sloped roofs are giving
up space that could otherwise be used for sleeping and working).
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architectural exclusion
environment.327 For example, in Nashville, Tennessee, white members of the
business community along with state highway officials decided to direct high-
way I-40 through the black community in North Nashville, even though such a
route was indirect.328 A federal lawsuit, brought by black and white citizens
with interests in North Nashville, failed to stop the construction of the high-
way.329 The plaintiffs raised due process and equal protection claims, alleging
“that construction of the highway segment as planned will cause substantial
damage to the North Nashville community, erecting a physical barrier between 
this predominantly Negro area and other parts of Nashville.”330 However, the
district court held that “[m]ost of the evidence presented by plaintiffs goes to 
the wisdom and not to the legality of the highway department’s decision.”331 
The court of appeals affirmed, finding no denial of due process or equal protec-
tion in the selection of the route, and instead determined that the “routing of 
highways is the prerogative of the executive department of government, not
the judiciary” and that the “minimizing of hardships and adverse economic ef-
fects is a problem addressing itself to engineers, not judges.”332 One could view 
this as a prime example of a court suggesting that architecture is not its busi-
ness; the court failed to see this architectural decision as a regulatory decision 
with which it should be concerned. Rather, it saw the architectural decision as
an issue for planners, engineers, and the executive—rather than the legislative
or judicial—branches of government.333 
327. Similarly, research also suggests that most courts do not consider the racial setting or com-
munity history and demographics (referred to as “racial territoriality”) underlying decisions 
and actions that take place in a given community. See Boddie, supra note 57.
328. Mohl, supra note 153, at 31; see also HELEN LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAY—SUPERHOAX 177-80
(1970); Richard J. Whalen, The American Highway: Do We Know Where We’re Going?, SAT-
URDAY EVENING POST, Dec. 14, 1968, at 22-24, 57-58. This decision was made at a nonpublic 
meeting. Mohl, supra note 153, at 31.
329. See Nashville I-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
330. Id. at 181.
331. Id (quoting memorandum opinion of district court). When a court determines that a given
issue goes to wisdom and not legality, it has determined that the issue at hand either does
not implicate legal matters, or it does not violate the law. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 795 F. Supp. 175, 182 (W.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, 18 F.3d 269 (4th
Cir. 1994), rev’d, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that “the plaintiffs’ complaints about the
Guidelines are more properly directed at the wisdom and not the legality of the restrictions. 
. . . [because] the Board’s Guidelines are reasonable and do not violate any of the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights”); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
73, 76 (2007) (“The ‘properly limited’ role of the courts in a democratic society is to rule on-
ly on the legality, and not on the wisdom, of the decisions of political officials.”).
332. 387 F.2d at 185.
333. Of course, one could argue that courts regularly defer to administrative agencies when those 
agencies possess expertise on a given matter; perhaps the same reasoning applies to the 
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B. The Jurisprudence of Exclusion Fails To Account for Architecture
1. Claims: Laws That Could Be Used To Challenge Architectural Exclusion
In some instances, the barrier to striking down architectural exclusion is
not a public or court that fails to recognize the regulatory nature of architec-
ture, but rather the failure of our existing discrimination and exclusion juris-
prudence to address architectural exclusion adequately. (Indeed, it is often in-
sufficient for addressing legal forms of exclusion more generally.334) When
analyzing exclusion through traditional legal methods, such as those addressed
in Part III, plaintiffs and courts tend to focus on a few common provisions. If
the government is the perpetrator of the alleged offensive action, then plaintiffs
rely on the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution335 and, to a lesser
extent, the Due Process Clause336 and the Thirteenth Amendment.337 When the
plaintiff’s claim is her attempt to secure property rights or status as a home-
owner or renter, it is also common to see claims relying on statutes,338 includ-
court’s willingness to defer to engineers and planners in the case of architectural decisions. 
However, it is also possible that the court here is not deferring to the administrators about
design decisions merely because they have expertise in those matters, but because it does not
view those design decisions as legal issues at all.
334. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that existing jurisprudence is often insufficient for 
addressing exclusionary zoning).
335. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141– 
43 (1971).
336. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Holmes v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
337. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-29 (1981); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971); Crenshaw v. City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-57
(N.D. Fla. 1995); Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 880 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d, 733 F.2d
318 (4th Cir. 1984).
338. See, e.g., Sanchez et al., supra note 119, at ix (“Civil rights laws such as Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 . . . provide some legal protections for minority communities faced with 
discriminatory transportation policies. Enforcement of these protections, however, has been 
limited and should be increased. Currently there are no generally accepted measures or 
standards by which to gauge whether transportation planning and outcomes of transporta-
tion policies are equitable, and it is extremely difficult to enforce any requirements for equi-
table transportation policies.”).
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architectural exclusion
ing section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866339 and the Fair Housing Act.340 
Plaintiffs often raise state constitutional claims as well.341 These same claims 
arise in the context of architectural exclusion, with varying degrees of suc-
342 cess.
To the extent that courts have examined issues of architectural exclusion,343 
they have often done so in the context of transportation—road closures,344 road
design,345 and the structure of transit systems.346 As the cases below suggest,
claims concerning architectural exclusion often sound in equal protection and
section 1982.347 A successful equal protection claim requires a plaintiff to show
that race was a reason for an exclusionary decision. However, as Elise Boddie 
recognized, “[t]he requirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent to
339. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 states that “[a]ll citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2012); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 27:8 (Westlaw) (noting that “exclusionary zoning cases often include a § 1982 claim”).
340. The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling 
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” which
could apply to architectural exclusion that blocks access to a person’s home. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a) (2012); SCHWEMM, supra note 339, § 27:8 (“Though § 1982 remains available to
curb public discrimination, the Fair Housing Act has now become the principal weapon
against government land-use restrictions that are racially discriminatory.”). However, the
examples of architectural exclusion in this Article are broader than claims surrounding ac-
cess to housing; they speak to access to and through entire communities. See, e.g., Southend
Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209, 1212 (7th Cir.
1984) (suggesting that section 3604(a) requires a strong connection between the activity
that is challenged and evidence that the activity will result in the denial or unavailability of 
housing).
341. McDougall, supra note 235, at 623-24.
342. While a complete analysis of all of these claims is beyond the scope of this Article, this sec-
tion will examine a few cases that address architectural exclusion and glean lessons from
these claims.
343. What follows is not a complete list of every case that has considered architectural exclusion.
Rather, it represents a diligent effort to locate cases addressing issues relevant to the theme
of this Article. 
344. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981). Some road closure cases in-
volve challenges to actions by private parties by their neighbors. See, e.g., Evans v. Tubbe,
657 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981); Jennings v. Patterson, 460 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th
Cir. 1972).
345. Greer v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C-6338, 1996 WL 169414 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1996).
346. See, e.g., Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 
1115 (9th Cir. 2009); N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995);
Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10895 (E.D. Pa
1990), aff’d, 935 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1991).
347. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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establish an equal protection claim and cramped judicial interpretations of in-
tent have significantly narrowed the practical scope and significance of consti-
tutional law for redressing persistent racial inequality.”348 Again, this is true
not just in the case of architectural exclusion, but also with respect to more tra-
ditional, legal forms of exclusion.349 
In the architectural exclusion cases discussed below, successful plaintiffs 
tend to prevail on claims under section 1982.350 To allege a violation of section
1982, a plaintiff must show that the conduct of the defendants has impaired her
property (or contract) interest.351 Cases suggest that a plaintiff will be more
likely to succeed if she can demonstrate that she has been intentionally discrim-
inated against,352 although the Supreme Court has not ruled out the possibility 
that discriminatory effect might be sufficient.353 Section 1982 cases are explicitly
about race as opposed to socioeconomic status; a poor, white plaintiff would
not have a claim under section 1982. Further, the plaintiffs in the cases I exam-
ined are often members of racial or ethnic minorities who own or lease proper-
348. Boddie, supra note 57, at 411 (footnote omitted). Unless the discriminatory intent behind an
exclusionary architectural decision is made quite clear, it is generally not actionable. Even if
there is discriminatory intent, in the context of infrastructure decisions, that intent is gener-
ally mixed in with more legitimate reasons. Even in the context of exclusion by law, it is
quite common that “the applicable law or ordinance was facially neutral though its impact 
was felt exclusively or disproportionately by blacks.” Austin, supra note 118, at 672.
349. See supra Part III.C (discussing architectural and legal exclusion).
350. See supra note 339.
351. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981) (“[T]he threshold inquiry under
§ 1982 must focus on the relationship between the [defendant’s conduct] and the property
interests of the [plaintiff].”). This provision relates more to property transfers and holdings 
than access. One problem with using section 1982 in the context of architectural exclusion is
that it relies on the African-American plaintiff’s possession of a stake in a piece of property.
Architectural exclusion, understood broadly, is more about restricting access, regardless of
where the excluded person lives. That said, it will often be the case that the access restriction
is imposed between a black neighborhood and a wealthy, white one. If that is the case, the
statute has more applicability. Of course, it does not apply to situations that exclude poor 
people who are not people of color.
352. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 839 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (“Appellants’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 are duplicative with their FHA disparate treatment claim, as the un-
derlying constitutional violations for these claims require a showing of discriminatory in-
tent.”); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[P]laintiffs who
make claims under § 1982 . . . have been required to allege that some intentional discrimina-
tion took place.”).
353. See Schwemm, supra note 339, §§ 27:4, 27:8, 27:19 (“The Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether § 1982 includes a discriminatory effect standard.”).
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architectural exclusion
ty and who are challenging small-scale examples of exclusionary architecture.354 
The line of section 1982 cases suggests that plaintiffs who are trying to bring a
claim based not on a right of property ownership or possession, but rather on a
right of access to or through a place (the broader concept of architectural exclu-
sion addressed in this Article), might have less success using the Civil Rights 
Act; these plaintiffs would have to demonstrate, for example, that their exclu-
sion was a result of the place that they lived, and therefore resulted in the im-
pairment of a property or contractual interest.355 
2. Holdings: Application of Relevant Law to Architectural Exclusion
The highest-profile case addressing architectural exclusion was the Su-
preme Court’s analysis of a road closure in City of Memphis v. Greene.356 In that
case, the city of Memphis closed off a street that connected a white neighbor-
hood, Hein Park, to a black neighborhood, after white residents petitioned for
the road’s closure.357 The given reasons for the street closing were to reduce
traffic through the white neighborhood; to increase safety for children in the
neighborhood; and to reduce “traffic pollution” like noise and trash.358 This
“traffic pollution” was allegedly coming from the adjacent black neighbor-
hood.359 While the white residents initially petitioned for the closure of four
streets, the city denied that request and determined that the closing of a single
street was sufficient to remedy the complaints.360 The physical manifestation of
the city’s decision to close the street involved granting a portion of land to the
property owners who lived at the far north end of the street to be closed and
erecting a barrier at “the precise point of black-white neighborhood separa-
354. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (“[Section] 1982 operates upon the
unofficial acts of private individuals . . . .”); SCHWEMM, supra note 339, § 27:14 (noting that
“[s]ome plaintiffs, such as black homeseekers who are the direct objects of the defendant’s 
discrimination, are so obviously the intended beneficiaries of § 1982 that their standing is
beyond question”); id. § 27:15 (noting that “minority homeseekers have standing to sue un-
der § 1982 whenever a developer, landlord, homeowners’ group, or any other defendant de-
nies them the right to buy, rent, or negotiate for housing”); see also Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that a white homeowner who wanted to
rent his house to an African-American tenant had standing under section 1982 when de-
fendants interfered with his actions).
355. See infra notes 371-373 and accompanying text.
356. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
357. See id. at 102-05.
358. Id. at 104.
359. Boddie, supra note 57, at 416.
360. Greene, 451 U.S. at 103-04 (noting that the city denied the residents’ request to close all four 
streets “[a]fter receiving objections from the police, fire, and sanitation departments”).
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tion.”361 So the owners of this new property also gained the right to exclude
others, including pedestrians, from the property (exclusion being an essential
stick in the bundle of rights), and the physical barrier that was erected was suf-
ficient to keep out motor vehicles.362 
The plaintiffs—individuals and civic associations who sued on behalf of a
class of black people who “own or stand to inherit property” in the black
neighborhood affected by the closing—raised section 1982 and 1983 and Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.363 The Sixth Circuit found that the
road closure constituted a badge of slavery in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a remedy under section
1982.364 That court held that the street closing would negatively affect black
members of the community while benefiting white members; that the barrier
between the white and black neighborhoods would limit contact between those
groups; that the closure was racially motivated; and that evidence showed that
the black homes would depreciate in value.365 The Supreme Court overturned
the Sixth Circuit, finding that the circuit court made its decision based on fac-
tual determinations that were not supported by the record,366 and dismissed
the plaintiffs’ claims.367 
The Court found that there was “no evidence that the closing was motivat-
ed by any racially exclusionary desire.”368 Rather, the Court acknowledged the
legitimate tranquility and safety-related traffic concerns espoused by City
Council members and residents at the public hearings.369 Consequently, be-
cause it found discriminatory intent lacking, the Court quickly dismissed the 
equal protection claim.370 
361. Boddie, supra note 57, at 416.
362. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that it is unclear
whether the new owners of the property will bar all foot traffic, but that “the proposed con-
veyance will leave them with the absolute right to do so if they wish”).
363. 451 U.S. at 105 n.6.
364. 610 F.2d at 405.
365. See 451 U.S. at 109-10 (explaining the holding of the lower court).
366. See, e.g., id. at 117-19 (discussing the lack of sufficient evidence regarding effects on property
values).
367. Id. at 128-29.
368. Id. at 114.
369. Id. at 114-16, 119. Both here and in the context of the forthcoming analysis, it is possible that
the Court was not saying that architectural exclusion can never be unconstitutional, but ra-
ther that it did not want to turn every single architectural decision into a question of federal
law.
370. Id. at 119.
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architectural exclusion
Turning to the section 1982 claim, the Court said that the key inquiry con-
cerned the relationship between the closing of the street and the plaintiffs’
property interests. The Court noted that “if the street closing severely restricted
access to black homes,” that type of property infringement would violate sec-
tion 1982 “because blacks would then be hampered in the use of their proper-
ty.”371 However, in the case at hand, the only injury was that the black residents
could not travel on one particular public street and had to use others instead;
this injury was not an “impairment to the kind of property interests” protected
by section 1982.372 This reasoning suggests the statute would not necessarily
assist those whose rights of access through or to certain places were being hin-
dered by the city in a way that was unrelated to their ownership or possession 
of property, which is often the case in the context of architectural exclusion.373 
Further, although the Court did not tie this point directly to its section 1982
analysis, the majority also found that, although the road closing would pri-
marily affect black drivers, “the extent of the inconvenience [was] not great.”374 
This suggests that the Civil Rights Act would protect those who owned or
leased property only if their access was severely restricted, and not if the access
restriction were slight.
Indeed, the Greene Court distinguished a similar Fifth Circuit case, Jennings
v. Patterson, on the grounds that the restriction in Greene was not “severe,”
whereas the barricade in Jennings “severely” restricted the access of the black
neighbors to their property.375 In Jennings, the defendants, who were white,
constructed a barricade on the road on which their houses were located.376 This
barricade prevented their black neighbors from using the western half of the
road, which required them to travel an additional two miles to reach town.377 
In contrast, the sole white resident of that neighborhood was offered an ease-
ment to pass through the barricade.378 The city refused to remove the barri-
371. Id. at 123.
372. Id. at 124.
373. For example, Moses’s low bridges did not adversely affect a property interest; rather, they
adversely affected individuals who were reliant on public transit.
374. Greene, 451 U.S. at 111-12, 120-24; see also Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v.
Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1212 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that “[t]he impact of an alleg-
edly wrongful activity clearly must be more than negligible to constitute a cognizable
claim”).
375. Greene, 451 U.S. at 123 n.36; see Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974).
376. Jennings v. Patterson, 460 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th Cir. 1972).
377. Jennings, 488 F.2d at 439.
378. Id.
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cade.379 The Jennings court held that “[c]learly, these persons, because they are 
black, have been denied the right to hold and enjoy their property on the same
basis as white citizens,”380 and so found a violation of various provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act, including section 1982.381 
Justice Marshall, who was joined in dissent in Greene by Justices Brennan 
and Blackmun, would have interpreted section 1982 more broadly and would 
have found a violation based on the facts in Greene.382 He stated: “[U]ntil today
I would have thought that a city’s erection of a barrier, at the behest of a histor-
ically all-white community, to keep out predominantly Negro traffic, would
have been among the least of [section 1982’s] prohibitions.”383 Unlike the ma-
jority, Justice Marshall appears to take into account the racial geography at play
in Hein Park, considering “the street closure against the backdrop of the pro-
tracted history of racial segregation and racial separateness in Memphis,” as
opposed to viewing the street closure as an isolated incident.384 
Finally, the majority found that the inconvenience that resulted from the
road closure did not measure up to the type of restraint on liberty that the
Thirteenth Amendment meant to eliminate.385 The Court stated that “the fact
that most of the drivers who will be inconvenienced by the action are black” is
of “symbolic significance,”386 but failed to afford weight to that symbolism.387 
There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, as Justice Marshall
noted, just because an act is symbolic does not mean that courts are free to ig-
379. See id. at 441.
380. Id. at 442.
381. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985 (2012). The court found that the plaintiffs were injured, in
part, because they were denied “convenient access to downtown.” Jennings, 488 F.2d at 442.
382. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 136-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 153.
384. Boddie, supra note 57, at 456-57; see also Greene, 451 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]s the District Court found, Hein Park ‘was developed well before World War II as an
exclusive residential neighborhood for white citizens and these characteristics have been
maintained.’”); THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 43
(1996) (describing Hein Park as “all-white, a situation first established by a set of racial cov-
enants that precluded the sale of any property to anyone of another race”).
385. The goal of the Thirteenth Amendment is to “abolish slavery of whatever name and form
and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor
free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another’s benefit.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
386. Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
387. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate them from others . . . sole-
ly because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the communi-
ty . . . .”).
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architectural exclusion
nore it.388 Further, the majority failed to recognize that the harm was in fact
more than merely symbolic and stigmatizing.389 The road closure resulted in
physical exclusion and directly regulated the behavior of individuals who lived
in the predominantly black neighborhood. Whether the inconvenience of hav-
ing to drive along another street is onerous or not, it required a change in be-
havior. Justice Marshall seems to have understood this point in a way that the
majority did not.
Greene also suggests that the Court hewed to Blomley’s idea of “traffic log-
ic,” wherein traffic engineers and city administrators are primarily interested in
traffic flow and do not focus on the exclusionary effects of their decisions,
though exclusion might be the result.390 Here, the majority found that
[a]lmost any traffic regulation—whether it be a temporary detour dur-
ing construction, a speed limit, a one-way street, or a no-parking sign— 
may have a differential impact on residents of adjacent or nearby
neighborhoods. Because urban neighborhoods are so frequently charac-
terized by a common ethnic or racial heritage, a regulation’s adverse 
impact on a particular neighborhood will often have a disparate effect
on an identifiable ethnic or racial group.391 
There is a lot to unpack here. First, the Court referred to examples of architec-
tural exclusion as “traffic regulation[s].”392 In doing so, the Court seemed to
acknowledge (as did the plaintiffs who brought this lawsuit) that design deci-
sions can regulate, but the Court also downplayed these forms of regulation
and suggested that they were not something that the Court needed to consider
seriously. The majority used traffic logic to characterize traffic restrictions as 
innocuous; it ignored the idea that these restrictions might have pernicious
undertones and failed to acknowledge a key tenet of urban planning scholar-
ship—that our built environment often “embod[ies] a systematic social ine-
quality.”393 Further, the court ignored the underlying reasons that neighbor-
hoods often share a “common ethnic or racial heritage.”394 When the majority
388. Greene, 451 U.S. at 152-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t defies the lessons of history and
law to assert that if the harm is only symbolic, then the federal courts cannot recognize it.”).
389. Id. (“It is simply unrealistic to suggest, as does the Court, that the harm suffered by re-
spondents has no more than ‘symbolic significance’ . . . .”).
390. Blomley, supra note 44, at 55.
391. Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
392. Id.
393. Winner, supra note 3, at 124.
394. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 128; PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 72 (1997)
(“[T]he [Greene] Court closes its eyes and ears to segregated housing patterns, racial hostil-
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states that “the inconvenience of the drivers is a function of where they live and
where they regularly drive—not a function of their race,”395 it forgets that the
location where these individuals live and drive is itself a function of their race:
the white neighborhood at issue in this case was originally created to be an ex-
clusively white neighborhood through the use of racially restrictive cove-
nants.396 
This case presents an example of architectural exclusion that was recog-
nized by plaintiffs, who thought to bring a lawsuit, but it also demonstrates
that our current jurisprudence, as applied by the Court, is likely insufficient to
remedy the problem. In one sense, the majority’s holding in Greene follows a
long line of exclusion-by-law cases that fail due to a lack of intent and likely re-
flects little more than the fact that the Supreme Court’s approach to discrimi-
nation is generally more restrictive than it could be.397 But at base, Greene is not
merely an example of a city using its laws to keep individuals out.398 Rather, it
is an example of a white community accomplishing its goal of keeping out
black neighbors through the use of an architectural device—the barrier—rather 
than through the use of an impermissible legal device like a racially restrictive
covenant or express zoning ordinance.399 
Justice Marshall was able to see the exclusionary built environment in a
way that the majority of his colleagues on the Court could not. He focused on
“the significance of the barrier itself,” not just the legitimate traffic and safety
ity, and the power of the white property owners to get the City of Memphis to do its racist
bidding.”); see also supra Part III (examining the laws and norms that led to racial and socio-
economic exclusion from certain parts of a given community and surveying judicial and leg-
islative treatment of those traditional forms of legal regulation).
395. Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
396. ROSS, supra note 384, at 43 (“After the legal demise of [racially restrictive] covenants, private
understandings maintained the exclusive character of Hein Park.”).
397. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEO. L.J. 279, 338 (1997) (claiming that the Supreme Court takes a limited view of discrimi-
nation).
398. Others, in addition to the majority, seemed to view it this way. For example, an amici stated,
“The sanctioning by this Court of the closing of West Drive may very well signal to white
communities all over the country that municipal zoning power is available to physically ex-
clude ‘undesirable elements,’ definable in racial terms, and thereby create a virtually all
white ‘oasis’ in the midst of a rapidly deteriorating nether world.” Brief for the Affirmative
Action Coordinating Center et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-3, Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (No. 79-1176),
1980 WL 339376. But here, this was not merely a zoning law that made it difficult for these
individuals to access a place; it was physical exclusion.
399. See Brief for Respondents Owens, Cross, and Burse at 3-4, Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (No. 79-
1176), 1980 WL 339375 (noting that a black civic association’s petition to the City Council
stated that “this closing symbolize[d] in unmistakable terms a white neighborhood shutting
its door on its adjacent Black and integrated communities”).
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architectural exclusion
justifications for it.400 Perhaps this is because he was “able to see through legal
complexities and grasp real human suffering underneath the abstraction.”401 
Or, as the first black Supreme Court Justice, perhaps he understood implicit
racial bias better than did his colleagues.402 It is known that Justice Marshall
believed his colleagues to be insensitive to issues pertaining to racism: “‘“You
can’t name one member of this Court who knew anything about Negroes be-
fore he came to this Court.” Most of all, he resented the unwillingness of some
of his colleagues to embrace minority preferences as a way of redressing past
injustice.’”403 Regardless, Justice Marshall’s views did not carry the day, and
the majority opinion set a precedent that makes architectural exclusion claims
unlikely to be successful in subsequent cases with similar facts.
For example, in a similar situation, the city of Roanoke, Alabama, deter-
mined that a road had to be rerouted so that an industrial facility could be
built.404 The rerouting increased the travel distance between a black residential
community and other points in the city.405 The plaintiffs, black property own-
ers, alleged substantive civil rights claims under the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and section 1982.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the city was going through a period of ra-
cial unrest due to police brutality and economic difficulties in the black com-
munity, but it upheld the district court’s finding that under the totality of the
circumstances, the plaintiff failed to prove any discriminatory intent, which
would have been required for the equal protection claim. The court further
held that because the case involved a road closing, the plaintiff’s Thirteenth 
Amendment and section 1982 claims were directly controlled by Greene and
thus failed.406 
400. Greene, 451 U.S. at 140 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
401. John O. Calmore, The Law and Culture-Shift: Race and the Warren Court Legacy, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1095, 1119 (2002) (noting that Marshall’s dissent in Greene was representative of
him serving as the Court’s conscience).
402. See also R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (recognizing that antidiscrimination law is limited in its ability to 
address stigma and implicit biases). See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (discussing implicit bi-
as).
403. HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN
AMERICA 205 (1998) (quoting JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 261 
(1994)).
404. Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986).
405. Id. at 1528.
406. Id. at 1536.
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However, the Fifth Circuit determined that plaintiffs raised valid claims
under section 1982 in Evans v. Tubbe.407 In Evans, the plaintiff, who was black, 
owned property that could be accessed only by a road that passed through the 
defendant’s property.408 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant constructed a
gate across his property and gave a key to all of his white neighbors who re-
quired the road for access to their properties, but not to the plaintiff.409 Ac-
cording to the court, section 1982, which protects property interests, would
prohibit the defendant “from allowing whites but not blacks to traverse his
land to obtain access to their property.”410 
Therefore, in instances in which black plaintiffs own property, and their ac-
cess to or from that property is limited in a way that is different from white res-
idents’ access, they may have some success challenging architectural barriers
using section 1982. However, past successes have generally occurred in situa-
tions involving black homeowners challenging small-scale, individual road clo-
sures. Moreover, successful plaintiffs seem to be able to easily prove intent to
treat white residents differently (and better than) black residents; justifications
based on “traffic logic” are less persuasive in cases such as these. In contrast, as 
is evidenced in the cases below, the same approach might not be successful
when plaintiffs are challenging broader, larger infrastructural elements in their
communities. Importantly, and perhaps due in part to the failure to recognize
architecture as a regulatory tool, few of these types of cases have been heard
and decided. Further, it is unclear where and how courts will draw the line be-
tween limitations on access that are “severe” and those that are merely “incon-
veniences.”411 
One example of a challenge to a broader, allegedly discriminatory infra-
structure design falls into the line of cases in which advocates for transit equity
have attempted to challenge systems that more heavily fund or subsidize forms 
of transit used by white people, while underfunding those used by people of
color. The only successful case of this nature, which resulted in a consent de-
cree,412 is Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
407. 657 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981).
408. Id. at 662.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 662 n.2.
411. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; supra note 375 and accompanying text.
412. “A consent decree is a settlement, in the form of a court order, containing injunctive relief in
which the trial court agrees to maintain jurisdiction over the case.” Thomas M. Mengler,
Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 291, 292 (1988).
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architectural exclusion
Transportation Commission (the Bus Riders Union case).413 In that case, the Un-
ion alleged that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) discrimi-
nated against the poor and people of color who lived in Los Angeles County, in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act.414 The Union
alleged that the MTA spent “a disproportionately high share of its resources on
commuter rail services, whose primary users were wealthy non-minorities, and
a disproportionately low share on bus services, whose main patrons were low
income and minority residents.”415 Before the consent decree was entered, the
district court certified a class of “[a]ll poor minority and other riders of MTA
buses who are denied equal opportunity to receive transportation services be-
cause of the MTA’s operation of a discriminatory mass transportation sys-
tem.”416 
When architectural exclusion cases of this sort do not settle, and move for-
ward on constitutional claims, they face the same problems that run-of-the-
mill exclusion-by-law discrimination cases face—the difficulty of proving in-
tent. In an unpublished case, Greer v. City of Chicago, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the federal claims, including due
process and equal protection claims, brought by a plaintiff challenging the City 
of Chicago’s placement of cul-de-sacs and a median.417 The plaintiff alleged
that the location of these architectural features was chosen to separate the Jack-
son Park Highlands neighborhood from the rest of the South Shore.418 The
opinion does not reveal the race or socioeconomic status of the plaintiff, but the
court held that the plaintiff failed to allege that the government intentionally
discriminated against him or treated him differently due to his membership in 
a certain class.419 
413. See Yan, supra note 119, at 1137 (noting that “[t]ransit justice advocates have developed two
lines of substantive equity cases,” the first “focus[ing] on the distribution of subsidies across
transit lines, typically alleging that transit agencies favored rail lines with predominantly
white riderships used to commute between suburbs and central cities over bus lines with
predominantly minority riderships used primarily for short, intra-city trips,” and second
“examin[ing] the siting of transit lines themselves” (citing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law re: Preliminary Injunction, Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp.
Comm’n, No. CV 94-5936 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1994))).
414. Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir.
2009).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See Greer v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C-6338, 1996 WL 169414, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9,
1996).
418. See id. at *1.
419. See id. at *2.
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Although the Greer opinion gives no details about the reasons for the archi-
tectural decisions, newspaper articles hint at the intent behind the City’s chal-
lenged design: one reporter suggested that Mayor Daley had plans to “block off
residential streets with cul-de-sacs and iron gates to reduce drive-by shootings
and other crimes,”420 while another stated that the cul-de-sacs and traffic cir-
cles were installed in the area to reduce traffic volume and speed.421 While the
intent behind the architecture might legitimately relate to traffic calming and
crime prevention,422 another article asserts that these architectural devices were 
installed with the more nefarious intent to exclude on the basis of race and
class: “[T]he barriers [were] designed to keep less well-off blacks on the other
side of the [subway] tracks. And . . . some of the well-to-do-blacks whose
beautiful North Beverly homes reflect their economic status are just as happy to 
let their poorer brethren stay far away.”423 Regardless of the actual intent, the
effect—as felt by members of the community—was that low-income African-
Americans would be “isolate[d]”424 and “put . . . in a cage.”425 
The elected City Council—which handled many land-use issues in the
community—made these architectural decisions in conjunction with the Chica-
go Department of Transportation.426 In allowing those architectural elements 
to remain in place, the Greer court stated that “municipal decisions regarding
land use are given considerable deference, even under an equal protection anal-
420. Cheryl W. Thompson, Cul-de-sac Plan Jeered on South Side, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1993, http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-01-24/news/9303171874_1_chase-criminals-mayor-richard
-daley-lawrence-bloom [http://perma.cc/SPX5-Z453].
421. Cindy Richards, Cul-de-sacs and Circles Divert Cars, Not Criticism, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 
1998, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-15/news/9805150290_1_cul-de-sacs-traffic
-circles-parallel-street [http://perma.cc/66F9-Y827] (noting that “traffic volume has been
reduced in those areas [including parts of the South Side] by 50 percent since [cul-de-sacs] 
were installed”).
422. Sometimes those undertaking exclusionary architectural actions, such as members of a city
council, might not be acting with obvious intent or animus, due in part to the background
of unconscious racism in the United States. Lawrence noted, in relation to Memphis v.
Greene, that “[i]ndividual members of the city council might well have been unaware that
their continuing need to maintain their superiority over blacks, or their failure to empathize
with how construction of the wall would make blacks feel, influenced their decision.” Law-
rence, supra note 14, at 357 (citation omitted); see also id. at 357 n.185 (noting that “Justice
Stevens’ opinion in Memphis is itself an example of how a decision need not involve self-
conscious racial animus to be race-dependent”).
423. Pat Somers Cronin, Op-Ed, The Road (or Cul-de-sac) to Disaster, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1998, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-21/news/9805210086_1_cul-de-sacs-fire-board
-police-board [http://perma.cc/4DX5-W9U3].
424. Thompson, supra note 420.
425. Cronin, supra note 423.
426. Richards, supra note 421.
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ysis,” citing Memphis v. Greene.427 This statement implies that the court may
have viewed Greer as a standard land-use case, not one that was more specifi-
cally about architecture. Regardless, the plaintiff’s failure to prove intentional 
discrimination was fatal to his equal protection claim.428 
In a similar case, Thompson v. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, plaintiffs, who were African-American residents of public housing in Bal-
timore County, alleged that the construction of a fence around the Hollander
Ridge public housing project was a violation of their Equal Protection rights.429 
They claimed that the fence was constructed to “physically . . . separate” the
black residents of Hollander Ridge from the adjacent white neighborhood,
Rosedale.430 Many Rosedale residents were concerned about public safety and
wanted separation from the high levels of crime at Hollander Ridge;431 the
court noted that on the days when the elderly residents of the housing project
would receive social security and welfare checks, the high-rise area of the com-
plex was effectively an “open air drug and sex market.”432 The court acknowl-
edged that the fence did achieve a physical separation and also recognized that
the “troubled” relationship between the residents of Hollander Ridge and
Rosedale was due, at least in part, “to racial animus harbored by some of the
Rosedale residents.”433 
The court addressed the intent and motives of the local elected officials, the
local housing authority, and HUD, all of whom undertook actions that resulted
in construction of the fence. The court found that the local elected officials
were acting in response to the concerns of their constituents. However, the
court did not believe that those officials had discriminatory motives for seeking
the fence, although “they were responding to a group of constituents, some of 
whom did have such motives.”434 The court further found that the housing au-
thority and HUD were both acting for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.435 
427. Greer v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C-6338, 1996 WL 169414, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1996) 
(citing Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)).
428. Id. As this Article has addressed, discriminatory effect alone is not enough in the context of 
an equal protection claim. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
429. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (D. Md. 2005).
430. Id. at 428.
431. Id. at 429; Texeira, supra note 105.
432. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
433. Id. at 428 n.56.
434. Id. at 431.
435. Id. at 431-32 (finding that, for example, they believed the fence would be an amenity to the
senior housing they planned to build on the site in the future, functioning like a fence
around a gated community).
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Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs could not make out a claim of intention-
al discrimination.436 
Synthesizing these cases and considering them alongside the more tradi-
tional methods of exclusion discussed in Part III—racial zoning, racially restric-
tive covenants, and exclusionary zoning—it appears that the judicial treatment
of different methods of exclusion will depend on a number of factors. These
include whether the constraint is being imposed on a legal right of access or a
physical right of access; whether the constraint is being put in place by a gov-
ernmental actor or a private actor; the extent to which the method is a legacy
issue or ongoing; and whether it was undertaken with an overtly racially dis-
criminatory purpose, merely has discriminatory or exclusionary effects, or
whether there were mixed motives. The bottom line is that (a) few of these
cases have even been brought due to a failure to consider architecture as regula-
tion; and (b) those that have been brought face the same types of challenges
that more traditional methods of exclusion, such as exclusionary zoning, face in
the courts.
v. problems and solutions
A. Legacy Problems and the Enduring Nature of Architecture
There is some question as to whether the problems discussed in this Article
are merely legacy problems (that is, present physical manifestations of policies
that are now defunct), problems that are still ongoing, or a bit of both. An-
swering this question is important not only to understand the severity of the
problem more fully, but also for the purposes of considering appropriate solu-
tions. Certainly, many of the examples of architectural exclusion discussed
herein are associated with the urban renewal and highway projects of the 1950s
and 1960s. Those projects are no longer being carried out and are now viewed
by many as mistakes.437 Additionally, while most forms of exclusion by law
have been declared illegal and the laws repealed, the architecture built in re-
436. Id. at 432.
437. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument
for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 547-48 (2006)
(describing the mistake of urban renewal); Robert C. Ellickson, The Law and Economics of
Street Layouts: How a Grid Pattern Benefits a Downtown, 64 ALA. L. REV. 463, 491 (2013) (re-
ferring to urban renewal-related superblocks as a “mistake in policy”); Nicole Stelle Garnett,
The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 953 (2003) (“De-
spite the enthusiasm of ‘slum clearance’ proponents, whose viewpoint the Supreme Court
accepted with vigor in Berman v. Parker, urban renewal generally is considered an abysmal
failure.”).
2014
  
  
 
 
           
         
   
           
            
         
          
          
           
              
         
           
          
           
        
 
     
             
            
           
           
         
       
          
            
     
          
              
      
         
 
          
             
   
     
   
         
               
         
 
          
          
  
        
           
          
 
architectural exclusion
sponse to those laws remains in place. That said, exclusionary zoning is still
quite common, and the exclusionary placement of transit stops and transit in-
frastructure is ongoing.438 
Even if architectural exclusion is predominantly a legacy problem, there is
still value in pointing out historical issues, especially when they are issues that
constrain present behavior and of which the law does not take account. Fur-
ther, even if some more progressive cities and planning departments now con-
sider some of these issues in making decisions about the built environment, the
legacies of the past continue to regulate in the present.439 Architecture is endur-
ing; the layout of cities is hard to change.440 As Eduardo M. Peñalver notes,
“The durability of land-use decisions’ consequences and the finite quantity of
land mean that the decisions that current owners make about how to use their
land will reverberate for generations.”441 Our roads, bridges, and structures are
built in place and made to withstand time and the elements; removal and rede-
velopment are very expensive.442 And while courts and legislators typically
438. See supra Part II.A.
439. Moreover, the government must now comply with the mandates of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) when undertaking large projects involving federal funding, such
as many transportation projects involving highways, bridges, and transit stop placement. 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). Although NEPA is often criticized for lacking “teeth”—it is an infor-
mation-forcing statute, not one that requires specific actions as a result of the information
discovered—it does require consideration of the “human health, economic, and social ef-
fects” that a project will have on low-income and minority communities in some instances.
William J. Clinton, Memorandum for the Heads of All Departments and Agencies, WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 11, 1994), http://www.dot.ca.gov/ser/vol1/sec1/ch1fedlaw/EO12898.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RN2E-FCR4]; Sanchez et al., supra note 119; see also Exec. Order No.
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (providing that “each Federal agency shall . . . identify[]
and address[] . . . disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental ef-
fects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income popu-
lations”).
440. “[U]nlike fashions, which come and go, the enduring nature of architecture is seen by the
Gothic and Renaissance examples still standing (and in use!) today . . . .” See History, CAL.
ARCHITECTS BD., http://www.architect.ca.gov/architects_in_demand/history.shtml [http://
perma.cc/7B3Y-6689]; cf. Lebbeus Woods, Inevitable Architecture, LEBBEUS WOODS (July 9,
2012, 9:38 PM), http://lebbeuswoods.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/inevitable-architecture 
[http://perma.cc/UK7L-RXRR] (“Most architects dislike the idea of buildings’ decay and 
work hard to avoid it by the careful selection of materials, systems, and methods of assembly 
that will withstand the forces of nature continually attacking them, chiefly those of weath-
er.”).
441. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 853 (2009).
442. See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, Why Is It So Expensive To Build a Bridge in America?, WK., Mar. 10, 
2014, http://theweek.com/article/index/257684/why-is-it-so-expensive-to-build-a-bridge-in
-america [http://perma.cc/2TRV-P7R5] (“U.S. infrastructure isn’t just a tad higher than the
next most expensive country—we pay something like twice as much as our closest peer.”);
Angie Schmitt, Why Are American Infrastructure Projects So Expensive?, STREETSBLOG (Aug.
2015
  
    
 
 
          
          
          
           
          
           
        
       
             
          
        
           
 
             
           
        
       
             
      
            
 
   
          
        
                
        
               
 
      
            
           
               
          
        
           
    
     
             
       
     
            
           
               
    
the yale law journal 124:19 34 20 15
eliminate old laws upon deciding that they are no longer valid—such as the
eradication of racial zoning and the removal of old racially restrictive covenants
from chains of title—it is much more difficult to remove exclusionary architec-
ture from the built environment. This is one reason that many courts do not
require people to tear down structures that were constructed in violation of or-
dinances; violators often pay a fine instead. The built environment continues to
regulate; as a legal matter, nothing is currently forcing municipalities to con-
front the continuing harms that result from those past architectural decisions.
This is a problem because “there are no meaningful lines between that which
the state tolerates, that which it encourages, and that which it effectuates.”443 
Further, these decisions are problematic because public infrastructure and pub-
lic spaces are such important and dominant features of the built environ-
ment.444 
There are a number of reasons that even legacy effects of the exclusionary
built environment are problematic and should be ameliorated. First, as many
commentators have noted, a person who is physically excluded from a place of-
ten feels stigmatized and degraded;445 preventing stigma was key to the Court’s
holding in Brown v. Board of Education.446 Indeed, a key element of the civil
rights movement was to further and promote “unencumbered movement” as 
an important right.447 When certain groups of people are intentionally kept out
29, 2012), http://streetsblog.net/2012/08/29/why-are-american-infrastructure-projects-so
-expensive [http://perma.cc/8GFX-6NRX] (“The state of Wisconsin is preparing to spend
$1.7 billion on an interchange. Kentucky and Indiana are getting ready to spend $2.6 billion 
on a bridge. The Portland region will spend at least $3.2 billion on its own bridge/highway.
And New York’s car-centric Tappan Zee Bridge replacement is projected to cost in the range 
of $5 billion. Part of the reason these projects cost so much is that they involved rolling ma-
jor road widenings into what should be simpler infrastructure fixes.”).
443. Sager, supra note 226, at 770 (1969). 
444. The federal government owns and manages approximately 635 to 640 million acres of land 
in the United States. ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWN-
ERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2012). Although much of that land is far from cities and un-
developed, publicly owned “[c]ity streets and sidewalks account for about one-quarter of
developed urban land . . . .” Katyal, supra note 21, at 1095. Thus, the government controls a
large portion of the U.S.-built environment, and the decisions it makes in creating these
spaces can have dramatic impacts on populations.
445. Boddie, supra note 57, at 420.
446. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (recognizing that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority as
to [black students’] status in the community. . . .”); Lawrence, supra note 14, at 350-51 (dis-
cussing the role of stigma in Brown).
447. Boddie, supra note 57, at 420 n.114; see also Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86
WASH. U. L. REV 515, 517 (2009) (“[T]here is no more fundamental liberty than the freedom
to choose one’s own place. The loss of that freedom can result in severe forms of not only
personal, but constitutional, displacement.”).
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architectural exclusion
of, or made to have a hard time accessing, certain parts of a community, it lim-
its their freedom and harms their dignity.448 
Similarly, extensive research has explored the “geography of opportunity,”
which suggests that the place in which a person grows up and lives has a dra-
matic impact on her future earning ability and educational attainment.449 The
mechanisms through which neighborhoods have an impact on future outcomes
for their residents are much debated, but part of the effect likely results from
the lack of political power and access to public resources and institutions that
often come with residence in a low-income neighborhood.450 The geography of
opportunity provides insight into the social costs of segregation in housing and
the built environment, which tends to heavily affect racial minorities; their ex-
clusion “engenders their absence from valuable social networks.”451 
Finally, because the built environment exists as a result of direct decisions
by policymakers who are employed by the state (or municipality), it is effec-
tively the state that has created the exclusion. As Reva Siegel has reminded us,
on an antisubordination conception of equal protection “it is wrong for the
state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically
oppressed groups.”452 By failing to actively alleviate the continuing harms
caused by the exclusionary environment, the state allows those practices to
continue. However, because there is at present no affirmative duty for the state
448. Boddie, supra note 57, at 423 (“Because they belong to one space but not another, their dig-
nity as individuals is spatially contingent.”); see also Schuette v. Coalition To Defend Af-
firmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Race matters be-
cause of . . . the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: ‘I do not
belong here.’”); Zick, supra note 447, at 517 (discussing freedom).
449. See, e.g., XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING 
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2005); George C. Galster & Sean P. Killen, The Geog-
raphy of Metropolitan Opportunity: A Reconnaissance and Conceptual Framework, 6 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 7 (1995); James E. Rosenbaum et al., How Do Places Matter? The Geography of
Opportunity, Self-Efficacy and a Look Inside the Black Box of Residential Mobility, 17 HOUSING 
STUD. 71 (2002); Gregory D. Squires & Charis E. Kubrin, Privileged Places: Race, Uneven De-
velopment and the Geography of Opportunity in Urban America, 42 URB. STUD. 47 (2005).
450. See generally Robert J. Sampson, Moving to Inequality: Neighborhood Effects and Experiments
Meet Social Structure, 114 AM. J. SOC. 189 (2008) (discussing causal claims for the effect of
neighborhoods on employment outcomes); Squires & Kubrin, supra note 449, at 47 (argu-
ing that poor education, housing, and other resources in neighborhoods contribute to future 
poor employment opportunities).
451. Strahilevitz, supra note 59, at 489.
452. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting that the separation of black students “solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone”).
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to act to remove legacy exclusionary architecture, there is likely no current state
action that could be challenged in court.
Although no laws currently force local governments to reconsider or recon-
figure their exclusionary infrastructures, cities and states do have the oppor-
tunity, and perhaps even the incentive, to significantly alter the built environ-
ment and remedy some of the impacts of architectural exclusion. The nation’s
infrastructure is in substantial decline and in need of major revitalization;
many of the roads and bridges in the United States were put in place over fifty
years ago, and these systems are becoming overwhelmed or worn out.453 More-
over, there are substantial economic incentives to revitalize the country’s failing 
infrastructure, and numerous initiatives have been undertaken in recent years
to address these issues.454 For example, more than $91 billion of capital is in-
vested annually to improve the nation’s highways and roads.455 Consequently,
there exists an opportunity for localities to address the impacts of architectural
exclusion as part of the much-needed rebuilding and repairing of outdated in-
frastructure.
Without large-scale rebuilding, architecture and the built environment are
durable and hard to change. Therefore, it will likely be more difficult to eradi-
cate existing exclusionary infrastructure than to prevent the creation of future 
barriers to access, assuming that citizens, city planners, elected officials, judges,
and lawmakers begin to take the ideas expressed here into consideration. The 
solutions proposed below will discuss ways to alleviate the harms of existing
architectural exclusion and ways to prevent it in the future.
B. Proposed Solutions: Courts and Legislators
1. Judicial Solutions Are Unlikely To Be Successful
Courts could take action to address the harms associated with architectural
exclusion. However, as was detailed above, current civil rights law does not
453. 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y CIV. ENGINEERS 3 (Mar. 2013), http://
www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-Report-Card.pdf [http://perma.cc
/X69J-GPU4].
454. Id. at 3 (“Six infrastructure sectors benefited from either an increase in private investment,
targeted efforts in cities and states to make upgrades or repairs, or from a one-time boost in
federal funding.”); id. at 4 (“[I]nvesting in infrastructure is essential to support healthy, vi-
brant communities . . . [and] is also critical for long-term economic growth, increasing
GDP, employment, household income, and exports.”).
455. Id. at 48-50. Moreover, in the United States $12.8 billion is spent annually on bridge con-
struction and refurbishment, over $75 billion has been invested in railroads since 2009, and
over $52 billion has been spent on public transit since 2008. Id. at 6-7, 53.
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architectural exclusion
show much promise for architectural exclusion claims. It is possible that the
courts could change course by adopting a more modernized or progressive 
view of the Equal Protection Clause, or by imposing a higher level of scrutiny
in cases that involve architectural exclusion claims. Courts could also issue in-
junctive relief if evidence of architectural exclusion is severe. This would re-
quire a locality to modify the built environment to remove exclusionary barri-
ers to access.
However, this is all quite unlikely given the current political and judicial
climate. Recall that most courts do not even find fault with exclusionary zon-
ing, which is a form of regulation by law.456 Some commentators have there-
fore suggested that the exclusionary zoning problem is one that should be
solved by legislatures rather than courts. For example, Daniel R. Mandelker 
concluded that “the federal courts should not expansively read the fourteenth
amendment to require a wholesale judicial review of exclusionary zoning prac-
tices absent proof of discriminatory racial intent. Congressional, rather than
judicial, correction of racially segregative zoning is urged as a more attractive
alternative.”457 Perhaps the same could be said for exclusionary architecture:
this is a problem that local (or state) governments should attack, not the
courts. Those legislative or administrative solutions could force consideration
of architectural exclusion in new design, could be applied retroactively to force 
removal of exclusionary architecture in some cases, and could provide a statu-
tory cause of action in the event that decisions are made in violation of their
mandates. However, even a statutory solution would require legislators and
administrative staff to take seriously the idea of architecture as regulation.
2. Legislative Solutions Carry Some Promise
Elected officials at the federal, state, or local level could take actions that
would alleviate some of the harms imposed by the exclusionary built environ-
ment. These solutions could address legacy effects of exclusionary architecture
by forcing reformation of certain existing discriminatory infrastructure,458 re-
quiring consideration of architectural exclusion in the funding or construction 
456. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing exclusionary zoning).
457. Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arling-
ton Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1977). Of course, this approach has not seen much
traction since the time of Mandelker’s writing.
458. Katyal suggests that governments could “redesign city streets to reduce crime . . . [by alter-
ing] the placement of bus stops and other public transit facilities so that they are not near al-
leys and other easy escape routes.” Katyal, supra note 21, at 1095. The same infrastructure
could be altered so that it no longer divides and cuts off neighborhoods, and instead increas-
es access.
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of new infrastructure, and providing a route for potential plaintiffs to sue in
the future if a locality fails to comply with the new requirements set forth in
the law. This legislative solution could be modeled on similar statutory re-
quirements in related areas, including environmental law and disability law.
C. An Architectural Bent on an Environmental Impact Statement
When undertaking large projects, administrators are often required to con-
duct a detailed environmental review pursuant to state or federal law.459 This
analysis could be expanded to include consideration of a proposed project’s
impacts on the exclusion of certain underrepresented groups, including poor
people and people of color.460 Indeed, one could arguably read some existing
state environmental statutes to incorporate those concerns into an analysis of a 
proposed project’s social impacts, including impacts on neighborhood charac-
ter and socioeconomics.461 This approach would allow actors to concern them-
selves with the exclusionary effects of architectural design choices rather than
with the motivations underlying those choices.
A similar approach has been used to address environmental justice con-
cerns: President Clinton issued an executive order462 calling for numerous fed-
eral agencies to ensure that the environmental effects of their policies and pro-
grams would not disproportionately affect minorities and the poor.463 
However, the executive order is non-binding and legally unenforceable.464 Ac-
459. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012); California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21189.3 (West 2012).
460. Similarly, perhaps inclusiveness could be used as a screening criterion for projects that re-
quire grants, including those for housing, transportation, or community development.
461. This was the argument made in Chinese Staff & Workers’ Ass’n v. Burden, 910 N.Y.S.2d 
761 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
462. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
463. For a detailed overview of Executive Order 12,898 and its efficacy, see generally Amanda K.
Franzen, The Time Is Now for Environmental Justice: Congress Must Take Action by Codifying
Executive Order 12898, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 379 (2009). The order directs that each
Federal agency “[t]o the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law . . . shall make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appro-
priate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.”
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629.
464. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632-33 (noting that it is “not intended to, nor does
it create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantial or procedural, enforceable at 
law or equity by a party against the United States”). Moreover, the order states that it
should not be “construed to create any right to judicial review involving compliance or non-
compliance of the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person.” Id. at 7633.
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architectural exclusion
cordingly, agencies are not forced to give any particular weight to environmen-
tal justice concerns and their effects in their analysis for rulemaking.465 The ex-
ecutive order “relies entirely on internal enforcement, does not create a right to
sue the government or allow for judicial remedies when agencies fail to comply
with the executive order . . . [resulting] in a major weakness of the executive
order . . . [which] is possibly the principal reason it has not had a greater im-
pact.”466 An amendment to the text of the environmental review statutes re-
quiring this kind of exclusionary analysis would have a stronger impact, espe-
cially in states like California and New York, where state-level Environmental 
Policy Acts require mitigation of significant environmental effects.467 That said,
an architectural exclusion analysis with a mitigation obligation might make in-
fill development even more difficult than it already is; there is a risk that such a
requirement could be used defensively by opportunistic opponents who want
to avoid change (which might result in further entrenching an exclusive status
quo).468 
D. An Architectural Inclusion Version of the Americans with Disabilities Act
In considering the legal regulation of exclusion, it is useful to make a com-
parison to the disability rights movement, which “pointed out the countless
ways in which machines, instruments, and structures of common use—buses,
buildings, sidewalks, plumbing fixtures, and so forth—made it impossible for
many handicapped persons to move about freely, a condition that systematical-
ly excluded them from public life.”469 Indeed, the disability rights literature
echoes many of the same concerns raised in this Article. For example, speaking
of disabled individuals, Robin Paul Malloy stated, “in order to be a full partici-
pant in one’s community, one must be able to enjoy reasonable access to the 
465. See Joshua Glasgow, Not in Anybody’s Backyard? The Non-Distributive Problem with Environ-
mental Justice, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 113 (2005).
466. Franzen, supra note 463, at 389-90 (highlighting the failures of the order by showing how
the Bush Administration was able to roll back many of the gains made in environmental jus-
tice during the 1990s through cuts to the EPA’s budget regarding environmental justice
oversight, including Superfund).
467. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189.3 
(West 2012); New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2015).
468. See, e.g., Todd Nelson, Save Tara and the Modern State of the California Environmental Quality
Act, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 289, 292-93 (2011) (“CEQA challenges have become an effective
tool to block projects that opponents deem undesirable, even if the reasons for their opposi-
tion are seemingly unrelated to environmental impacts.”).
469. Winner, supra note 28, at 126; see also supra note 30 (summarizing cases suggesting that the
ADA was needed due to the neglect of disabled individuals’ needs).
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spaces and places that make up civic life.”470 This reasoning should extend be-
yond access for individuals with disabilities to all individuals, including poor
people and people of color.471 A statute like the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) aimed at architectural exclusion would seem to make sense: currently
the ADA prohibits the construction of a separate entrance for disabled individ-
uals,472 but the city of New York is allowing developers to construct apartment
buildings with “poor doors”—a separate entrance for low-income tenants in
mixed-income buildings.473 
Despite these similarities, there are important differences between the disa-
bility rights movement and the ideas behind architectural exclusion. First,
there is general consensus that individuals with disabilities were excluded by
infrastructure that resulted more from “long-standing neglect than from any-
one’s active intention.”474 Indeed, the ADA does not require intent to find dis-
crimination.475 This distinction between neglect and intent raises important 
questions. For example, why does it seem that the law is more protective in the
context of neglect, which is less malicious? Or is it not so much the intent ver-
sus neglect distinction, but rather that the law cares more about disabled indi-
viduals than about racial minorities or poor people? Is this a function of who
has a better ability to organize? Or is it because many white, wealthy people
have disabled individuals in their own families? Second, many examples of ar-
chitectural exclusion occur at a citywide, infrastructural scale, while much of
470. Robin Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 699, 710 (2009).
471. Interestingly, many individuals with disabilities self-identify as members of a distinct mi-
nority group consisting of people with disabilities. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws 
and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41, 48 
(1996).
472. The main entrance must be made accessible if possible. See Americans with Disabilities
Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, U.S. ARCHITECTURAL & TRANSP.
BARRIERS COMPLIANCE BD. § 4.13 (2002), http://www.access-board.gov/attachments/article
/1350/adaag.pdf [http://perma.cc/W6RS-DFKQ]. Similarly, the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing due to a handicap, and
Congress intended the Act to be a “clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end
the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream.” H.R.
REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988).
473. Some city officials say that they will revise the zoning code to disallow future poor doors.
See Janet Babin, New York Skyscraper’s Separate ‘Poor Door’ Called A Disgrace, NPR (July 30,
2014, 4:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/30/336322608/new-york-skyscrapers-separate
-poor-door-sparks-outrage [http://perma.cc/V6PJ-YD2B].
474. Winner, supra note 28, at 125.
475. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2012) (asserting that, under the ADA, discrimination includes “a 
failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy . . . that are readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities”).
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architectural exclusion
the ADA’s work has resolved problems within individual buildings. Similarly,
architectural exclusion and the barriers to access it entails are somewhat more 
amorphous than barriers to access for disabled individuals, and therefore per-
haps harder to correct. Finally, while the Court in Tennessee v. Lane found an
enforceable right of access (in that case, access to the courthouse) accorded to a 
protected class (people with disabilities) under the ADA,476 architectural deci-
sions often exclude poor people, who are not a protected class.477 
Despite these differences, adopting a similar remedial approach could be
useful. The ADA requires both retrospective and prospective solutions to ex-
clusionary environments.478 Generally, the ADA places the greatest burden on
those building new construction, followed by those who are making alterations
to existing structures.479 Existing structures that are not undergoing alterations
are not completely grandfathered under the ADA; although a building owner
or tenant is not required to bring a building up to ADA standards simply be-
cause she owns or occupies the building, she must remove accessibility barriers 
where doing so is “readily achievable.”480 A similar approach could be used in
the context of architectural exclusion. However, it is important to note that 
there is widespread non-compliance with the retrofitting provisions of the
ADA.481 As a result, the ultimate success of an architectural exclusion statute
with regard to legacy issues, as opposed to just new developments, is unclear.
conclusion
Viewing the built environment through a regulatory lens, one may begin to
see the world differently. A bridge does not exist merely to transport pedestri-
476. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
477. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973).
478. “Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same
practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable
measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility.” 541 U.S. at 531.
479. “In the case of facilities built or altered after 1992, the regulations require compliance with
specific architectural accessibility standards. But in the case of older facilities, for which
structural change is likely to be more difficult, a public entity may comply with Title II by
. . . relocating services to alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to assist persons 
with disabilities in accessing services.” Id. at 532 (internal citation omitted).
480. See Civil Div., Reaching Out to Customers With Disabilities, Lesson Four, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.ada.gov/reachingout/lesson41.htm [http://perma.cc/U4JC-YQP4] (“Barrier
removal is considered ‘readily achievable’ when it can be easily accomplished, without much
difficulty or expense.”).
481. See Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in “Design and
Construction” Cases Under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. RICH. L. REV 753, 754 (2006).
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ans or motorists across a body of water or over a road, but also to deposit those 
pedestrians and motorists into certain areas and not others. If a law were to re-
quire certain individuals to take one exit but not another, we might question its
intent or its legality, but if a decision-maker creates an architectural feature that
has the same effect, it is often viewed as innocuous. This Article seeks to raise
awareness and foster discussion about the regulatory nature of architecture and
its role in dividing (or, more positively, bringing together) people within and
across communities. Just as educational campaigns have been used to shift
norms,482 this Article aims to expand the way that citizens, courts, legislators,
administrators, and legal scholars consider regulation through architecture.
Once the issue of architectural exclusion is brought to a person’s attention, she
will see it in her own community483 and can begin taking action to fight against
its effects in the future. Zoning ordinances that explicitly divided cities along
racial lines were struck down many years ago, but walls and roads continue to
divide cities along racial lines. Are these any less pernicious?
482. See, e.g., Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 139, 173 (2010) (“[T]he anti-smoking campaign provides a powerful example of
how such a campaign can change perceptions of harm and, in so doing, shift the social 
norms about getting involved.”); Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1295, 1339 (2009) (“Norm-shifting could be accomplished through educational efforts 
using schools, public service announcements, etc. Current examples of fairly successful envi-
ronmental norm-shifting efforts in the United States include the Smokey Bear campaign by
the U.S. Forest Service to encourage the safe use of fire in natural areas, and anti-littering
campaigns.”).
483. Every time the author presented this Article, numerous commenters provided her with ex-
amples of architectural exclusion in their own towns.
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